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Abstract 
It is known that not all earth faults on power system networks are permanent faults, but yet 
the standard approach is to momentarily open either a single-phase circuit breaker (HV 
systems) or a three-phase circuit breaker (HV and MV systems) to clear the fault.  The 
obvious consequence of this is a loss of power to the load being fed. 
The aim of this thesis is to endeavour to develop, through a literature study, a method or 
methods whereby transient  earth faults on neutral earthed MV networks may be cleared 
without customer supply interruptions, without compromising public safety and without 
compromising network integrity.  In order to propose such a method, or methods, it is 
important to understand the various earthing practices employed in MV networks in terms of 
network behaviour under earth fault conditions, as this may influence network component 
insulation rating requirements, as well as the way in which such a system may function.  
Following the literature study the thesis aims to propose, design, build, test and implement a 
transient earth fault clearing scheme on an actual MV network, and to report on the operating 
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1. Introduction 
It is known that not all earth faults on power system networks are permanent faults, but yet 
the standard approach is to momentarily open either a single-phase circuit breaker (HV 
systems) or a three-phase circuit breaker (HV and MV systems) to clear the fault.  The 
obvious consequence of this is a loss of power to the load being fed, with all the 
consequential problems to the customer when losing power to a production line for instance. 
The aim of this thesis is to endeavour to develop, through a literary study, a method, or 
methods whereby transient  earth faults on solidly earthed or resistance earthed radial 
overhead medium voltage (MV) networks may be cleared without customer supply 
interruptions, and without compromising public safety and network integrity.   
In the search of a transient earth fault clearing method fulfilling the above requirements, a 
literature study has been done of the unearthed (isolated), solidly earthed, resistance 
earthed and impedance earthed (Petersen coil) neutral earthing practices in order to 
determine their advantages and disadvantages.  Each of these earthing methods will be 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Special attention has been devoted to the unearthed network 
practice as the proposed transient earth fault clearing method will, for a short duration, 
change the solidly earthed or resistance earthed network into an unearthed network. 
The effects of an earth fault on a system will differ depending on the type of earthing method 
employed on a network.  Different countries adopted different MV network earthing practices 
and may change from one method to another as the network composition changes over 
time.  The type of earthing method applied to a network may be influenced by safety 
aspects, supply security requirements, maximum tolerable overvoltages on the healthy 
phases during an earth fault and maximum tolerable earth fault current. 
A novel transient earth fault clearing method for solid and resistance earthed networks, 
fulfilling the above requirements, and operating on the principle of limiting the earth fault 
current to a very low level has been proposed.  By limiting the earth fault current to a very 
low level a transient earth fault is prevented from developing into a permanent earth fault or 
a more severe phase-to-phase fault by limiting arcing at the fault point. 
The literature studied did not reveal any reference or attempt to specifically clear transient 
earth faults, as opposed to clearing of permanent earth faults.  All faults are dealt with in the 
same manner, i.e. open a circuit breaker in order to disconnect power, temporarily or 
permanent, to the fault.  This identifies an apparently untested approach to dealing with 
transient earth faults specifically.  An attempt was made to find a non-interruptive method of 
transient earth fault clearing for solidly and resistance earthed MV networks.   
A transient earth fault is defined as a fault which is temporary in nature, such as faults 
caused by lightning, switching transients, conductor clashing, a tree branch momentarily 
touching a conductor during strong winds, or an animal that momentarily causes a short 
circuit between a live conductor or apparatus to earth, and then falls away, thus clearing the 
fault.  In order to prevent such a fault from developing into a permanent fault, the fault arc is 
to be extinguished by reducing the fault current flow to zero or to a very low level.  This is 
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circuit breaker on a solid or resistance earthed network.   This action obviously results in 
total supply loss downstream of the tripped circuit breaker.  
Transient earth faults are generally self-clearing on unearthed (isolated) and resonantly 
earthed networks due to the very low fault currents, that is, without protection intervention to 
auto reclose the feeder circuit breaker or auto recloser.  Low earth fault currents aid self-
extinguishing of arcing earth faults.  
Strong focus will be placed on clearing of transient earth faults in existing solid and 
resistance earthed networks by temporary conversion to an unearthed network.  Conversion 
to a resonant earthed network is deemed more expensive than temporary conversion to an 
unearthed network. 
It has been documented that approximately 50% to 80% of all faults on medium voltage 
(MV) networks are earth faults, i.e. involving only one phase and earth [Dán et al, 2003 or 
later, 1; Erroa et al, 2006, 3; Hänninen, 2001, 13; Heine et al, 2004, 100; Nelson, 2002, 1, 
and Smeets & Knol, 2009, 3].  These faults include both transient and permanent earth 
faults.  Of these earth faults 70% to 80% are transient in nature [Coopers, 1990, 7; Smeets & 
Knol, 2009, 3], and may be extinguished by interrupting the fault current flow for a short 
period (dead time), say 10 seconds, allowing the object causing the fault (conductor 
clashing, animal, tree branch blown into the line, etc.) to fall or move away, and ionised air to 
clear from the fault path. 
Permanent earth faults are those faults that will not be cleared by temporarily preventing 
fault current from flowing.  It has been documented by Coopers [1990, 7] that 30% of all 
permanent faults start off as transient faults.  
Assuming then (very conservatively) that 50% of all network faults are earth faults, that 70% 
of these are transient in nature (thus 30% are deemed to be permanent earth faults), and 
that 30% of the “deemed to be” permanent earth faults may be cleared by interrupting the 
fault current very quickly, before it is given a chance to develop into a permanent fault, then 
about 40 faults out of a 100 network faults may be cleared.  This constitutes successful 
clearing of 80% [(40/(0.5 x 100)) x 100%] of all earth faults. 
This then implies that if a method can be found whereby transient earth faults can be cleared 
safely without customer supply interruptions, about 40 out of every 100 network faults, or put 
differently, about 80% of all earth faults may be cleared without affecting power supply to 
customers, and this represents a significant improvement in the quality of supply, and 
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2. An Overview of Different MV Network Earthing Methods 
In order to better understand network earthing methods, and in particular unearthed 
networks, as the thesis is mainly concerned with temporary conversion of a solid or 
resistance earthed network into an unearthed network, all common earthing methods will be 
studied, but the bulk of attention will be devoted to unearthed networks.  
A comparison is provided in Table 1, at the end of this chapter, of a number of selected 
characteristics of the different earthing methods to be discussed in this chapter 
2.1. Unearthed MV Networks 
In an unearthed network the system neutral is isolated from earth.  The advantage of such a 
system is that for an earth fault there is no resulting fault current, except for a small 
capacitive current due to an imbalance in line capacitance to earth, caused by the earth fault 
short circuiting the faulted phase-to-earth capacitance.  The whole system, therefore, 
remains operational until a second earth fault occurs on another phase, resulting in a phase-
to-phase fault and significant fault current [Alstom, 2002, 139; Erroa et al, 2006, 1; Lehtonen 
& Hakola, 1996, 15]. 
In an unearthed network the source (substation) neutral-to-earth needs to be fully insulated 
to withstand full normal phase-to-phase voltage to earth.  This is due to the neutral-to-earth 
voltage rising to full normal phase-to-neutral voltage during an earth fault condition on one 
phase. 
Unearthed networks are popular in the Nordic countries, but are not very common in other 
countries due to alleged high, destructive transient overvoltages that may pose a hazard to 
network equipment [Hänninen, 2001, 13].   
 
Figure 1:  Capacitive currents in an unearthed MV network. 
Under normal network conditions the three phase-to-earth capacitive currents of the three 
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capacitive current flow to earth is therefore zero, as shown in Figure 1.  The voltage and 
capacitive current vector diagram is depicted in Figure 2.  The neutral-to-earth voltage will be 
zero if it is assumed that the network loading is balanced and that the phase-to-earth 
capacitances of all three phases are equal [Uppal, 1984, 909].  Since the neutral of the 
phase-to-earth capacitances is at earth potential, the supply transformer’s neutral is also at 
earth potential as the balanced phase-to-earth capacitances are keeping it there.  In either a 
3-wire or 4-wire unearthed network the network loading will only affect the neutral voltage-to-
earth magnitude if the loading on two phases is such that it actually pulls down these two 
phase voltages.  The three conductor voltages to earth are now of different magnitudes, 
which will cause a shift in the network’s neutral point voltage (and the transformer neutral 
voltage-to-earth) with respect to earth potential. 
 
Figure 2:  Vector diagram of system voltages and capacitive currents in an unearthed 
(isolated neutral) network under normal network conditions. 
The only currents flowing as a result of an earth fault are the two capacitive currents, of the 
phase-to-earth capacitances, of the two healthy phases (ignoring load current).  In Figure 3 it 
is indicated that the phase-to-earth capacitance of the faulted phase is being short circuited 
by the earth fault and will therefore produce no capacitive current.  This is an approximation 
as phase-to-earth capacitances are actually distributed along the whole length of the line, 
but is represented for convenience as lumped quantities [ABB, 1994, 93; Allen & Waldorf, 
1945, 299; Alstom, 2002,140; Eaton Power, 2009, 2; Glover, 1978 or later, D-2; Uppal, 1984, 
908; Westinghouse, 1944, 458].  The residual current measured at the substation on the 
faulted feeder will only include the capacitive currents from the two healthy phases on the 
other two feeders, as depicted in Figure 5, which represents an unearthed MV network with 
three feeders. 
In practice, for an earth fault just outside the substation the capacitive fault current 
contribution from the faulted phase will be zero, as the driving voltage across the line 
capacitance-to-earth is zero.  For an earth fault at the end of a long line, however, there will 
be a capacitive current contribution from the faulted feeder as the phase-to-earth voltage 
(driving voltage) is not zero as from the substation up to the fault, but will diminish 
approximately linearly from a maximum at the MV busbar to zero at the fault point.  The 
magnitude of faulted phase capacitive current will, however, always be smaller than that of 
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The two capacitive current magnitudes (Ibe and Ice) during an earth fault will be √3 times the 
capacitive current per phase (Ia, Ib & Ic) flowing to earth under normal conditions.  This is due 
to the healthy phases’ normal phase-to-earth voltages rising to full phase-to-phase voltage 
across these healthy phases’ phase-to-earth capacitances, if the fault point resistance is 
assumed as being zero, as vectorially shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3:  Capacitive currents in an unearthed MV network during an earth fault. 
Based on the forgoing paragraph, for an a-phase earth fault, the phase-to-earth capacitive 
currents flowing from earth into the b- and c-phases are obtained by: 
Current through the b phase-to-earth line capacitance,  Ibe = √3*Ib  
Current through the c phase-to-earth line capacitance,  Ice = √3*Ic 
where Ib and Ic are the b-phase and c-phase capacitive currents to earth, respectively, under 
normal network conditions.   
The fault current magnitude, If, is given by the vector sum of Ibe and Ice, shown vectorially in 
Figure 4: 
If = ICapacitive total = Ibe + Ice 
If = √3*Ib*cos30° + √3*Ic*cos30° 
Let Ixc= Ibe = Ice, thus  If = Ixc*cos30° + I xc*cos30° 
If = 2*Ixc*cos30° 
If = 2*Ixc*(√3/2) 
If = √3*Ixc, or     (1) 
If = 3*Ib , or  [Ixc= Ibe = √3*Ib]  (2) 
If = 3*Ic    [Ixc= Ice = √3*Ic] 
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From the above derivation it may be seen that the fault current is equal to 3 times the phase-
to-earth capacitive current under normal system conditions. 
During an earth fault the network neutral voltage will increase from zero to normal phase-to-
earth voltage as the faulted phase is directly connected to earth. 
According to Uppal [1984, 911] it has been determined that an earth fault current in excess 
of about 5 A is sufficient to maintain an arc in the ionized path of the fault (No mention has 
been made of the spark gap size.)  This phenomenon is also known as arcing ground.  This 
statement by Uppal [1984, 911] is not substantiated by laboratory or network tests, and 
therefore it seems to be a general statement.  Based on the results of studies conducted on 
unearthed 20kV networks in Finland, Hänninen [2001, 28] found 35 A to be the maximum 
capacitive fault current that will allow arc extinction at the fault point.   
It was also found that if arcing takes place across an arcing horn on a 20 kV unearthed 
network, the maximum capacitive fault current that will allow arc extinction is reduced to 5 A 
(No mention has been made of the spark gap size.).  The reduced current level allowing for 
arc self-extinction is ascribed to the fact that the arc is not free to move across the arcing 
horn as in the case of an insulator flashover [Hänninen, 2001, 28]. 
 
Figure 4:  Capacitive current and system voltage vectors of an unearthed MV network during 
an earth fault condition. 
Hänninen [2001, 28] did not offer an explanation as to why a free moving arc is more likely to 
self-extinguish as compared to an arcing horn arc.  This effect is most likely as a result of the 
ionized air generated by the arc between the horns of an arcing horn, which provides a low 
resistance path to the arc and tends to prevent it from extinguishing.  If the fault arc is able to 
move around, the ionized air will be spread over a wider area resulting in a higher resistance 
path to the arc, making it more likely to self-extinguish. 
Under these arcing conditions the phase-to-earth capacitances of the two healthy phases 
are charged and discharged, resulting in (claimed) overvoltages.   
From the literature study it seems as if there is no consensus on the actual magnitude of 
overvoltages attainable in unearthed networks.  Phase-to-earth overvoltage magnitudes of 5 
to 6 times the normal peak system phase-to-neutral voltage are claimed by some [Evans et 
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Westinghouse [1944, 457] states that overvoltages, caused by faults and switching 
operations, are higher on unearthed networks than on earthed systems, but not to the 
magnitudes formerly suspected.  No further explanation of this statement has been given.  
Furthermore Westinghouse [1944, 457] states that the operating records of unearthed 
networks do not show pronouncedly greater equipment failure rates than on earthed 
systems.  This then may imply that (claimed) overvoltages generated by arcing earth faults 
are either not present, or are not high enough to cause equipment failure. 
Allen & Waldorf [1946, 303] found, through arcing earth fault investigations on a 13 kV power 
station busbar with all connected equipment, that the highest overvoltages attained were not 
more than 2,8 times normal phase-to-neutral voltage.  It was commented by Allen & Waldorf 
[1946, 301] that the voltages produced by arcing across the spark gap were not nearly as 
high as published theory indicates. Allen & Waldorf [1946, 302] stated that the total phase-
to-earth capacitance of the power station busbar was 2,6 µF and that the spark gap size was 
set to 15 mm.  The phase-to-earth capacitance of 2,6 µF would have resulted in a 6 A 
capacitive current per phase under normal network conditions, and by using equation 2 the 
capacitive earth fault current is calculated to be 18 A. 
Overvoltages are reduced by circuit resistance, which will introduce damping of the 
transients, but the transients can be very high and represent the major disadvantage of an 
unearthed network [ABB, 1994, 94].   
The above discussion assumed that the phase-to-earth capacitances of the three phases of 
the network are equal.  This may not be true for untransposed lines on vertical or flat 
conductor configurations [Westinghouse, 1944, 459].  In practice MV lines (unearthed or 
otherwise) are seldom intentionally transposed.  In extreme cases the imbalance with either 
flat or horizontal configuration may give as much as 5% zero-sequence voltage 
Westinghouse [1944, 459] (neutral-to-earth voltage displacement).  For these line 
configurations then, in practice, the system neutral voltage on an unearthed network may be 
displaced from earth by as much a  6% of the normal line-to-neutral voltage under unfaulted 
conditions [Westinghouse, 1944, 459].   
It should then be safe to deduce, from the above statement, that system neutral voltage shift 
will not be a problem with delta configured line constructions as vertical and flat conductor 
configurations have been singled out as to cause system neutral voltage shifts (zero-
sequence voltage).  It should also be noted that Westinghouse [1944, 459] was the only 
literature source encountered that mentioned the effect of untransposed lines, but it was not 
explicitly stated that the effect applies equally to MV and HV lines.   
Neutral voltage shift (zero-sequence voltage) may become a quality of supply problem in 4-
wire networks, but is irrelevant in 3-wire networks as the shift in neutral voltage will not be 
transferred to the customer supply through the MV/LV step-down distribution transformers. 
During the early 1900s protection of unearthed networks was more difficult than for networks 
where the system neutrals were connected directly to earth, or via a resistance or 
impedance to earth, as the very low levels of fault currents during earth faults require good 
protection sensitivity and discrimination capability.  With modern numeric protection this is no 
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In order to detect the presence of an earth fault, the offset of the transformer neutral from 
earth potential may be measured.  Such a zero sequence overvoltage, however, only alarms 
the fact that an earth fault exists on the MV network, and do not identify the faulted feeder or 
the faulted phase.  Other means of identifying earth faults therefore need to be employed. 
A varmetric relay may be used per feeder for detecting earth faults on unearthed networks.  
The varmetric relay responds to the quadrature (imaginary) component of the zero sequence 
current, compared to the neutral displacement voltage (zero sequence voltage, 3Vo).  See 
Figure 6 and section 2.5.3.  The zero sequence current has a high capacitive content and 
may be used to determine the fault direction [IEEE, 2006, 82].  The neutral displacement 
voltage measurement requires the use of three single phase VTs or a 5-limb VT in order to 
provide a low reluctance path to the residual magnetic flux in the VT [Alstom, 2002, 139]. 
Another method of identifying the faulted feeder amongst other feeders feeding from the 
same busbar employs a directional earth fault relay per feeder as the residual currents of the 
healthy and faulted feeders are in anti-phase [Alstom, 2002, 140].  This is illustrated in 
Figure 5 where I1 and I2 (residual currents) are flowing from the source to earth through the 
healthy feeders’ b- and c-phases, and towards the source through the faulted a-phase 
conductor.   
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The directional earth fault protection method makes use of the residual current obtained from 
a core balanced CT (IResidual 3 in Figure 5) and the neutral displacement voltage (-3V0) from 
a 5-limb VT or three single phase VTs with the secondary windings connected in open delta.  
The residual voltage is used as the polarising quantity in the directional protection relay.   
As previously shown by the fault current derivation, the residual current of the faulted feeder 
is three times the normal steady state capacitive charging current per phase (equation 2) for 
the complete network as indicated in Figure 4 for a single feeder scenario. 
Figure 6 vectorially depicts the a-phase fault scenario for the three feeders in an unearthed 
network depicted in Figure 5.  The vector sums of the healthy feeders’ capacitive currents, I1 
and I2, residual voltage, -3V0, and residual current, IResidual 3, of the faulted feeder with an a-
phase–to-earth fault.  For illustrative purposed it is simplistically assumed that the three 
feeders illustrated in Figure 5 have exactly the same phase-to-earth capacitances, and 
therefore the capacitive current vectors (I1, I2 and I3) will be exactly the same. 
From Figure 5 it may be seen that the vector sum, I3, of the faulted feeder’s two healthy 
phases’ capacitive currents to earth will be vectorially subtracted from the capacitive fault 
current, If, by the ring type CT, and provide the resultant, IResidual 3, to the protection relay. 
Also from Figure 5 it may be seen that the residual current (vector) presented to the 
protection relay is given by, 
IResidual 3 = (Ibe1 + Ice1) + (Ibe2 + Ice2)  
 = I1 + I2 
The current vectors Ibe and Ice in Figure 6 represent the capacitive current vectors under an 
earth fault condition (Ibe1, Ice1, Ibe2, Ice2, Ibe3 and Ice3) for each of the three feeders 
individually.   
As an earth fault on an unearthed network does not affect the quality of supply or endanger 
the network itself (assuming that the network insulation co-ordination was properly done), 
some utilities have their own rules governing continued operation of such networks under a 
permanent earth fault condition until such time as the fault may be located and repaired.  
Network operating regulations in Croatia, for instance, dictate that an unearthed network may 
continue operating with a permanent earth fault if the capacitive earth fault current does not 
exceed 10 A for a 35 kV network, and 15 A for a 20 kV network. The German regulation, 
VDE 0228 (1987), on the other hand prescribes a maximum capacitive earth fault current of 
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Figure 6:   a) The vector summation of the capacitive currents Ibe and Ice of each of the three 
feeders which are simplistically assumed to have exactly the same phase-to-earth capacitive 
fault currents per phase, and b) the residual voltage (-3V0), and residual current (IResidual 
3) of the faulted feeder in an unearthed network during an a-phase–to-earth fault. 
2.1.1. Sub-harmonic Oscillation of the Neutral Voltage 
When a transient (temporary) earth fault occurs, the charge stored in the earth capacitance 
of the faulted phase is removed [Lehtonen et al, 2001, 1183] as it is short circuited by the 
cause of the fault.  Due to the faulted phase being connected to earth, the voltages on the 
two healthy phases rise to full phase-to-phase voltage with respect to earth.  The phase-to-
earth capacitances of the two healthy phases are now charged by these higher voltages.  
When the temporary connection to earth is broken again, the charges on the two healthy 
phase capacitances dies away slowly, causing sub-harmonic oscillation of the neutral 
voltage to earth.  This sub-harmonic oscillation of the neutral voltage is generated by a 
circuit formed by the earth capacitances and voltage transformer inductance [Lehtonen et al, 
2001, 1183]. 
2.1.2. Measurement of the Capacitve Reactance of an Unearthed Network 
The capacitive reactance if an unearthed network may be measured by solidly earthing one 
phase of the network to earth through an ammeter, i.e. effectively putting an earth fault on 
the phase, say, the a-phase.  When this is being done the a-phase capacitance-to-earth will 
be short circuited by the ammeter and the two healthy phases will pass their capacitive 











   Page 14 
For the network depicted in Figure 5 the fault current that will be measured by the ammeter 
will be: 
If = ICapacitive total = 3I0 = I1 + I2 + I3 
  = (Ib1 + Ib2 + Ib3)*cos30° + (I c1 + Ic2 + Ic3)*cos30° 
  = Ibe*cos30° + I ce*cos30° 
  = (Ibe + Ice)*cos30° [A] 
The vector sum of the capacitive currents Ibe and Ice, are the b- and c-phases’ capacitive 
currents flowing to earth and passing through the a-phase (faulted phase), back to the 
source, for the total network, and are for practical purposes numerically equal.  This is 
pictorially presented in Figure 7. 
Let      Ixc = Ibe= Ice 
Thus,        If = 2*Ixc*cos30° 
Then from (1)         If = ICapacitive total = √3*Ixc  [2*cos30° = √3] 
Thus,      Ixc = ICapacitive total / √3 [A] 
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The capacitive reactance, Xc, between one phase and earth for the whole network is 
determined from the phase-to-phase voltage, VLL, and ICapacitive total measured by the 
ammeter: 
Xc = VLL / Ixc      (3) 
 = VLL / (ICapacitive total / √3) 
 = √3*VLL / ICapacitive total [Ω] 
The capacitance, C, of one phase of the total network may then be found from:  
C = 1 / (2*π*f*Xc) 
    = ICapacitive total / (2*√3* π*f* VLL) [F]   (4) 
Where f is the power system frequency in hertz, and VLL is the rated phase-to-phase system 
voltage in volt. 
2.1.3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Unearthed Networks 
Advantages 
• The main advantages of an unearthed network are that it allows transient earth faults to 
self-extinguish and also allows the existence of an earth fault on one phase without the 
need to disconnect the affected phase from the source, until such time that someone 
may attend to the fault.  For the duration of an earth fault no customer’s electrical supply 
will be affected.  The benefit of unearthed networks is to provide a better security of 
supply as compared to an earthed network. 
• The earth fault current is of a capacitve nature and is very low, typically less than 20A in 
a 13.8kV network [Bridger, 1983, 16].  This results in minimal fault point and equipment 
damage during a fault, and requires a less extensive substation earth mat, as there are 
no high earth fault currents to be catered for. 
• From a cost point of view the unearthed network may be cheaper to construct as no 
earthing devices (earth electrodes, solid earth connections and earthing resistors or 
earthing transformers on transformer star connected secondary winding neutrals, or 
neutral earth compensators on transformer delta connected windings) are required.  
Maintenance on these devices is therefore also not required. 
Disadvantages 
• Earth faults on unearthed networks tend to give rise to so called arcing faults, which 
may lead to substantial overvoltages on the affected network.  According to Glover 
[1978 or later, D-2] overvoltages of up to six times normal phase-to-neutral voltage have 
been produced in laboratory tests.  Field experience, however, indicates that a 
maximum of 3 times the normal phase-to-earth voltage may be a more realistic value 
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North and Eaton [1933, 70] measured overvoltages of up to 3.5 times normal phase-to-
neutral voltage with respect to earth during earth faults. 
• Although arcing faults occur in all network types they are particularly dominant in 
unearthed networks where arcing faults made up at least half of all the disturbances 
during an investigation by Lehtonen et al [2001, 1181].  The reason as to why arcing 
earth faults are more common in unearthed networks may lay in the fact that the earth 
fault current is capacitive in nature.  The fault current, therefore, leads the voltage by 90° 
and as an arc will tend to self-extinguish at current zero, this will happen when the 
voltage is at its peak, and this may lead to re-striking. 
• Traditionally earth fault detection was more difficult than in earthed networks, but easily 
achieved by modern numeric protection relays. 
• If an unearthed network’s capacitive current is too high transient faults may not self-
extinguish. 
2.2. Solidly (or Effectively) Earthed MV Networks 
In a solidly earthed network the transformer neutrals are directly connected to earth without 
any intentional resistance in series between transformer n utrals and the earth electrodes.  
Even though a network may be solidly earthed, the actual earth fault current magnitude will 
depend on the positive, negative, and zero sequence impedance values of the specific 
network, as well as the fault point resistance to earth magnitude.  
In solidly earthed networks the earth fault currents vary largely depending on the fault 
location and on fault resistance [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 22]. 
According to Westinghouse [1944, 460] the earth fault current in a solidly earthed network 
may range from 0 to 2 times the three phase short circuit current in a given network.   
A solidly earthed network is generally defined as a network where X0/X1 ≤ 3, where X0 
represents the zero sequence network impedance and X1 represents the positive sequence 
network impedance [Westinghouse, 1944, 460].   
In addition to the Westinghouse requirement, Lehtonen & Hakola [1996, 22] states that for a 
network to be classified as solidly earthed it also has to conform to R0/X1 ≤ 1, where X1 
represents the positive sequence network impedance, and R0 the zero sequence resistance. 
The advantage of a solidly earthed network is that the earth fault currents will generally have 
a high magnitude and will therefore ensure detection by simple protection equipment.  A 
major disadvantage of such a network is the possibility of very high earth fault currents which 
may result in major equipment and fault point damage.  For this reason the use of solidly 
earthing philosophy is generally not implemented on MV networks.  
In a solidly earthed network the general practice is to disconnect all three phases (unlike in 
unearthed and Petersen coil earthed networks where an earth fault may be tolerated for 
some time until the fault may be located to effect repairs) up-stream of an earth fault in an 
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phase fault.  Some networks, mainly HV networks, may employ single phase auto reclosing 
for transient earth fault clearing.  After the circuit breaker has tripped it will stay open for a 
short duration (dead time) after which the circuit breaker is closed and the protection resets 
after a set delay if no fault current is detected.  If fault current is still present after the auto-
reclose, the breaker will go through a set number of auto-reclose attempts before staying 
open (locking out). 
Network capacitive currents will have no effect on a network clearing faults by means of a 3-
phase circuit breaker as the complete network is isolated from the source.  If, however, a 
single phase circuit breaker is used to clear an earth fault, capacitive currents from the two 
healthy phases will flow up the transformer neutral connection from earth.  This current 
(vector sum of the two capacitive currents) will be much less than the earth fault current pick-
up protection setting and will pose no risk in terms of tripping the other two phases as well.   
When single-pole reclosing is employed, the user should be aware that the resultant 
capacitive current magnitude on extensive networks may approach that of the sensitive earth 
fault protection setting. 
On a solidly earthed network it is therefore not possible to clear network faults without 
customer supply interruptions. 
2.2.1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Solidly Earthed Networks 
Advantages 
• Solid earthing is the least expensive method of network earthing, apart from applying no 
network earthing. 
• The fact that the system neutral is solidly earthed (grounded) inhibits the generation of 
extreme overvoltages as a result of arcing (re-striking) earth faults and power frequency 
overvoltages due to network switching operations.  The potential rise of the sound 
phases will depend on the fault current magnitude, which is dependent on network 
impedance, the earth electrode resistance and fault point resistance. 
• As a result of the lower overvoltages lower insulation levels may be used, which 
translates into lower network establishment cost. 
Disadvantages 
• Solid earthing of networks results in very high earth fault currents, and may even be 
higher than phase-to-phase fault currents due to the low resistance earth path as 
compared with the resistance of a phase conductor.  These high earth fault currents 
may lead to severe fault point and equipment damage, such as conductors burning off 
due to hot connections and conductor or insulator damage due to arc damage at the 
fault point. 
• The fault current energy is proportional to If²t, where If is the fault current and t is the 
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• Due to the high earth fault current, fast acting protection would be required. 
• Every earth fault, transient or bolted, will result in disconnection of the affected feeder 
from the source. 
• The larger fault currents may lead to high step and touch potentials within the substation 
during earth fault conditions, and therefore special care needs to be taken when 
designing earth electrodes/earth mats in areas of high soil resistivity. 
2.3. Resistance Earthed MV Networks 
In such a system the neutral is connected to earth through a resistance.  The higher this 
resistance the closer the voltage and current characteristics will become to that of an 
unearthed network. 
This earthing method may be employed on the MV neutral of a step-down transformer (say, 
66kV to 11kV) with a star connected MV winding as shown in Figure 8.  Alternatively the 
method may also be applied by installing a neutral earth compensator with a neutral resistor 
(NECR) on a step-down transformer with a delta connected MV winding as shown in Figure 
9.  In both cases the resistances are inserted in the neutral connections to earth in order to 
limit earth fault currents to acceptable levels, thereby limiting equipment damage in the fault 
current path and voltage dips on healthy adjacent networks feeding from the same busbar.   
 
Figure 8:   A typical resistance earthed star connected MV network employing a neutral 
resistor (R). 
The earth fault current is primarily limited by the neutral resistor as its ohmic value is 
normally considerably more than the network reactance at the resistor location.  Other than 
in exceptional cases, such as long lines at high voltages, or extensive cable networks, the 
capacitive current is small compared to the resistive current, and can be neglected 
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The voltage and load current vectors for a resistively earthed network with a lagging power 
factor load under normal conditions are shown in Figure 10 a), and the vectors in Figure 10 
b) are representative of a typical a-phase earth fault condition with the load currents ignored. 
 
Figure 9:   A typical resistance earthed delta connected MV network employing a neutral 
earth compensator (NEC) with a neutral resistor (R). 
 
Figure 10:   Voltage and load current vectors for a resistively earthed network a) under 
normal network conditions and b) with an earth fault on a-phase. 
It will be noted that the neutral point shifted from the normal, and this offset is known as the 
neutral displacement voltage, residual voltage or 3V0.  The fault current, If, may be broken 
down into two components, an inductive component lagging the a-phase voltage by 90° and 
a resistive component in phase with the a-phase voltage.  The fault current magnitude is 
determined mainly by the neutral resistance value, but is also dependent on the zero 
sequence source impedance, line impedance and the fault point resistance. 
The neutral resistor value is normally chosen to allow an earth fault current equal to the full 
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connection [Uppal, 1984, 914].  Choosing a neutral resistor value in this way will ensure that 
overvoltages are limited to values safe enough to be handled by all equipment and 
switchgear on the network. 
When the neutral resistor value is increased to such an extent that the lagging current 
component, Iinductive, becomes less than the resultant capacitive line charging currents of the 
two healthy phases, the network will behave similar to an unearthed network. 
With the resistance earthed neutral network the phase-to-earth voltages of the healthy 
phases will be slightly more than the phase-to-earth voltages, during an earth fault, for a 
similar fault condition on a solidly earthed network [Uppal, 1984, 914]. 
2.3.1. Low Resistance Earthing 
Low resistance earthing of a system results in earth fault currents in a typical range of 25 to 
2000 A, or higher [Glover, 1978 or later, D4].  A typical earthing resistor current limiting 
range of 50 to 800 A is specified by Lehtonen & Hakola [1996, 22].   
In order for the resistor to provide adequate limitation of transient overvoltages, the 
magnitude of the earth fault current must be at least equal to the capacitive reactive current 
of one phase conductor to earth [Glover, 1978 or later, D4].  Any earth fault current higher 
than the capacitive reactive current will limit overvoltages satisfactorily. 
The protection scheme is optimized by selecting a fault current low enough to minimize fault 
damage, but still allow earth fault protection to operate fast [Glover, 1978 or later, D4].  Fast 
clearance of faults limit fault damage, provide improved safety to personnel, prevent earth 
faults from developing into phase-to-phase faults and it limits overheating and mechanical 
stress, associated with high fault currents [Glover, 1978 or later, D4]. 
2.3.1.1. Direct Connection to Neutral 
The standard connection for low resistance earthing is by direct connection of a transformer 
neutral through a resistor to earth.  The network’s neutral point will be displaced by the 
magnitude of the voltage drop across the neutral resistor during earth fault conditions, but 
maximum displacement will be by the full normal phase-to-neutral voltage. 
2.3.1.2. Earthing Transformers and Resistors 
In a delta connected system an artificial neutral point will have to be created by means of an 
earthing transformer.  The earthing transformer is also known as a neutral earth 
compensator (NEC) and when a resistor is added between the NEC’s neutral connection 
and earth it is called an NECR.  An NECR typical limits the earth fault current to within the 
range of 25 to 400 A [Glover, 1978 or later, D4]. 
2.3.2. High Resistance Earthing 
High resistance earthing may be used as an alternative to unearthed networks due to the 
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High resistance earthing is typically used in MV and LV industrial networks where continuity 
of supply is important [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 21]. 
High resistance earthing is defined as the insertion of nearly the highest permissible 
resistance into an earth connection such that R0 ≤ Xco/3, where R0 is the zero sequence 
resistance (R0 = 3*neutral resistance, R), and Xco is the capacitive reactance between a 
phase and earth [Glover, 1978 or later, D4]. 
For high resistance earthing the neutral resistor is selected such that the fault current is 
limited to slightly more than the phase-to-earth capacitance current, and typically not more 
than 10 A [Glover, 1978 or later, D4]. 
The fault current in a high resistance earthed network is typically low enough to permit 
continued operation while the fault is being located and a shutdown scheduled to effect 
repairs [Glover, 1978 or later, D4].  The application of high resistance earthing to an 
ungrounded system will greatly enhance the network operation [Glover, 1978 or later, D4]. 
2.3.2.1. Direct Connection to Neutral 
When a system neutral is available the resistor is connected as explained in 2.3.1.1 above. 
2.3.2.2. Single Phase Transformers and Loading Resistor 
With this earthing option the primary winding of a single phase distribution transformer is 
connected in series between the system neutral and earth.  The secondary winding of the 
transformer is loaded with a resistor, which is sized to typically permit an earth fault current 
of between 2 and 10 A to flow in the primary winding [Glover, 1978 or later, D5]. 
2.3.2.3. Zig-Zag Earthing Transformer and Resistor 
In South Africa the zig-zag transformer with internal current limiting resistor is commonly 
known as a neutral earth compensator (NECR). These transformers are used on the delta 
connected medium voltage (secondary) windings of power transformers to provide an 
artificial neutral point for earth fault detection purposes. 
The NECs usually have a short time rating of about 10 s to 1 minute for which it can carry 
rated earth fault current [Glover, 1978 or later, D5].  The earth fault current limiting resistor is 
connected between the NEC neutral and earth, and the resistor is sized to permit low fault 
currents of typically 5 A in the USA [Glover, 1978 or later, D5]. 
The South African utility, Eskom, currently employ the practice of resistance earthing all MV 
networks.  The MV networks are mainly rated at 11 kV and 22 kV.  As a norm the MV 
overhead networks are 3-wire delta with NECRs providing the MV neutrals and limiting the 
earth fault currents to 350 A per NECR for overhead lines, and 960 A for MV cable networks. 
These NECRs are equipped with two protection current transformers (CTs), one for power 
transformer MV restricted earth fault protection and one for the transformer MV earth fault 
protection, which is coordinated with the MV feeder earth fault protection. 
The advantage of a NECR, apart from providing a physical neutral point to be earthed, is 
that it limits the earth fault current to an acceptably low level, thus preventing fault point and 
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fault currents may reach higher magnitudes than the 3-phase fault level due to the low 
resistance earth return path of the fault current. 
2.3.2.4. Star-Earthed-Open Delta Transformer and Resistor 
A transformer with a star connected primary and an open delta secondary winding loaded 
with a resistor may be used to provide an artificial neutral to an unearthed network. See 
Figure 11.  Under normal conditions the star/delta transformer presents a high impedance to 
the three phase system, and consequently draws very little magnetizing current [Glover, 
1978 or later, D6].  Under an earth fault condition the loading resistor limits the current in the 
delta secondary, which then in turn limits the primary earth fault current.  Low fault currents 
are attained by appropriately sizing the loading resistor [Glover, 1978 or later, D6]. 
 
Figure 11:   Star-Earthed-Open Delta Transformer and Resistor. 
2.3.3. Advantages and Disadvantages  of Resistance Earthed Networks 
Advantages 
• The main benefit of high resistance earthing is that an earth fault does not cause a 
system outage if the earthing resistor is chosen such as to allow the flow of only a small 
earth fault current.  If the earthing resistor is chosen such that its current is higher than 
the system capacitive earth fault current, potential transient overvoltages are limited to 
2.5 times the normal peak phase-to-earth voltage. [Lethonen & Hakola, 1996, 21]. 
• Low resistance earthing is typically used in large MV networks where the capacitive 
earth fault current is too high to only alarm an earth fault condition [Lethonen & Hakola, 
1996, 21].  In such systems immediate tripping is required in order to prevent arcing 
faults. 
• Resistance earthing reduces potential overvoltages on the system neutral and the two 
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magnitude to a value in the order of normal load current, or less.   As a result of the low 
earth fault current, equipment damage and fault point damage is kept to a minimum. 
• The highest neutral overvoltage in high resistance earthed networks is equal to the 
normal phase-to-earth voltage, and is attained when the fault resistance is zero 
[Lethonen & Hakola, 1996, 21]. 
• Power frequency overvoltages are usually smaller for low resistance earthed than for 
high resistance earthed networks [Lethonen & Hakola, 1996, 22]. 
• Simple protection, in comparison to unearthed neutral networks, may be used in low and 
high resistance earthed networks. 
• Intermittent overvoltages cannot occur on a low resistance earthed network, thus 
reducing the chances of double phase-to-earth faults [Cucic, 2008 ,84]. 
• Overvoltages on a low resistance earthed network is lower than on an unearthed 
network [Cucic, 2008 ,84]. 
Disadvantages 
• Resistance earthing is more expensive than both unearthed and solidly earthing 
methods due to the additional cost of the neutral resistor for a star connected network, 
or a neutral earth compensator with neutral resistor (NECR) in the case of delta network 
configuration, additional substation space occupied by the resistor or NECR, 
commissioning expenses and maintenance expenses. 
• Additionally, a resistance earthed network needs to be fully insulated for phase-to-phase 
voltage-to-earth as the neutral may rise to rated phase-to-neutral voltage during an 
earth fault.  For this reason only fully insulated power transformers may be employed on 
resistance earthed transformers.  Fully insulated transformers are more expensive than 
graded insulation transformers.  At this point it should be noted that graded insulation is 
normally only used on HV or higher voltage levels as this is where significant cost 
savings may be had as a result of using graded insulation. 
• Every earth fault, transient or bolted, on a low resistance earthed network will result in 
disconnection of the affected feeder from the source [Cucic, 2008 ,84]. 
• The larger fault currents on a low resistance earthed networks may lead to high step 
and touch potentials within the substation during earth fault conditions, and therefore 
special care needs to be taken when designing earth electrodes/earth mats in areas of 
high soil resistivity.  Lower earth mat resistance also comes at additional expense due to 
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2.4. Impedance Earthed MV Networks 
Impedance earthed (or resonant grounded as known in the USA) networks are normally 
employed where it is desirable to limit the earth fault current to a very low level in order to 
continue operating the network with an earth fault present on the network, without affecting 
customer supply.  In such a system the capacitive current is tuned or neutralized by a neutral 
reactor, known as a Petersen coil. 
The efficacy of the Petersen coil is theoretically independent of voltage, but in practice it is 
most effective and useful on relatively low voltage lines, say below 33 kV.  For voltages of 
the order of 132 kV and above there is a good economic case for direct neutral earthing.  
Very high voltage lines are almost immune from faults, even without Petersen coils, and it 
seems rather difficult to justify their adoption in such cases [Marshall, 1930, 399]. 
The current rating of a Petersen coil is determined by the network charging current due to 
phase-to-earth capacitance.  The coil is designed to pass an inductive reactive current which 
is equal in magnitude to the network charging current in the two healthy phase conductors 
when the third phase conductor is earthed and the system neutral is raised to normal phase-
to-neutral voltage above earth potential [Hunter, 1937, 13]. 
Almost 90% of German MV networks are resonant earthed and Austria, Switzerland, 
Scandinavia and Eastern European countries have a long history with positive experiences 
of resonant earthing.  France and Italy also changed their neutral earthing philosophy to that 
of resonant earthing to improve power system quality [Pühringer, 2003, 1]. 
The Petersen coil was first proposed by Professor W. Petersen of Germany during 1917 
(German patent number 304 823) [Hunter, 1938, 12]. 
The exact location of a Petersen coil on a network is immaterial from a proper functioning of 
the coil point of view.  It is however desirable, from an operating point of view, to have it in a 
centrally located position so that network switching operations will not separate the coil from 
the rest of the network. 
According to Hunter [1938, 14] it is usually uneconomical to apply Petersen coil earthing to 
lines having less than 5 A charging currents. 
The Petersen coil is simply a tapped reactor installed between a transformer neutral and 
earth.  When one of the network phases is earthed, a lagging reactive current flows from 
earth, through the reactor, via the transformer to the fault and then to earth.  At the same 
time a leading current flows from the phase-to-earth via the phase-to-earth capacitances.  
The actual current flowing at the fault point is very small as the leading capacitive current 
from the phase-to-earth capacitances, and the lagging reactive current from the reactor are 
practically 180° out of phase and therefore subtrac t from each other.  See Figure 12.  The 
two currents can be made almost exactly equal by tuning the reactor by selecting the correct 
tap.  
Tuning of a Petersen coil is not critical.  On medium voltage networks different network 
sections may be switched out up about 25 to 30% of the total network length, and still obtain 
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Tuning of a Petersen coil is either achieved through manual off-load tap adjustment on the 
coil to change the inductance thereof, or automatically by on-load adjustment of the Petersen 
coil’s magnetic circuit’s reluctance in order to cancel out the network capacitive current 
component flowing to earth during an earth fault as closely as practically possible.   
 
Figure 12:   The Operating Principle of a Petersen Coil Earthed Network. 
In the case of automatic Petersen coil adjustment the magnetic circuit reluctance is changed 
by altering the position of a plunger core inside the coil winding.  The plunger core basically 
consist of two halves which are moved further apart or closer together, thereby altering the 
size of the air gap between them.  The larger the air gap the larger the magnetic circuit’s 
reluctance [Papp, 1992, 3].  This increase in reluctance is due to air having a larger relative 
permeability than a magnetic material.  A larger permeability increases the Petersen coil 
inductance, resulting in a lower inductive coil current for a given driving voltage.   
Inductance,   L = µr µ0 N² (A/l)     [H] 
µr is the relative permeability of the magnetic circuit, µr = 1 for air. 
µ0 is the permeability of free space and is equal to 4π x 10-7. 
N is the number of coil windings. 
A is the magnetic circuit’s cross-sectional area in m². 
l is the length of the magnetic circuit in ampere in metre. 
As may be seen from the equations above and below, an increase in µr will result in a larger 
coil inductance, which in turn produces a larger inductive reactance, and therefore reduces 
the inductive current for a given voltage.   
Inductive reactance,  XL = 2 π f L 
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L is the coil inductance in henry. 
V is the applied voltage across the coil in volt. 
f is the power system frequency hertz. 
When the reactor is correctly tuned the fault current is so small that the arc at the fault point 
cannot be maintained so that the arc is extinguished.  A typical impedance earthed star 
connected MV network is shown in Figure 13. 
For a permanent earth fault the network may be operated as per normal without opening the 
faulted feeder’s circuit breaker.  This allows field personnel to locate the fault and rectify the 
problem with the minimum supply outage time to the customers. 
According to Pühringer [2003, 4] utilities in Germany and Austria are allowed to continue 
network operation under a permanent earth fault condition for as long as necessary in order 
to do fault location and effect repairs. 
Application of Petersen coils in networks with more than 1.5% zero sequence voltage may 
result in a neutral voltage of 10 to 15 times the original zero sequence voltage 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 462].  This is due to a series resonant zero sequence circuit being 
formed by the reactance of the Petersen coil, the capacitive reactance of the line and the 
zero sequence voltage (network’s neutral displacement voltage).  In order to reduce the 
neutral-to-earth voltage under normal operating conditions it is necessary to transpose the 
phase conductors of the lines.  This has a significant effect on the phase-to-earth 
capacitance imbalance on HV and higher voltage lines, but to a much lesser extent on MV 
lines due to their smaller line constructions, and usually much shorter lengths. 
As with the unearthed network the phase-to-earth voltages of the healthy phases during an 
earth fault will increase by a factor of √3 times the normal phase-to-neutral voltage, and the 
magnitude of the resultant capacitive current will be three times the normal line charging 
current of one phase (i.e. the capacitive current to earth due to the phase-to-earth 
capacitance of one phase) [Uppal, 1984, 915].  This is illustrated in Figure 14 a).  The 
residual capacitive current and reactor current, IReactor, will respectively lead and lag the 
faulty phase-to-neutral voltage by nearly 90° (circ uit resistance and inductance will cause the 
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Figure 13:  A typical Petersen coil (impedance earthed) star connected MV network. 
On each of the two healthy feeders the vector sum (resultant) of the imbalanced line currents 
is provided by a core balanced CT (ring type CT).  The resultant currents of the three feeders 
lag the residual voltage (-3V0) vector by 90° as depicted in Figure 14 a) and b).   
With reference to Figure 13 the residual current in the faulted feeder is: 
IResidual 3 = If + I3 
If = IResidual 3 – I3 
IReactor = If + I3 + I1 + I2 
Substitude for If, thus            IReactor = (IResidual 3 - I3) + I3 + I1 + I2 
IReactor = IResidual 3 + I1 + I2 
IResidual 3 = IReactor - I1 - I2 
From the above derivation it may be seen that the fault current, If, is equal to zero when the 
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IReactor.  This then shows that by adjusting the Petersen coil through changing of taps 
(manually or automatically), the earth fault current may be made very small. 
The voltage and b- and c-phase, phase-to-earth capacitive current vectors (Ibe and Ice) of the 
two healthy feeders depicted in Figure 13 is shown in Figure 14 a), and the faulty feeder’s 
residual current, IResidual 3, zero sequence voltage, 3V0, and reactor current, IReactor, vectors 
for an a-phase earth fault are indicated in Figure 14 b). 
Currents Ibe and Ice represent the b-phase and c-phase capacitive currents to earth, 
respectively, for each of feeders 1, 2 and 3 during an a-phase earth fault .   
The fault currents, Ibe and Ice, are respectively equal to √3*Ib and √3*Ic due to the healthy 
phases’ voltage rising by a factor of √3, i.e. to full phase-to-phase voltage. 
Currents Ib and Ic represent the normal  b-phase and c-phase capacitive currents to earth, 
respectively, for each of feeders 1, 2 and 3.   
Currents I1, I2 and I3 represent the vector sums of capacitive currents Ibe and Ice, 
respectively, for each of feeders 1, 2 and 3 during an a-phase earth fault . 
 
Figure 14:   Voltage and current vector diagrams for an a-phase-to-earth fault, a) residual 
voltage and current vectors of the healthy feeders feeding from the same busbar as the 
faulty feeder, and b) the reactor current, IReactor, the resultant capacitive current vectors of 
the two healthy feeders, and the faulty feeder residual current, IResidual 3. 
Where Petersen coils rated for continuous operation during earth fault conditions are 
employed, cognisance should be taken of standards governing the maximum allowable step 
and touch potentials, as represented in Figure 15, to which such a network has to conform to 
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Figure 15:   Permissible step and touch voltages [Fickert et al, 2009, 1]. 
2.4.1. Advantages and Disadvantages  of an Imped nce Earthed Network 
Advantages 
• A major advantage of an impedance earthed network is that an adequately rated 
Petersen coil is able to continuously carry fault current during an earth fault condition.  
The network may then continue operating normally with one earth fault (one phase 
earthed), until such time as the fault may be repaired, just as in the case of the 
unearthed network.  This ensures high power supply quality as earth faults constitute 
50% to 80% of all MV network faults [Dán et al, 2003 or later, 1; Erroa et al, 2006, 3; 
Hänninen, 2001, 13; Heine et al, 2004, 100; Nelson, 2002, 1, and Smeets & Knol, 2009, 
3].  
• A Petersen coil installation will prevent most arcing earth faults according to a study 
done by Lehtonen et al [2001, 1185], due to the very low capacitive fault current as a 
result of the reactive coil current mostly cancelling the capacitive fault current, and 
thereby reducing the number of overvoltage incidents caused by arcing earth faults, as 
experienced on some unearthed networks. 
• Due to the low earth fault current present (mostly resistive) in a Petersen coil earthed 
system self extinguishing of transient earth faults may be achieved, thus preventing line 
disconnections in such instances. 
• The rate of rise of the recovery voltage across the spark gap is slower after an arc has 
self-extinguished, than in an unearthed network.  This is due to the Petersen coil 
delaying the return of full voltage across the arc path (recovery voltage) after the first 
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prevents re-striking [Sumner, 1946, 285].  This has the advantage that arc self-
extinguishing can take place at higher earth fault current levels, as compared with an 
unearthed network.  The chances are therefore small that an earth fault may develop 
into a phase-to-phase fault. 
• Optimally tuned Petersen coils will result in low earth fault currents, which reduces the 
risk of high step and touch potentials in substations. 
• Petersen coils are successfully applied to both MV and HV power systems.  In Germany 
the highest voltage level compensated network is running at 220 kV [Lehtonen & 
Hakola, 1996, 19]. 
Disadvantages 
• When Petersen coils are applied to MV or HV networks it is required that the entire 
network be fully insulated to witstand full phase-to-phase voltage-to-earth [ABB, 1994, 
97], as the transformers’ neutral voltages may rise to full normal phase-to-neutral 
voltage-to-earth, and the healthy phases may rise to full normal phase-to-phase voltage-
to-earth during an earth fault. 
• Petersen coil earthing is not suitable for application to systems with auto-transformers or 
where graded insulation is used on transformers, as graded insulation requires that 
transformer neutrals be solidly earthed.  This implies that all star (wye) connected 
transformers on a compensated network be fully insulated for full phase-to-phase 
voltage [ABB, 1994, 97]. 
• Operation of compensated networks is more onerous as the Petersen coil requires re-
tuning every time significant changes are made to a network [ABB, 1994, 97 & Lehtonen 
& Hakola, 1996, 19].  This problem may be overcome by implementing automated coil 
tuning [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 19], alas at added cost. 
• With Petersen coil earthed systems a high incidence of faults will occur essentially 
simultaneously in different parts of the network [ABB, 1994, 97].  This has not been 
substantiated in the reference literature. 
• If a substantial number of lines are of wood pole construction the effectiveness of the 
Petersen coil earthed network may be reduced considerably.  This is due to the high 
insulation to earth that will force a larger number of potential earth faults to develop into 
phase-to-phase faults [ABB, 1994, 97].  As Eskom’s MV lines are mostly of wood pole 
construction, the previous statement implies that converting the current resistive earthed 
networks into compensated networks may pose the risk of increased phase-to-phase 
faults on such networks. 
• Petersen coil earthing may prove more expensive than unearthed, solidly earthed and 
resistance earthing. 
• Petersen coil earthed systems have a poor sensitivity to high resistance earth faults and 
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2.5. Discussion of issues influenced by different network earthing methods 
This section discusses three issues, namely the effect of arcing earth faults, application of 
surge arresters and protection, which are common to all network types, irrespective of the 
earthing method. 
2.5.1. Arcing Earth faults  
Unearthed Networks 
According to literature [ABB, 1994, 96; Allen & Waldorf, 1945, 304; Bridger, 1983, 15; Eaton 
et al, 1931, 1476; Eaton Power, 2009, 6; Glover, 1978 or later, D-1; Hänninen, 2001, 13; 
Nelson, 2002, 1638; Uppal, 1984, 910] arcing earth faults, or otherwise known as arcing 
grounds, may result in fast developing very high phase-to-earth voltages.  Overvoltages of 
six times the normal phase-to-neutral voltage are theoretically attainable within 1.5 cycles of 
the fundamental frequency. 
Eaton et al [1931, 1478] found the maximum overvoltages due to arcing earth faults on a 75 
kV unearthed network to be not more than 3 times the normal phase-to-earth system 
voltage. 
From earth fault statistics of a 20 kV unearthed network Lehtonen et al [2001, 1186] 
determined that the maximum overvoltages due to arcing earth faults to be about 2 times the 
normal phase-to-earth system voltage. 
Through test conducted on a 140 kV unearthed network, North & Eaton [1933, 70] 
determined the maximum overvoltage due to arcing earth faults to be 3.5 times the normal 
phase-to-earth system voltage.  It was further also found that the maximum overvoltage due 
to solid earth faults was 3.2 times the normal phase-to-earth system voltage.  
In order to explain the rapid development of overvoltages due to an arcing earth fault, an 
explanation by Eaton Power [2009, 6], using a phasor diagram, is depicted in Figure 16. 
Point 1 in Figure 16 represents a normal balanced phasor diagram without an earth fault.  
The phase rotation is anti-clockwise and the system frequency is 50 Hz (or 60 Hz in some 
countries). 
If the a-phase is now earthed the phasor diagram will appear as at point 2.  Earthing the a-
phase causes the neutral point, n, to rise to the normal phase-to-neutral voltage, Vl-n, with 
respect to earth.  If we assume now that the applied earth fault is not solid, but intermittent, it 
will result in arcing taking place at the fault point.  Arcing is as a result of the line charging 
current (or that of the whole system if there is more than one line) of the a-phase previously 
flowing through the earth connection, but now discharging through an air gap of the 
intermittent earth fault.  By definition the arc must extinguish at the next current zero, since 
there will be zero current flowing at that point. 
As the fault current is capacitive it leads the voltage by 90°, and therefore the voltage across 
the phase-to-earth capacitance of the a-phase will be at a maximum when the arc 
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extinguished arc there will be no current flowing to charge or discharge the phase-to-earth 
capacitor and as a result the voltage across the phase-to-earth capacitor remains at 
whatever value it has been charged to prior to the arc being extinguished [Eaton Power, 
2009, 5], (This is assumed to be an assumption as a practical circuit is more complex and 
will always have stray capacitive coupling with the live conductors that will charge or 
discharge the phase-to-earth capacitance).  This then establishes a new, higher, neutral-to-
earth voltage reference point in the phasor diagram. 
As the phasors continue to rotate in an anti-clockwise direction the a-phase phasor would 
have spun 180° in one half cycle.  At this point th e a-phase-to-earth potential is double the 
normal phase-to-earth potential as indicated at point 3.  
If the voltage across the a-phase capacitance to earth is high enough to cause a restrike of 
the fault, the line capacitance is rapidly discharged through the arc to earth.  Due to the 
capacitive discharge taking place through the phase inductance being in the opposite 
direction to the normal capacitive charging current, the voltage across the inductance will be 
inverted.  This then has the effect that the voltage phasors will drop to a value equal to the 
negative of the previous value.  See phasor diagram at point 4. 
From the phasor diagram at point 4 it may be seen that, although the a-phase voltage simply 
changes from a positive to a negative value, the neutral-to-earth voltage actually increases 
from 1 to 3 times the normal phase-to-neutral voltage. 
From point 4 to point 5 the phasors rotate by 180°,  resulting in the a-phase-to-earth voltage 
to now being 4 times the normal phase-to-neutral voltage. 
This higher voltage may again lead to a restrike with the process repeating itself, moving the 
neutral-to-earth voltage yet higher again.  Theoretically this process of increased voltage-to-
earth after every restrike may carry on indefinitely, but in practice some insulation will 
eventually break down to cause a permanent earth fault resulting in the overvoltages being 
ceased.  
During 1998 and 1999 Lehtonen et al [2001, 1185] conducted a study on 20 kV unearthed 
overhead networks in Finland, and through analysis of 316 earth fault events, found that 67 
% of all disturbances on the unearthed networks were arcing faults and the average duration 
of arcing current was approximately 60 ms, as compared to 28 % of all disturbances on, and 
arcing duration of 30 ms for a compensated network (Petersen coil). 
During the same study the maximum measured residual current at which auto extinction of 
an earth fault took place was 9.5 A, compared to 23.8 A in the impedance earthed (Petersen 
coil) network.  Lehtonen et al [2001, 1185] furthermore found that half the disturbances on 
the unearthed network were arcing faults, which could lead to overvoltages higher than 
double the normal phase-to-earth voltage. 
According to Pühringer [2003, 2] German standards, dictating the operating of unearthed 
networks, prescribes a maximum phase-to-earth current of 35 A for system voltages below 
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As a result of an increase in phase-to-earth capacitance with increase in line length, and 
consequential increase in capacitive earth fault current, the lower the chances of self-
extinction of arcing earth faults. 
 
Figure 16:   Pictorial representation of the development of overvoltages between the phases 
and earth due to arcing earth faults in unearthed networks. 
An arcing ground study, conducted by Allen and Waldorf [1946, 305] on an unearthed 13 kV 
power station busbar, revealed the following information, some of which may be considered 
when designing the proposed transient earth fault clearing method:  
1. Arcing grounds on the tested station bus did not produce voltages to earth exceeding 
three times the normal crest phase-to-neutral voltage.  Higher overvoltages did not 
materialize even though conditions in some of the tests were probably as severe as 
any likely to occur under operating conditions.  The highest overvoltages occurred 
during tests conducted with self-lengthening spark gaps, as compared with fixed 
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2. The highest overvoltage measured on the two healthy phases was 3 times the peak 
phase-to-earth voltage.  
3. The maximum voltages to earth on the unfaulted phases are not equal under most 
arcing ground conditions. 
4. Arcing grounds occur sometimes on only one polarity of voltage. 
5. The tests revealed arcing transients which raise the phase-to-phase voltages as high 
as 1,73 times normal.  The frequency of these transients was found to be as high as 
6780 Hz.  Transients of this character may cause abnormal voltage stresses on the 
turn insulation of machines.  In the author’s opinion this statement applies equally 
well to transformer winding insulation. 
6. Insulation on unearthed networks should be able to withstand phase-to-earth 
voltages in excess of three times the normal phase-to-neutral voltage. 
Experimental studies of arcing ground faults on a 214 km unearthed 75 kV line, conducted 
by Eaton et al [1931, 1475 - 1478], revealed the following information:  
1. The maximum overvoltage is approximately 3 times the normal peak phase-to-neutral 
voltage, and occurs most frequently during the first cycle of the fault. 
2. From fault inception the healthy phase voltages change from normal phase-to-earth, 
to phase-to-phase voltage with respect to earth without going through an oscillation 
of appreciable amplitude.  A DC transient is present for several cycles and shifts the 
zero of the normal frequency wave, and in some cases a third harmonic was present 
on the overvoltage waveform. 
3. As the length of the isolated system was increased, there was a gradual increase in 
the overvoltages magnitudes on the sound phases attained during arcing ground 
faults. 
4. The fault location on the line (middle or end of line) did not affect the attained 
overvoltages magnitudes on the sound phases. 
5. The type of transformer connections (star or delta) had no effect on attained 
overvoltages magnitudes on the sound phases. 
6. The method of initiating an arc (fuse, swinging wire, etc) had no effect on the attained 
overvoltages magnitudes on the sound phases. 
7. An arc to a high resistance earth (e.g. a brushing tree branch) limits the shift of the 
system neutral and hence tends to reduce the magnitude of overvoltages produced. 
8. It was concluded from the tests that an arc to a low resistance earth, which allows 
maximum fault current to flow when the arc resistance is low, is more conducive to 
overvoltages on the sound phases than one to a high resistance earth. 
9. Tests carried out with the system neutral solidly earthed resulted in overvoltages on 
the sound phases of between 1.6 and 2.2 times the normal phase-to-neutral 
voltages.  These are somewhat less than the maximum values attained with the 
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Subsequent to the tests performed by Eaton et al [1931, 1478] on an unearthed 75 kV line, 
recorders on a 1072 km unearthed 140 kV line captured oscillographs of 18 earth faults and 
the highest overvoltages recorded during these faults varied between 1.2 and 2.6 times the 
normal peak phase-to-neutral voltage.  The duration of the faults varied from 4 to 112 cycles.  
In most of these oscillograms evidence of arcing were observed in several cycles just prior to 
clearance of the fault, but in no case did cumulative oscillations appear in the voltage during 
the fault [Eaton et al 1931, 1478]. 
The above overvoltage test results from the 13 kV power station busbar tests, 214 km 75 kV 
line tests and the 1072 km 140 kV line test, all of them unearthed systems, show very similar 
maximum overvoltage magnitudes.  The first two networks delivered maximum overvoltages 
of 3 times normal peak phase-to-neutral voltage and the 140 kV unearthed network 
delivered a maximum overvoltage of 2.6 times normal peak phase-to-neutral voltage.  
Although no reference has been made in the literature [Eaton et al 1931, 1469 - 1478] to the 
discrepancy between the 3 times and 2.6 times overvoltages, it may be partially attributed to 
the difference in network structures in terms of the conductor configuration and the 
conductor height above ground level, and also the lengths of the different lines.  These 
factors all play a role in the capacitance-to-earth and therefore will determine the magnitude 
of capacitive earth fault current in the event of an earth fault.  An increase in the conductor 
height above ground level will decrease the capacitance-to-earth, and an increase in line 
length will increase the capacitance-to-earth. 
It was found by Eaton et al [1931, 1474] that arcs formed in capacitive circuits are less likely 
to self-extinguish than those in inductive and resistive circuits.  Eaton et al [1931, 1477] also 
found that there is a gradual increase in overvoltages due to arcing earth faults as the 
unearthed system length is increased (increase in phase-to-earth capacitance). 
Furthermore Eaton et al [1931, 1473] established that after an earth fault arc is extinguished 
the voltage across the fault point rises to normal phase-to-neutral voltage in resistance and 
inductive circuits, but rises to approximately twice normal phase-to-neutral in a capacitive 
circuit.  Eaton et al [1931, 1473] contributes the greater persistence of arcing earth faults in 
capacitive systems to not only the rate of change of the recovery voltage, but also to the 
maximum value to which the recovery voltage rises.   If the recovery voltage increases at a 
faster rate than what the arcing medium can recover at, the arc will be persistent.  The 
recovery voltage is defined as the voltage developing across the arc gap immediately after 
arc extinction.  During the test conducted by Eaton et al [1931, 1473] arc restriking was 
observed only in the capacitve circuit.   
Allen & Waldorf [1946, 303] conducted an experiment with a self-lengthening spark gap.  
This is of particular interest as this would closely resemble a transient earth fault where a 
tree branch, for instance, makes contact with a live conductor and then moves away from it 
again, drawing an arc as it moves away, until the gap becomes too large for the arc to be 
sustained.  Through the experiment it was established that overvoltages stabilized at 2.8 
times normal phase-to-neutral voltage, even with an extended arcing period of 2.25 seconds 
before the arc self-extinguished.  
From the above it therefore seems most likely that each transient earth fault will result in 
arcing as a fault will be caused by an earthed object getting into contact with live apparatus, 











   Page 36 
moving away from the live apparatus an arc will be drawn, which will generate overvoltages, 
but that these overvoltages will be limited to under 3 times normal peak phase-to-neutral 
voltage by system losses [Eaton et al, 1931, 1478].  These overvoltages were reached within 
3 to 4 power frequency cycles after fault inception.  This then implies that even if 
instantaneous tripping of the faulted feeder’s circuit breaker upon fault detection in an 
unearthed network was implemented, the tripping action (about 60 ms) will most probably 
not be fast enough to prevent overvoltages on the network in any event. 
During the conducted literature study no literature or reference documentation has been 
encountered relating to deliberate action being taken by protection devices to clear transient 
earth faults specifically.  All earth fault clearing methods thus far encountered either, 
1) interrupt customer supply by means of single- or three-pole tripping of the affected 
feeder, 
2) reduce the fault current to virtually zero by means of a Petersen coil system, or  
3) only allow the relatively small line charging (capacitive) current to flow due to the 
system neutral being isolated from earth on a permanent basis. 
Solidly Earthed Networks 
Arcing earth faults do occur on solidly earthed networks, but do not generate any significant 
overvoltages as the source transformer’s MV neutral is solidly earthed. 
Resistance Earthed Networks 
Arcing earth faults do occur on both low and high resistance earthed networks, but do not 
generate any significant overvoltages on low resistance earthed networks due to the low 
earthing resistance.  The lower the resistance the closer the earthing resembles that of a 
solidly earthed network. 
On high resistance earthed networks overvoltages due to arcing earth faults may become 
more significant as the earthing resistance is increased and the closer it gets to resemble an 
unearthed network. 
Petersen Coil Earthed (Compensated) Networks 
In a real network study Lehtonen et al [2001, 1185] found that 28% of all disturbances on a 
Petersen coil earthed (compensated) network were arcing faults and the average duration of 
arcing was approximately 30 ms, as compared to 67% of all disturbances on, and arcing 
duration of 60ms for an unearthed network. 
During the same study the maximum measured residual current at which auto extinction of 
an earth fault on the compensated network took place was 23.8 A, compared to 9.5 A in the 
unearthed network.  
According to Fickert et al [2009, 3] utilities are motivated to keep on operating their resonant 
earthed networks due to the good quality of supply as a result of the inherent capability of 
such networks to self-extinguish arcing earth faults, especially on long overhead lines as a 
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As a result of resistance losses in the coil, transformers and lines, corona losses and 
insulator leakage resistance, neither the Petersen coil current nor the capacitive conductor to 
earth current is exactly 90° out of phase with the faulty phase voltage.  This will result in a 
small residual fault current.  A system with low losses will have a small residual fault current. 
[Sumner, 1946, 284]. 
The small residual current (assuming a well tuned Petersen coil) in the fault, during an earth 
fault, is practically in phase with the faulty phase voltage (resistive current), and therefore it 
will pass through zero at the same instant as the voltage.  The arc will therefore be less likely 
to re-strike than with a capacitive current as in an unearthed system [Sumner, 1946, 284]. 
From earth fault statistics of a 20 kV Petersen coil earthed network Lehtonen et al [2001, 
1186] determined that the maximum overvoltages, due to arcing earth faults, to be about 1.7 
times the normal phase-to-neutral system voltage. 
Through tests conducted on a 140 kV unearthed network converted to a Petersen coil 
earthed network, North & Eaton [1933, 70] determined the maximum overvoltage due to 
arcing earth faults to be 2.2 times the normal phase-to-neutral system voltage, with the 
Petersen coil installed.  It was further also found that the maximum overvoltage due to solid 
earth faults was 2.7 times the normal phase-to-neutral system voltage.  The fact that the 
maximum overvoltage measured was actually higher for a solid earth fault than for an arcing 
earth fault is quite surprising, as all the studied literature ascribed high overvoltages to arcing 
earth faults.  No other studied material made mention of this phenomenon.  
Lehtonen and Hakola [1996, 64] mentions that it has been estimated that since the 
introduction of Petersen coils into traditional unearthed Finnish overhead networks, the 
number of line outages decreased by 70 to 90%. 
The above findings suggest then that compensated earthing may be more successfully 
applied to longer lines (more capacitance = higher capacitive fault current) as auto extinction 
of arcing earth faults will take place at higher fault current levels in compensated networks, 
as compared to unearthed networks. 
2.5.2. Application of Surge Arresters 
General 
Distribution transformers in MV networks are typically being protected from overvoltages, 
due to switching operations, or lightning by either surge arrestors or spark gaps (arcing 
horns).  These devices remove overvoltages quickly and safely, thereby protecting human 
life and equipment.   
MV distribution networks are typically operated radially, with one feeder supplying many 
distribution transformers, and therefore many customers.  It is therefore important not to 
unnecessarily interrupt the feeder supply. 
Although cheap compared to surge arresters, arcing horns have a major drawback in that 
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probably not self-extinguish, and will have to be cleared by opening the upstream circuit 
breaker.  
Interruption and re-establishing of supply to a feeder by auto-reclosing the feeder breaker, 
due to spark gap operations, will not only cause a short duration supply interruption to the 
customers on the affected line, but may also lead to voltage dips on the adjacent lines due to 
transformer inrush currents, especially on weak networks (high source/network impedance) 
and solidly earthed networks (high earth fault currents). 
Unearthed Networks 
According to Heine et al [2004, 100] the standard practice in Finland is to equip the large 
transformers with surge arresters and the smaller ones (200 kVA and below) with spark 
gaps.  ESB Networks Ltd in Ireland, for example, applies 12 kV MCOV (maximum 
continuous overvoltage) surge arresters on their 10 kV unearthed overhead networks.  
In the study conducted by Heine et al [2004, 105] on a 20kV unearthed network it was found 
that if arcing in a spark gap was sustained for longer than 10 cycles, the earth fault will most 
likely change to a phase-to-phase-to-earth fault.  This is inherently a much more severe 
fault, which may lead to equipment and conductor damage.   
Due to its own operation a spark gap may initiate re-striking of arcs across the spark gap as 
a result of high transient recovery voltages established upon sudden extinguishing of an arc 
across a spark gap.  Heine et al [2004, 105] found that unearthed feeders equipped with 
spark gaps have 6 times more earth faults than feeders equipped with surge arresters.  The 
same study revealed that feeders equipped with spark gaps have the tendency to develop a 
high number of phase-to-phase faults, presumably due to high recovery voltages.  The 
modern gapless surge arresters may tend to smoothly conduct high transient voltage spike 
energy to earth, thereby reducing high recovery voltages to acceptable levels, with a 
consequential reduction in the possibility of an arc restriking. 
With a spark gap equipped network the protection would most probably have to trip the 
feeder breaker upon detection of an earth fault in order to prevent a phase-to-phase fault as 
system frequency capacitive current may follow through after the initial flashover, and may 
not self-extinguish due to the ionized air in the arc path creating a conductive path to earth 
[Uppal, 1984, 1183; Heine et al, 2004, 100; Freeman, 1969, 253].  This obviously defeats the 
inherent benefit of an unearthed network, which is to leave the network operating with a 
permanent earth fault on one phase until such time as the fault may be located and repaired 
[Alstom, 2002, 140; Westinghouse, 1944, 457; Erroa, 2006,1]. 
According to Cotton & Barber [1970, 440] operation of a spark gap in an unearthed network 
may lead to an arcing fault. 
Heine et al [2004, 100] states that when a spark gap flashes over, particularly in an 
unearthed MV network the faulted feeder’s circuit breaker needs to be opened in order to 
clear the fault, as opposed to a network equipped with surge arresters where no opening of 
a circuit breaker is required.. 
In order to limit the number of short interruptions in an unearthed network Heine et al [2004, 
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as surge arrester operation is smooth and without any arcing, and therefore do not require 
feeder breaker operation.   
Correctly rated surge arresters are effective in providing protection against overvoltages due 
to lightning, switching operations, earth faults, and direct and indirect lightning strokes. 
Solidly Earthed Networks 
Surge arresters applied to solidly earthed networks should have a rating of 80% of rated 
phase-to-phase voltage [Coopers, 1990, 217], due to the fact that the neutral voltage will 
never be raised above normal phase-to-neutral voltage during an earth fault. 
Resistance Earthed Networks 
As the phase-to-earth voltages of the two healthy phase conductors in both low and high 
resistance earthed networks, during an earth fault, may rise to rated phase-to-phase voltage, 
due to the neutral being raised to rated phase-to-neutral voltage, surge arresters applied on 
the network should all be rated for continuous operation at rated phase-to-phase. 
As a result of this potential maximum voltage rise during an earth fault, the power 
transformer neutrals should be insulated to withstand rated phase-to-neutral voltage. 
The South Africa utility, Eskom, applies 12 kV MCOV and 24 kV MCOV surge arresters 
respectively to their low resistance earthed 11 kV and 22 kV networks as standard practice. 
Petersen Coil Earthed (Compensated) Networks 
As the phase-to-earth voltages of the healthy phases, in a compensated network, may rise 
to rated phase-to-phase voltage, surge arresters applied on the network should all be rated 
for continuous operation at rated phase-to-phase voltage. 
2.5.3. Protection Issues 
Unearthed Networks 
Protection of unearthed MV networks against earth faults is easily achieved with directional 
protection relays.  This directional protection will positively identify the faulty phase and 
feeder, and isolate it if required.  The characteristic of a numeric directional earth fault 
protection relay is shown in Figure 17. 
Normal load current is either resistive or inductive, or a combination of the two, but never 
capacitive.  Directional protection may therefore be used on unearthed lines to identify the 
faulted feeder as such protection utilizes the zero sequence voltage, Vo, (neutral to earth 
voltage) as a reference quantity and the zero sequence current, Io (residual), of the feeder 
as an operating quantity if Io is above a pre-set threshold level and leading Vo by a certain 
minimum angle.  The load current therefore does not affect the protection sensitivity, as long 
as it is not capacitive.   
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The threshold setting for Vo is determined by the highest expected earth fault resistance, 
which will result in the lowest V0 due to the voltage drop across the earth fault resistance. 
The threshold setting for Io*sinφ is determined by the smallest possible network to be in 
operation together with the feeder to be protected (connected to the same busbar).  The 
smaller the total network (smallest capacitance), the smaller the capacitive current to be 
measured by the relay during an earth fault on the protected feeder and the lower the 
threshold current setting needs to be [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 87]..  The I0 threshold 
should therefore be set according to the smallest expected network (smallest capacitance) 
being connected to the same busbar. 
 
Figure 17:   Directional earth fault relay characteristic for an unearthed network [Lehtonen & 
Hakola, 1996, 87]. 
In a study conducted by Lehtonen et al [2001, 1182] it was found that the majority of earth 
faults on an unearthed network disappeared (self-clearing) without any protection 
intervention.  It was also found that one third of the self-clearing earth faults were caused by 
the operation of disconnectors on the network.  Lehtonen et al [2001, 1182] did not provide 
any explanation as to why operation of the disconnectors caused earth faults.  It is, however, 
plausible that arcing, as a result of breaking of load current when opening a disconnector, 
may result in an earth fault especially in windy conditions where the arc is blown out to one 
side towards earthed metal parts of the disconnector.   
In the same study by Lehtonen et al [2001, 1182] it was found that high speed auto reclosing 
with an operating delay of 0.5 s was mostly successful in unearthed networks, but it was also 
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Erroa et al [2006, 16] found that the application of numeric protection to unearthed 46 kV 
overhead distribution networks made a dramatic improvement in the performance of the 
networks.  This is due to modern numeric protection employed on unearthed networks being 
able to identify the faulted feeder as well as the faulted phase, a function which older simple 
protection could not perform.  This allows for selective tripping of the faulted feeder without 
first manually or automatically tripping a number of feeders in order to identify the faulted 
feeder, as is the (unacceptable) case with older protection.  The modern protection therefore 
has a large positive impact on customer supply quality and also reduces revenue losses 
[Erroa et al, 2006, 3]. 
Solidly Earthed Networks 
Due to high earth fault currents present in a solidly earthed network during an earth fault, 
simple overcurrent and directional earth fault protection may be applied.   
In solidly earthed networks earth fault currents vary largely depending on the fault location 
and on fault resistance [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 23]. 
The maximum earth fault current may in some cases be higher than the 3-phase short circuit 
current, and therefore require immediate fault clearing. 
Resistance Earthed Networks 
Protection of a high resistance earthed MV network against earth faults is achieved with a 
directional protection relay measuring the active component of the zero sequence current 
flowing in the line conductors by means of residually connected current transformers, and 
using the zero sequence voltage measured on the transformer neutral as the polarizing 
quantity.  Alternatively the zero sequence current flowing through the neutral resistor may be 
used as the polarizing quantity [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 96].   
The earth fault currents in high resistance earthed networks are usually very small, dictating 
low earth fault protection settings.  High resistance earthed  network earth fault protection 
relays are typically set to pick-up at a primary current of 1 A or below [Lethonen & Hakola, 
1996, 96].  As a result of this, false relay operation may take place due to current 
transformer errors, load current imbalance or an open circuit phase conductor if residually 
connected current transformers are used instead of a core balance current transformer to 
measure the zero sequence current flowing in the feeder’s conductors.  Also, cold load pick-
up, transformer inrush and short circuits may lead to false tripping of a feeder breaker due to 
imbalance in the phase currents [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 96].   
Standard inverse definite minimum time lag (IDMTL) overcurrent relays may be used in low 
resistance earthed networks as the fault currents are considerably larger than in high 
resistance earthed networks [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 97]. 
Typical earth fault pick-up settings for an MV feeder would be in the range of 40 to 120A. 
Sensitive earth fault protection is also used in low resistance earthed networks for the 
detection high impedance earth faults, typically a broken conductor on the ground.  Typical 
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Auto reclosing is normally not done with sensitive earth fault protection as its operation may 
indicate a potentially dangerous situation, e.g. a conductor on the ground. 
The zero sequence impedance of distribution networks are relatively high, which leads to 
lower fault currents the further a fault is away from the substation.  This enables easier 
coordination of protection relays [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 97]. 
Petersen Coil Earthed (Compensated) Networks 
Petersen coil earthed network protection cannot be based on the reactive current component 
of the earth fault current, since the inductive current of the Petersen coil will interfere with the 
protection relay operation [Lehtonen and Hakola, 1996, 88].  For this reason then the active 
(resistive) component (Icosφ) of the earth fault current is used for selective tripping of circuit 
breakers. 
The magnitude of the earth fault current’s active component is usually small and may be 
increased by connecting a resistor in parallel with the Petersen coil. 
The protection relay operating characteristic for a Petersen coil earthed network is similar to 
that of an unearthed network, but the characteristic is shifted by -90° [Lehtonen & Hakola, 
1996, 88].  The characteristic of a numeric earth fault protection relay is shown in Figure 18:   
 
Figure 18:   Numeric earth fault protection relay characteristic using the active component, 
Io*cosφ, of the feeder’s residual current for selectivity. 
In a Petersen coil earthed network the protection must also be able to operate selectively in 
the event that the Petersen coil is temporarily out of order.  In such an event auxiliary 
contacts from the Petersen coil’s circuit breaker will automatically change the relay operating 
characteristic from an Io*cosφ to an Io*sinφ via a binary input on the numeric protection 
relay, where Io is the residual current of a specific feeder.  At this stage now the network is 
being operated as an unearthed network [Lehtonen & Hakola, 1996, 89]..   
In the event of an earth fault with the Petersen coil in service, an overvoltage protection 
relay, measuring the neutral-to-earth voltage, will automatically switch a resistor into the  
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current and reduce the neutral-to-earth voltage [Lehtonen and Hakola, 1996, 66].  The 
resistor stays connected in parallel until the earth fault has cleared. 
2.5.4. Safety 
The safest situation from a human or animal contact incident perspective will be where the 
one phase conductor has a solid earth fault.  In this case there may be a minimal touch 
potential to earth at the fault point, but there is no guarantee of this.   
Currently there is no protection sensitive, selective and/or reliable enough to detect a human 
or animal contact incident and operate fast enough to prevent serious injury or death. 
Cases do exist where people or animals did survive electrical contact incidents on MV 
networks, but they were just fortunate and their survival cannot be ascribed to protection 
operations. 
Unearthed Networks 
With the aid of modern numeric protection it is possible to reliably detect earth faults on an 
unearthed network, but the risk of electrocution on such a network is just as high as in any 
other earthed type network.  
Solidly, Resistance and Petersen Coil Earthed Networks 
Base on the effects of electrical shock on the human body [IEC 60479-1: 2005], the chances 
of survival of a person involved in a contact incident resulting in a low level earth fault, are 
extremely slim on solid or resistance earthed networks due to the long fault clearing duration 
(5 to 15 s typically). 
A Petersen coil earthed system’s claim to fame is the fact that it may be operated for 
prolonged periods with an earth fault present on one phase.  The Petersen coil will most 
probably not have its inductive current level adjusted in such a way as to completely cancel 
out the network’s capacitive fault current during an EF, and therefore some current will still 
pass through the body of a person or animal during a contact incident.  The chance of 
survival of such a contact victim may be better than that of a solid or resistance earthed 
network due to the low fault current during an earth fault condition, if the Petersen coil is 
optimally tuned. 
IEC 60479-1: 2005 states that about 105 mA for 1000 ms through a human body from hand 
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Table 1:   Comparison of the characteristics of different network earthing methods 






Fully insulated [Westinghouse, 
1944, 462] 
Unfaulted phase voltages may be 
raised to 1.8 x normal phase-to-neutral 
voltage, therefore phase-to-phase 
voltage insulation is required. 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 460] 
The phase-to-earth voltage of the 
unfaulted phases may considerably 
exceed the normal phase-to-neutral 
voltage [Willheim et al, 1956, 72], 
therefore phase-to-phase voltage 
insulation is required. 
The higher the neutral 
resistance the higher the neutral 
voltage to earth during an earth 
fault and will almost invariably 
be fully displaced to normal 
phase-to-neutral voltage and will 
require full phase-to-phase 
voltage insulation. 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 463] 
The neutral will be fully displaced to normal 
phase-to-neutral voltage during an earth fault 
and will require full phase-to-phase voltage 
insulation. [Westinghouse, 1944, 464] 
2 Earth fault 
current    
Usually low [Westinghouse, 
1944, 467] 
Maximum value rarely higher than 
three-phase short circuit current 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467] 
Low [Westinghouse, 1944, 467] Negligible except when the Petersen coil is 
short circuited for relay purposes when it may 
compare with solidly earthed systems 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467] 
3 Protection 
relaying   
Difficult [Westinghouse, 1944, 
467], but easily achieved with 
modern numeric protection. 
Satisfactory [Westinghouse, 1944, 467].  
Easily achieved with modern numeric 
protection. 
Satisfactory [Westinghouse, 
1944, 467].  Easily achieved 
with modern numeric protection. 
Requires special provisions but can be made 
satisfactory [Westinghouse, 1944, 467].  Easily 
achieved with modern numeric protection. 
4 Arcing 
grounds   
Likely [Westinghouse, 1944, 
467] 
67% of all network faults 
[Lehtonen et al, 2001, 1185] 
Unlikely [Westinghouse, 1944, 467] 
Comment:  Arcing faults will take place 
on networks of any earthing type.  
Perhaps Westinghouse meant to say 
that overvoltages due to arcing earth 
faults are unlikely to happen in solidly 
earthed networks. 
Unlikely [Westinghouse, 1944, 
467] 
Comment:  Arcing faults will 
take place on networks of any 
earthing type.  Perhaps 
Westinghouse meant to say that 
overvoltages due to arcing earth 
faults are unlikely to happen in 
resistance earthed networks. 
Unlikely [Westinghouse, 1944, 467] 
Comment:  Arcing faults will take place on 
networks of any earthing type.  Perhaps 
Westinghouse meant to say that overvoltages 
due to arcing earth faults are unlikely to happen 
in resonant earthed networks. 
28% of all resonant earthed network faults are 
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  Unearthed Solidly Earthed Resistance Earthed Resonant Earthed (Petersen Coil) 
5 Lightning 
protection   
Lightning arresters must be 
applied on the basis of full 
phase-to-phase voltage, which 
increases the cost of protection 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467] 
Lightning arresters rated for “solidly 
earthed neutral service” may be applied 
as the maximum neutral displacement 
will not be much higher than the normal 
phase-to-neutral voltage if the earth 
electrode resistance to earth is low 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467]. 
Lightning arresters must be 
applied on the basis of full 
phase-to-phase voltage, which 
increases the cost of protection 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467] 
Lightning arresters must be applied on the basis 
of full phase-to-phase voltage, which increases 
the cost of protection [Westinghouse, 1944, 467] 
6 Line 
availability   
The line will inherently clear 
itself (self-extinguishing arcing 
earth faults) if total length of 
interconnected line is low and 
requires isolation from system 
in increasing percentages as 
length becomes greater 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467].   
The network may be operated 
for prolonged periods with a 
single permanent earth fault 
[Fickert et al 2009, 3]. 
The line must be isolated from the 
source for each fault [Westinghouse, 
1944, 467]. 
Line must be isolated from the 
source for each fault 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467]. 
Line need not be isolated from the source during 
a permanent earth fault [Westinghouse, 1944, 
467]. 
Transient earth faults will inherently clear itself 
in about 60% to 80% of faults [Westinghouse, 
1944, 467] (Comment: Clarification of what 
causes the range was not provided in the 
reference). 
Hunter [1937, 16] found that on a Petersen coil 
equipped 440 km long 140 kV network, 70% of 
all network earth faults were cleared without 
circuit breaker operation. 
ABB [1994, 97] states that about 75% of earth 
faults are self-extinguishing. 
A network may be operated with an earth fault 
until such time as repair can be effected 
[Marshall, 1937,402]. 
7 Circuit 
breakers   
Interrupting capacity is 
determined by the three-phase 
fault conditions [Westinghouse, 
1944, 467]. 
Interrupting capacity is determined by 
the three-phase fault conditions and in 
some cases even higher ratings are 
required for earth faults close to the 
neutral earth connections 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467]. 
Interrupting capacity is 
determined by the three-phase 
fault conditions [Westinghouse, 
1944, 467]. 
Interrupting capacity is determined by the three-
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  Unearthed Solidly Earthed Resistance Earthed Resonant Earthed (Petersen Coil) 
      
8 Operating 
procedure   
Ordinarily simple but double 
faults introduce complication 
[Westinghouse, 1944, 467]. 
Modern protection methods 
exist whereby the faulted 
feeder, faulted phase, and the 
fault location may be identified 
[Erroa et al, 2006,3] 
Simple [Westinghouse, 1944, 467]. 
Distance to fault locating equipment is 
available, working on the travelling 
wave principle. 
Simple [Westinghouse, 1944, 
467]. 
Distance to fault locating 
equipment is available, working 
on the travelling wave principle. 
Taps on Petersen coils have to be changed 
when major system switching is performed 
(Comment: Sections of a network connected or 
disconnected).    Difficult to tell where faults are 
located [Westinghouse, 1944, 467] with 
electromechanical protection relays. 
Modern protection methods exist whereby the 
faulted feeder, faulted phase, and the fault 
location may be identified [Hänninen, 2001, 42] 
9 Transient 
overvoltages  
Up to 6 times normal peak 
phase-to-neutral voltage 
[Glover, 1978 or later, D-7]. 
A real life study by Allen and 
Waldorf [ 1946, 303 & 305] on 
a 13 kV busbar at a power 
station revealed maximum 
overvoltages of 3 times the 
normal peak phase-to-neutral 
voltage. 
A 140 kV network study by 
North & Eaton [1933, 70] 
revealed overvoltages of 3.5 
times the normal peak phase-
to-neutral voltage. 
Up to 2.5 times normal peak phase-to-
neutral voltage [Glover, 1978 or later, 
D-7] 
Up to 2.73 times normal phase-to- 
neutral voltage [Clark et al, 1938, 377]. 
Up to 2.5 times normal peak 
phase-to-neutral voltage for 
both high and low resistance 
earthing [Glover, 1978 or later, 
D-7 & North & Eaton 1933, 70]. 
Laboratory experiments conducted by Conwell 
& Evans [1922, 79] delivered overvoltages of 
2.5 times the normal peak phase-to-neutral 
voltage during earth faults. 
A 140 kV network study by North & Eaton [1933, 
70] revealed overvoltages of 2.7 times the 
normal peak phase-to-neutral voltage. 
Comment: This maximum overvoltage is not 
much lower than the 3 times normal peak 
phase-to-neutral voltage for an unearthed 
network, as found by Allen and Waldorf [ 1946, 
303 & 305]..    
10 Positive fault 
location  
No [Glover, 1978 or later, D-7] 
Modern protection methods 
exist whereby the faulted 
feeder, faulted phase, and the 
fault location may be identified 
[Hänninen, 2001, 42] 
Yes [Glover, 1978 or later, D-7] 
Methods to detect the earth fault 
location on radial networks include, 
travelling wave technique, earth fault 
initial charge transients can be utilised 
and Fourier transform methods 
[Hänninen, 2001, 55] 
Yes [Glover, 1978 or later, D-7] 
Methods to detect the earth 
fault location on radial networks 
include, travelling wave 
technique, earth fault initial 
charge transients can be 
utilised and Fourier transform 
methods [Hänninen, 2001, 55] 
Modern protection methods exist whereby the 
faulted feeder may be identified, as well as the 
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1st fault  
Sometimes [Glover, 1978 or 
later, D-7] 
Yes [Glover, 1978 or later, D-7] Optional for high resistance and 
Yes for low resistance earthing 
[Glover, 1978 or later, D-7] 
Sometimes  
12 Safety to 
personnel  
Poor [Glover, 1978 or later, D-
7] 
Fair [Glover, 1978 or later, D-7] Best for high resistance and 
good for low resistance earthing 
[Glover, 1978 or later, D-7] 
Fair, as most of the voltage drop during an earth 
fault will be across the Petersen coil, resulting in 
a low touch potential at the fault point.  This, in 
theory makes it safer than the other earthing 
methods, but human or animal contact with a 
phase conductor will most probably be lethal. 
13 I2t damage  Low [Glover, 1978 or later, D-
7] 
High [Glover, 1978 or later, D-7] Low to Medium [Glover, 1978 or 
later, D-7] Comment:  Damage 
depends on the level of 
resistance earthing, e.g. low 





Impossible [Glover, 1978 or 
later, D-7] 
Comment:  Protection co-
ordination with downstream 
protection devices is surely 
possible by means of time 
grading at least. 
Best [Glover, 1978 or later, 1978 or 
later, D-7] 
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3. Proposed Transient Earth Fault Clearing Method 
Based on the knowledge gained from the aforementioned text in this thesis, it is now 
possible to suggest a number of methods likely to assist clearing of transient earth faults. 
Four of the discussed earthing schemes are, to some extent, inherently capable of transient 
earth fault clearing without customer supply interruption.  These are the Petersen coil system 
due to the fact that it reduces the fault current to a very small value (mostly resistive current 
component) when tuned correctly, a solidly earthed network if the fault current can be 
interrupted “instantaneously”, a resistance earthed network due to its fault current limiting 
effect, and an unearthed network if the capacitive current is not too high (<9.5 A according to 
Lehtonen et al, [2001, 1185], or <35 A in the case of the German standard VDE 0228 (1987) 
[Hänninen, 2001, 16 and Cucic et al, 2008, 82]), which is dictated by the type and size of line 
construction, and the total length of lines connected to the same busbar.  The upper limit on 
capacitive fault current is imposed to still allow for reliable self-extinguishing of arcing earth 
faults in unearthed networks.  
The high resistance and Petersen coil network earthing types are both theoretically suitable 
for temporary conversion to unearthed networks, but as mentioned elsewhere, the Petersen 
coil earthed network is in general a better performing network than an unearthed network in 
terms of (claimed) overvoltages, due to arcing earth faults, and the maximum capacitive 
earth fault current that may be tolerated in such a network in order to allow reliable self-
extinguishing of arcing earth faults.  Consequently there is no value in temporary conversion 
of a Petersen coil earthed network to an unearthed network.  Basically the same argument 
applies to a high resistance earthed network as extreme overvoltages will not be generated 
due to arcing earth faults and arc self-extinguishing may be easily attained due to the small 
resistive earth fault current.   
Another factor that may render permanent conversion of a solid or resistance earthed 
network into a Petersen coil earthed network less effective, is a wood pole line construction.  
A wood pole line construction may force a large number of potential earth faults to develop 
into phase-to-phase faults [ABB, 1994, 97].  Most of Eskom’s MV lines consist of wood pole 
constructions.  
Low resistance earthed networks may contain transformers with graded insulation on the 
neutrals (HV networks), which render them unsuitable for unearthed network operation 
where the neutrals will be elevated to full normal phase-to-neutral voltage during an earth 
fault .  As a norm graded insulation only becomes economically viable on HV equipment, 
and MV equipment is normally fully insulated to withstand full phase-to-phase voltage to 
earth. 
None of the four network earthing philosophies specifically cater for transient earth fault 
clearing, but they are inherently able to clear transient earth faults without customer supply 
interruption if the cause of the fault, such as a tree branch momentarily touching a line 
conductor, moves away from the conductor before the protection operates to open the 
feeder circuit breaker or auto recloser. 
The proposed method of transient earth fault clearing on solid or resistance earthed 
networks is to, as fast as practically possible, temporarily disconnect the source 
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be to temporarily insert a high resistance (in the kilo-ohm range) in series between the 
transformer neutral and earth in order to limit the earth fault current to below, say, 1 A. 
The pre-requisite for this to be done upon detection of an earth fault is that the network 
insulation be rated to withstand full phase-to-phase voltage to earth.  Based on this 
insulation requirement, an existing solidly earthed network may not be suitable for temporary 
conversion to either a high resistance earthed or an unearthed network. 
In general MV networks and associated equipment such as transformers do not make use of 
graded insulation as the cost benefit is very marginal compared to being fully insulated for 
full phase-to-phase voltage to earth.  Surge arresters implemented on existing solidly 
earthed networks may have lower overvoltage ratings than those implemented on resistance 
earthed networks, and may require replacement. 
For convenience Table 2 provides a few network parameters needing special attention when 
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Table 2:   Network parameters needing special attention when a solid or low resistance earthed MV network is to be temporarily converted into an 
unearthed network. 
  Unearthed Network 
Requirements/characteristics 
Systems that are normally Solidly Earthed  Systems that are no rmally low Resistance 
Earthed 
1 Network insulation 
(all lines and 
primary plant 
equipment) 
All network equipment to be fully insulated, i.e. it 
must be able to withstand full phase-to-phase 
voltage between any live part and earth 
In general MV equipment insulation will be 
rated to withstand full phase-to-phase voltage 
between any live part and earth, but this 
needs to be verified for the given network.   
Graded transformer insulation is generally 
only adopted on HV networks.  
In general MV equipment insulation will be rated 
to withstand full phase-to-phase voltage 
between any live part and earth, but this needs 
to be verified for the given network.   
Graded transformer insulation is generally only 
adopted on HV networks.  
2 Arcing grounds The occurrence of arcing earth faults are very 
likely due to the capacitive fault current, and 
requires full phase-to-phase voltage network 
insulation. 
When operated as an unearthed network the 
occurrence of arcing earth faults are 
(apparently) very likely due to the capacitive 
fault current, and requires full phase-to-phase 
voltage network insulation. 
This type of network will most probably not 
require upgrading of the network’s insulation 
level, as solidly earthed MV networks are 
generally fully insulated to withstand full 
phase-to-phase voltage between any live part 
and earth.  Solidly earthed HV systems will 
most likely employ graded insulation. 
When operated as an unearthed network the 
occurrence of arcing earth faults are very likely 
due to the capacitive fault current, and requires 
full phase-to-phase voltage network insulation. 
This type of network will most probably not 
require upgrading of the network’s insulation 
level, as resistance earthed MV networks are 
generally fully insulated to withstand full phase-
to-phase voltage between any live part and 
earth.  This makes temporary conversion to an 
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Table 2:   Continued 
  Unearthed Network Requirements/characterist ics  Systems that are normally Solidly 
Earthed 
Systems that are normally low 
Resistance Earthed 
3 Lightning protection  
(surge arresters) 
Surge arresters must be rated for full phase-to-phase voltage.  
The MCOV voltage rating commonly used is 1.83 times 
normal phase-to-neutral voltage [Clarke et al, 1939, 383].  
Surge arresters applied to a solidly 
earthed network may not be suitable for 
application on a solidly earthed network 
which is to be temporarily converted to 
an unearthed network.  These surge 
arresters are to be replaced with 
arresters having a MCOV rating equal ot 
about full phase-to-phase voltage, which 
will have a cost implication. 
Surge arresters applied to 
resistance earthed networks are 
generally rated for full phase-to-
phase voltage, and may therefore 
not have a cost implication when 
required to temporarily operate the 
resistance earthed network as an 
unearthed network.  
Eskom employs a 1.9 times normal 
phase-to-neutral voltage rating 
factor to determine the surge 
arrester’s MCOV rating. 
4 Safety to 
personnel/public 
The inherent benefit of an unearthed network is the fact that it 
may be operated for extended periods with one permanent 
earth fault on the network.  This poses a risk to personnel and 
the public alike as a live conductor may be lying on the ground.  
This very same condition may, however, be experienced with 
solid, resistance and impedance earthed networks during high 
impedance earth fault conditions.  This therefore does not 
render the unearthed network more dangerous than other 
networks, especially not in the case of a network momentarily 
converted into an unearthed network as the unearthed state will 
only be maintained for tens of seconds as opposed to a 
permanently unearthed network or a permanent high 
impedance earth fault. 
Same as for unearthed network. Same as for unearthed network. 
5 Multiple faults Emanating from the literature study, arcing earth faults on 
unearthed networks may lead to insulation failures on the two 
healthy phases or equipment during an earth fault, which will 
result in more than one network fault, most likely a phase-to-
phase fault. 











  Page 52 
3.1. Temporarily Disconnecting the Neutral Earth Connection of a Solid or Low 
Resistance Earthed Network 
In a solid or low resistance earthed network the feeder breaker will most probably be opened 
for the majority of transient earth faults as arcing may not self-extinguish due to high earth 
fault currents. 
It is envisaged that significant benefit may be derived from combining some of the 
advantages of both solid and low resistance earthed networks with the advantages of an 
unearthed network by temporarily converting such existing networks into unearthed networks 
upon detection of an earth fault. 
It may be argued that by temporarily disconnecting the source transformer’s MV neutral 
connection to earth, and effectively temporarily converting a network from solid or low 
resistance earthed to unearthed, that the action may allow transient earth faults to be 
cleared without the need to trip the feeder breaker, or any recloser upstream from the fault.   
If the source transformer’s neutral is disconnected during an earth fault on a solid or low 
resistance earthed network, the fault current magnitude will be reduced dramatically at the 
instant of opening of the circuit breaker, and the fault current will then only consist of the 
vector sum of the phase-to-earth capacitive currents of the two healthy phases.   It is 
envisaged that the dramatic reduction in fault current will r duce the likelihood and severity 
of arcing significantly, and that the arcing will quench quicker, as the object causing the fault 
moves/drops away from the live conductor or apparatus.  This implies that the disconnected 
neutral connection to earth should remain disconnected for long enough to allow the object 
to drop clear, which could take a number of seconds, say between 5s and 10s.  This will 
then be the minimum dead time settings of the neutral circuit breaker. 
The optimal duration of the neutral circuit breaker dead time for a practical application of 
such a protection scheme will have to be determined through experience gained over some 
period of operating such a network.  The length of the dead time will not have an impact on 
overvoltages due to arcing earth faults as the maximum overvoltages are being generated, 
according to the studied literature, within the first power frequency cycles after an arcing fault 
inception on an unearthed network Eaton et al [1931, 1476].  In this case then, as soon as 
the neutral circuit breaker starts to open to create a temporary unearthed network, with an 
arcing earth fault still present, overvoltages are expected to be generated by the arcing, as 
predicted by the studied literature.   
The intention is to interrupt the normal earth fault current as quickly as possible (without any 
intentional time delay) in order to prevent excessive air ionization from taking place, and also 
to prevent the normal protection from tripping the feeder breaker, or downstream auto-
recloser, depending on the earth fault location.  If ionized air is present at the fault point the 
chances of continued arcing after the neutral circuit breaker has opened is increased.  Also if 
and arcing fault has cleared after opening of the neutral circuit breaker and the dead time is 
too short (1 or 2 seconds for instance), ionized air may cause the fault to re-establish itself 
after the neutral breaker has closed.  In this regard the weather may play a roll, for example, 
wind will quickly blow away ionized air making it more difficult for an arc to sustain itself. 
In unearthed systems the network insulation level needs to be rated for at least full phase-to-
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and the two healthy phase voltages may rise to normal phase-to-phase voltage during an 
earth fault on one phase. 
An arcing earth fault may theoretically result in overvoltages of up to 6 times normal phase-
to-neutral voltage [Evans et al, 1939, 392; Glovers 1978 or later, D-2 and Uppal, 1984, 911], 
and the system insulation needs to be able to withstand these overvoltages.  Physical 
measurements on unearthed networks did not substantiate this claim as the maximum 
overvoltages measures were not more than 3 times normal phase-to-neutral voltage, which 
occured most frequently during the first cycle of the fault [Eaton et al, 1931,1475 – 1478].   
The neutrals of substation transformers therefore need to be fully insulated and not partially 
graded, but this should not be a problem on MV networks as insulation grading is normally 
applied to high voltage transformers only, and not on MV transformers.  In the case of MV 
delta windings where neutral earth compensators with a neutral resistor (NECR) are utilized, 
the NECR neutral has to be fully insulated.   
Apart from being able to withstand the expected earth fault current the neutral circuit breaker 
also needs to withstand normal phase-to-phase voltage, plus a safety margin, across its 
open contacts. 
For a utility currently employing either solid or low resistance earthed MV networks it may 
not be feasible to convert these networks to Petersen coil earthed networks or even build all 
new networks based on Petersen coil earthing as this will require a change in protection 
equipment, protection philosophy, training of protection personnel in the new protection 
philosophy, training the network operating personnel in the working of the Petersen coils and 
adapting new network fault locating methods, and the Petersen coil itself may prove much 
more expensive than the neutral circuit breaker (including associated protection).   
Changing a solid or low resistance earthed method to one where the neutral is temporarily (a 
few seconds) disconnected from earth, will not require any feeder fault locating method 
change (as the change in network earthing is only being done temporarily), but do require a 
slight earth fault protection philosophy change.  Most modern numeric protection relays will 
be able to cater for such a protection philosophy change, therefore not requiring any 
protection refurbishment where these relays are employed. 
Based on the findings of Allen & Waldorf [1946, 303], it seems most probable that even a 
network temporarily converted from solid or low resistance earthed into an unearthed 
network, will have to be able to withstand the inevitable overvoltages of up to 3 times normal 
phase-to-neutral voltage on the healthy phases for the duration of the dead time of the 
neutral circuit breaker. 
As overvoltages may pose a problem when arcing earth faults occur during the time when 
the neutral is disconnected from earth, it is suggested that surge arresters rated for at least 
full phase-to-phase voltage be employed throughout the MV network.  Gapless metal oxide 
surge arresters should be used as they control overvoltages in a smooth fashion, as 
opposed to gapped arresters which has a tendency to abruptly conduct or quench current 
flow.  The abrupt termination of current flow may trigger re-striking of the fault due to high 
recovery voltages.  On the other hand, spark gaps, once flashed over, keep on conducting 
50 Hz current to earth until the current through it is interrupted.  Operation of a spark gap will 
invariably result in opening of the upstream circuit breaker, thus defeating the object of 
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Permanently converting a solid or low resistance earthed network to an unearthed neutral 
network is not considered an option due mainly to the problem of (claimed) overvoltages 
caused by arcing earth faults, and the requirement for special protection to identify a specific 
feeder and phase with a permanent fault. This will also constitute a whole protection and 
feeder fault locating philosophy change within a utility not currently operating unearthed 
networks.  
3.1.1. Enhancement of the Proposed Transient Earth Fault Clearing Method  
As evident from the literature study arcing earth faults and their associated overvoltages may 
be problematic on unearthed overhead lines, especially long lines where the phase-to-earth 
capacitance is large, resulting in high capacitive earth fault currents.   
The mail foreseen problem with the proposed transient earth fault clearing method is that 
arcing earth faults are relied upon to self-extinguish, but an enhancement to the scheme will 
actively extinguish an arcing earth fault. 
A method to quench arcing earth faults in unearthed networks shortly after inception has 
been proposed by Dutoit et al [2005, 1], Dutoit & Gonzalez [2009, 1] and Koeppl et al [2005, 
1], and works on the principle of short circuiting the faulted phase to earth.  Burkholder & 
Marvin [1911, 327] suggested a similar method, called an “insulator protector”, in order to 
prevent arc damage to glass insulators during insulator flashovers, as a result of lightning. 
This arc quenching method requires, apart from the proposed neutral circuit breaker of the 
transient earth fault clearing scheme, an additional three single phase circuit breakers to be 
installed, one on each phase, between each phase and earth.  See Figure 19.  They are 
normally in the open position. The most logical location for installation of such single phase 
earthing breakers would be within the source substation on the MV busbar.   
As for the proposed transient earth fault clearings scheme, this arc quenching method 
operates for the whole network connected to the same busbar as the single phase earthing 
breakers/switches. 
When employing the method suggested by Dutoit and Gonzalez [2009, 1], Koeppl et al 
[2005, 1], and Burkholder and Marvin [1911, 327], in conjunction with the suggested 
transient earth fault clearing protection scheme, the method of operation would be as 
follows.  These single phase switches or circuit breakers will operate in conjunction with the 
neutral circuit breaker, or breakers.  When an earth fault occurs on, say, the b-phase, the 
neutral breaker/s will open instantaneously upon fault detection, the b-phase switch/breaker 
will close shortly afterwards to short circuit the fault and solidly earth the b-phase, thus 
preventing arcing at the fault point.  After a set time the b-phase earthing switch/breaker will 
open, and the neutral circuit breaker/s will close shortly afterwards restoring the network to 
its normal state.   
A transient fault would have been cleared by this action, and the network would not have 
been subjected to any supply interruption or overvoltage transients.   
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, overvoltages due to arcing earth faults, are being 
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of an earth fault Eaton et al [1931, 1475 - 1478].  The same will therefore happen at the 
instant that a solid or low resistance earthed network is being converted to a temporary 
unearthed network during an earth fault condition.  If then the researched literature is 
correct, such a temporary unearthed network will most probably experience transient 
overvoltages on the network while there is an arcing earth fault on the line. 
Permanent earth faults will require further action by the normal protection after closure of the 
neutral circuit breaker, and will disconnect the faulted feeder after going through the 
standard ARC sequence. 
 
Figure 19:  A variation on the proposed neutral earth switching, whereby three normally open 
single phase circuit breakers are installed between each phase and earth, in addition to the 
neutral circuit breaker. 
The concept of earthing the faulty phase of an unearthed network was not pursued as it 
would have been more costly, more difficult to implement as a trial site, and more time 
consuming.  This method may well be more applicable to larger networks (larger conductor 
capacitance-to-earth) where large capacitive currents may prevent reliable fault arc 
extinction when temporarily converting a resistance earthed network to an unearthed 
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4. Transient Earth Fault Clearing Scheme  
4.1. A Typical Transient Earth Fault Clearing Scheme 
Assume a typical step down substation from 66kV to 11kV with two 10MVA star/delta 
transformers, a NECR on the MV side of each transformer, a MV bus section circuit breaker 
and one MV line feeding from each of the two bus sections. 
The neutral-to-earth connections of the two NECRs will have to be disconnected from the 
substation earth mat.  Next the two NECR neutrals are connected together on one side of a 
single phase circuit breaker, and the other side of the circuit breaker is bonded to the 
substation earth mat.  It goes without saying that the single pole circuit breaker needs to be 
adequately rated to carry the combined maximum earth fault current of the two NECRs and 
have an appropriate voltage rating of normal phase-to-neutral voltage plus some safety 
margin.  See Figure 20 which depicts a substation station electrical diagram indicating the 
application of a neutral circuit breaker.  As the HV protection has o bearing on this 
discussion, only the MV protection has been indicated. 
If so desired, two single pole circuit breakers may be used, for switching each of the NECR 
neutrals individually during conditions when the bus section circuit breaker is open. 
An instantaneous (no intentional time delay) earth fault protection element is to be used to 
control the neutral circuit breaker. 
It is intended that the transient earth fault clearing protection scheme be set to detect any 
earth fault from well below sensitive earth fault (SEF) level upward, and trip the neutral circuit 
breaker without any intentional time delay.  For the purpose of this document a SEF is 
defined as a high resistance earth fault resulting in a fault current in the range of about 3 A 
up to the earth fault protection pick-up setting.   
The SEF protection pick-up setting may typically be set within a range of 3 A to 15 A with a 
definite trip time of 5 to 15 seconds, depending on protection grading requirements.  
Practical experience gained from protection operations on Eskom overhead MV networks 
indicates that current pick-up settings below 3 A may give rise to nuisance tripping due to 
normal network imbalances as a result of load imbalances and single phase fuse operations.  
A normal earth fault protection pick-up setting for the Eskom MV networks would typically be 
in the range of 40 A to 80 A with a normal inverse definite minimum time lag (IDMTL) 
characteristic for a resistance earthed network.   
As the neutral circuit breaker protection scheme will be measuring the actual earth fault 
current only, flowing through the NECR neutrals, its earth fault pick-up may be set lower than 
that of the SEF trip settings employed in the standard MV feeder protection schemes, which 
derives the earth fault current from the summation of the three phase current transformers 
(larger measurement error).  For this reason the neutral circuit breaker trip pick-up setting 
may be set very low, say to 1 A, as there should only be a current in the NECR neutrals 
during an earth fault.  
The neutral circuit breaker protection is therefore required to cover a settings range from 
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to set the pick-up as low as possible in order to detect all earth faults, does not matter how 
small as all have the potential of developing into permanent faults.  
 
Figure 20:   AC key diagram (only MV protection indicated) of a typical 66 kV/11 kV step 
down substation showing the implementation of a neutral circuit breaker. 
4.2. Operation of the Transient Earth Fault Clearing Scheme 
4.2.1. Transient Earth Fault Clearing 
The transient earth fault clearing protection scheme (TEFCS), as proposed in Figure 20 , will 
sense the presence of an earth fault condition and instead of opening the faulted feeder’s 3-
phase circuit breaker, the neutral circuit breaker will be opened instantaneously (about 60 ms 
for protection and circuit breaker operation) upon detection of an earth fault.  The neutral 
circuit breaker will be opened for a predetermined time (dead time) after which it will be 
closed again.  This neutral breaker auto-reclose (ARC) action will only happen once for any 
given earth fault.  Thereafter the normal feeder protection will operate as required for 
permanent earth faults. 
For a substation with more than one NECR, each on its own bus section, the NECR neutrals 
may be connected together and connected to earth via one adequately rated normally closed 
neutral circuit breaker.  This saves the cost of an additional neutral circuit breaker and its 
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breaker is acceptable, even though the MV busbar may be separated into two sections by 
the bus section circuit breaker. 
It is deemed acceptable to disconnect both NECR neutrals simultaneously from earth even 
though only one NECR will pass fault current through its neutral.  The reason for this is that 
the neutral circuit breaker will never be in the open state for longer than a few tens of 
seconds, which is the dead time of the neutral circuit breaker (proposal is 10 to 20 s), and it 
is not required for passing load current.  The protection should be set such that the neutral 
circuit breaker cannot locked out in the open position due to a protection operation.  Through 
this action no risk is being posed to the unfaulted 3-wire network and no disturbance will be 
experienced by the customers on such a network as they are being supplied through 
delta/star distribution transformers.   
At the instant of fault inception on a solid or low resistance earthed network, the phase-to-
earth voltages of the two healthy phases of the whole network will rise to some value 
between the normal phase-to-neutral voltage and full normal phase-to-phase voltage due to 
the fault current flowing through the NECR resistor.  The voltage rise magnitude is 
determined by the NECR resistor value, the fault current magnitude (assuming a good 
substation earth mat), and the fault point resistance.  The higher the current and the neutral 
resistor value, the higher the neutral voltage rise with respect to earth.  The higher the fault 
point resistance, the lower the neutral voltage rise with respect to earth. 
Upon opening the neutral circuit breaker the network is temporarily converted into an 
unearthed network.  The only current flowing back to the source would be the vector sum of 
the phase-to-earth capacitive currents of the two healthy phases of all the feeders feeding 
from the same busbar as the faulted feeder, similar to those currents indicated in Figure 5.   
For calculation purposes the capacitances of all the feeders connected to the same busbar 
as the faulted feeder may be lumped together.  As only transient earth faults are of interest 
the magnitude of the total phase-to-earth capacitive current is of little concern as it is 
assumed that the object causing the earth fault will “disappear” by itself and the fault will be 
cleared.  It would be safe to assume that all transient earth faults will lead to arcing as an arc 
will be drawn during the fault clearing process while the object responsible for the fault is in 
the process of moving away from the live conductor.   
In this regard Lehtonen et al [2001, 1185] found during an unearthed 20 kV network study 
that 67% of earth faults were arcing faults and that the average duration of arcing was 60 
ms.  The study does not make mention of what the cause of these arcing earth faults were, 
but it is very unlikely that they were caused by, for example tree branches or animals that 
made contact with a live conductor, as it would take much longer than 60 ms for them to 
move away far enough from the conductor to a point where arcing would stop.  
In the event of a transient earth fault due to an animal or tree branch briefly touching a live 
conductor of an overhead line, the fault will be successfully cleared if the animal or branch is 
to fall/move away far enough from the conductor during the dead time of the neutral breaker 
for the capacitive current arc to be extinguished.   
Before the inception of an earth fault the phase-to-earth capacitive currents of the three 
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standard 3-wire Eskom 11 kV delta configured untransposed overhead line structure are 
listed in Table 4, and it shows that the imbalance is in the order of 2.5%. 
While the earth fault is in progress the capacitive currents-to-earth of the three phases will 
become imbalanced as the capacitance of the faulted phase is being short circuited by 
whatever is causing the earth fault.   
At the instant that the cause of a transient earth fault is being removed from the conductor 
(i.e. the faulted phase’s phase-to-earth capacitance is no longer shorted out), during the 
dead time of the neutral circuit breaker, the capacitive currents-to-earth of the three phases 
will return to the balanced state, the phase-to-earth voltage of all three phases will return to 
normal, and no capacitive current will flow to earth.   
The neutral-to-earth voltage (zero sequence voltage) is an indication of the phase-to-earth 
voltage imbalance on a network, and is a convenient quantity to measure as the reduction in 
zero sequence voltage may be used to close the neutral circuit breaker as soon as the 
transient fault cleared, instead of waiting for the dead time to expire.  
Small phase-to-earth capacitance imbalances will exist on all overhead lines where line 
structures, unsymmetrical with respect to earth (e.g. flat, delta or staggered vertical 
arrangements), are being used, which will result in a zero sequence voltage on the NECR 
neutral.  This zero sequence voltage is much smaller than what would be experienced during 
an earth fault and will therefore not impact on the decision of whether an earth fault is still 
present, or not. 
4.2.2. Permanent Earth Fault Clearing by Three Pole Tripping 
In the event of a permanent earth fault the neutral circuit breaker will auto reclose (ARC) 
once, as for a transient earth fault, as no distinction can be made between a transient and 
permanent fault at inception of the fault.   After the neutral circuit breaker has closed the 3-
phase feeder circuit breaker will be tripped after some set time delay, and will go through the 
normal ARC sequence as per the utility’s ARC philosophy.  It is not foreseen that any 
protection settings of the existing standard Eskom protection scheme will need to be 
changed in order to implement the TEFCS, but this is subject to change on findings during 
the commissioning tests and trial site operating performance data.  The TEFCS may be 
viewed as an additional earth fault “protection layer” installed below the existing protection in 
order to filter out the transient earth faults. 
Just before inception of a permanent earth fault the three phase-to-earth capacitive currents 
are equal in magnitude, bar the imbalance caused by unsymmetrical line structures.  Upon 
inception of the earth fault, as with the transient fault, the phase-to-earth capacitive currents 
become imbalanced due to the capacitance-to-earth of the faulted phase being short 
circuited by the fault. 
During an earth fault the earthing resistance (NECR) causes a rise in the phase-to-earth 
voltage on the two healthy phases, up to the normal phase-to-earth voltage, which is 
determined by the fault current magnitude, the NECR resistor value and the fault point 
resistance.   The higher the NECR resistor value or fault current, the higher the voltage rises 
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potential.  The higher the fault point resistance the lower the neutral voltage rise with respect 
to earth.  This situation is valid for as long as the NECR neutral is connected to earth via the 
neutral circuit breaker. 
Upon opening of the neutral circuit breaker the NECR neutral-to-earth voltage will be raised 
to the normal line-to-neutral voltage as the faulted phase is tied to earth by the low 
resistance fault.  As a result of this the two healthy phases will now experience full phase-to-
phase voltage to earth as indicated in Figure 4.  
As per Table 1, rising of the healthy phases’ voltages, with respect to earth, to full phase-to-
phase voltage during an earth fault (assuming zero fault impedance) is not unique to 
unearthed neutral networks as solid, resistance and impedance earthed networks all suffer 
from the same problem.  It is therefore a requirement that all these networks be insulated 
from earth to withstand full phase-to-phase voltage to earth, plus a safety margin for extra 
security.  Temporarily converting an existing low resistance earthed network to an unearthed 
neutral network should therefore not present a problem in terms of insulation as all 
equipment associated with the network, such as transformers, insulators and surge 
arresters, have to be insulated for full phase-to-phase voltage to earth anyhow.  The degree 
of insulation should, however, be verified for each network before applying a TEFCS. 
The full phase-to-phase voltage to earth will be impressed upon the two healthy phases 
when zero fault resistance is present, i.e. the worst situation for a network with an unearthed 
neutral.  Any fault resistance will have the effect of decreasing the neutral-to-earth voltage, 
and simultaneously also decreasing the two healthy phases’ phase-to-earth voltages. 
While the neutral circuit breaker is open, and the faulted phase is connected to earth, the 
earth fault current (residual current) measured by the feeder protection at the source 
substation is the vector sum of the capacitive currents of the phase-to-earth capacitances of 
the two healthy phases as indicated in Figure 4.    
Due to the low resistance earth fault (permanent fault) there is no possibility of restoring the 
feeder to normal.  The neutral circuit breaker will close after the dead time and the 3-phase 
feeder breaker or downstream auto-recloser, depending on the fault location, will go through 
the set ARC cycle and lock out, i.e. disconnecting the feeder from the busbar at the source 
substation, or the network downstream of the auto-recloser, as dictated by the fault location.  
4.3. Safety of the Transient Earth Fault Clearing Scheme 
The international standard on “Effects of current on human beings and livestock”, IEC 
60479-1: 2005 states, amongst others, the following: 
1. For voltages ≥1000V the internal human body resistance of 50% of the population is 
about 775 Ω. 
2. The let go threshold for an adult male is 10 mA. 
3. Ventricular fibrillation may occur for current magnitudes above 500 mA for shock 
durations below 100 ms.  
4. Currents >500 mA through the human body from hand to feet for longer than 500 ms 
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5. With currents of several amperes lasting more than seconds, deep-seated burns and 
other internal injuries may occur.   Surface burns may also be seen.  
6. An average human body may endure  
• about 1250 mA for 10ms 
• about 900 mA for 100 ms 
• about 105 mA for 1000 ms 
• about 65 mA for 10 s, for a 50% probability for onset of ventricular fibrillation. 
The Eskom Distribution standard on the application of sensitive earth fault protection 
provides the following SEF setting ranges: 
 Current:  3 A ≤ Ipick-up≤6 A  
   Trip time:  5 s ≤ Ttrip≤15 s 
In the case of a solid or resistance earthed network any EF above the SEF pick-up and 
below the EF pick-up will cause the circuit breaker (CB) to be tripped in the SEF definite trip 
time.  In light of the IEC standard extracts above, the long SEF trip times will probably be 
lethal for human and animal alike in most accidental type contact incidents.   EF protection 
from a survival point of view will not be any better as the IDMTL trip time may also be in the 
range of seconds, depending on the fault current magnitude.  
In the event of an earth fault on a solid or resistance earthed network, employing a TEFCS, 
the resistive earth fault current will be interrupted within about 90 ms (neutral circuit breaker 
plus protection operating time) by the neutral circuit breaker, leaving only the lower 
capacitive current (sum of the phase-to-earth capacitive currents of the two healthy phases) 
to flow.   
This lower fault current may allow quicker fault clearing (due to less arcing and less ionized 
air) and less burn damage inside and on the skin of a human or animal body in the event of 
a contact incident, than in the case where SEF protection is called upon to clear a similar 
fault. 
It should be borne in mind that no existing protection technique will save a human or animal 
life in the event of good electrical contact with a live conductor.  
Table 3 provides a short comparison of the effectiveness of transient earth fault clearing on a 
solid or low resistance earthed network with and without transient earth fault clearing 
capability for different earth fault types, compared to the capability of a normal earth fault 













  Page 62 
Table 3:   Effectiveness of transient earth fault clearing on a solid or low resistance earthed 
network with and without transient earth fault clearing capability for different earth fault types. 
 
Earth Fault Type 
Solid or low resistance 
earthed network 
Solid or low resistance earthed 
network fitted with transient earth 
fault clearing capability 




All three phases will be tripped, 
resulting in total supply loss to 
customers.   
(If single phase tripping 
functionality is employed a three-
phase customers would have one 
healthy LV supply voltage and two 
phases at half normal voltage due 
to delta/star MV/LV distribution 
transformers, and two healthy 
phases in the case of star/star 
MV/LV distribution transformers, 
for the duration of the dead time of 
the single pole feeder circuit 
breaker.) 
Initially only the neutral circuit breaker will be 
opened (if the fault current magnitude is 
above its pick-up setting) for a short duration 
(10 to 20 s), allowing the object causing the 
fault to fall clear of the line/equipment.  The 
neutral circuit breaker will close and a reset 
time of 30 s is started.  If successful 
(transient earth fault) it would have 
prevented a customer supply interruption.   
In the event of a permanent fault the normal 
feeder protection should clear the permanent 
fault, if the fault current is above the feeder’s 
SEF or EF protection pick-up settings, within 
the 30 s reset time of the neutral circuit 
breaker by tripping all three phases (feeder 
breaker or an auto-recloser upstream of the 
fault). 
2 MV Sensitive earth 
fault (SEF) 
As for MV earth fault above. As for MV earth faults above. 
3 MV Conductor on the 
ground on the 
source  side of the 
fault 
This is a permanent fault, which 
may or may not fall into the 
sensitive earth fault category.  
The three phases will be 
disconnected by the feeder 
breaker or auto-recloser upstream 
of the fault, if the fault current is 
above the feeder’s SEF or EF 
protection pick-up settings. 
This is a permanent fault, which may or may 
not fall into the sensitive earth fault category.  
Initially only the neutral circuit breaker will be 
opened for a short duration (10 to 20 s), if 
the fault current magnitude is above its pick-
up setting.  The neutral circuit breaker will 
close and a reset time of 30 s is started 
during which the normal protection should 
clear the fault. 
The three phases will be disconnected by the 
feeder breaker or auto-recloser upstream of 
the fault, if the fault current is above the 
feeder’s SEF or EF protection pick-up 
settings. 
4 MV Conductor on the 
ground on the load  
side of the fault 
As above for the MV Conductor 
on the ground on the source  side 
of the fault, if the fault is detected 
by both the neutral circuit breaker 
protection and normal feeder 
protection. 
As above for the MV Conductor on the 
ground on the source  side of the fault, if the 
fault is detected by both the neutral circuit 
breaker protection and normal feeder 
protection. 
If the fault is only being detected by the 
neutral circuit breaker protection it will open 
and close again after the dead time.  It will 
then stay closed for 30 s, the reset time, 
during which the normal protection should 
have operated.  After expiry of the reset time 
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5. Trial Site Proposal 
5.1. Trial Site Selection 
From the onset of this thesis the aim was to, through a literature study, determine the 
feasibility of a protection scheme specifically aimed at clearing of transient earth faults on an 
existing solid or resistance earthed MV network without customer supply interruptions.  The 
low resistance earthed MV network is of special interest as it is widely applied within Eskom.   
In Eskom, as it should be in all electricity supply utilities, there is an active drive to reduce 
the number of supply interruptions by, for example, performing required maintenance on 
time, replace obsolete equipment before failure rates escalate too much and to do effective 
vegetation management in substations and in line servitudes.  Apart from these normal 
activities continuous improvement is sought through innovative thinking.   
One initiative that came about is the proposal to establish a transient earth fault clearing 
(TEFCS) trial site to investigate a non supply disruptive method of earth fault clearing.  The 
decision to establish a TEFCS trial site was based on guidance by findings during the 
literature study, taking into account the suitability of the existing MV networks to 
accommodate such a proposed method, the time frame within which a trial site may be 
established, consequential training of operators and network control centre personnel, and 
the actual trial site cost. 
The literature study revealed advantages and disadvantages of different earthing methods, 
and although the Petersen coil earthed network seems to be favoured by many authors, it 
was decided to establish a TEFCS trial site based on the unearthed neutral network 
principle.  This decision was mainly based on its simplicity of implementation and operation, 
the easy availability of the necessary equipment, relative inexpensiveness to implement, and 
the familiarity of staff with the equipment being used. 
This trial site will be established on a typical Eskom rural overhead 3-wire delta configured 
11 kV low resistance earthed network.  The Eskom 11kV and 22kV overhead networks are 
being fed by star/delta substation power transformers and the customers are being supplied 
by pole-mounted delta/star distribution transformers.  Any neutral voltage shift on the MV 
network would therefore not affect the customer’s LV voltage levels.  All star/delta substation 
power transformers have neutral earth compensators with neutral resistors (NECRs) on the 
delta side.  The neutral resistor limits the earth fault current to 360 A per substation 
transformer. 
The selected trial site is a 66/11 kV step-down substation comprising two 66/11 kV 10 MVA 
star/delta transformers with an NECR each, and four MV feeders out of the substation with a 
total combined length of 217 km overhead lines, including a small cable section on one of 
the feeders. 
At this point it may be noted that the trial site is located in a high soil resistivity area 
comprising river sand and lots of boulders, where sensitive earth faults sometimes goes 
undetected by the conventional protection. 
As part of the planned trial site a protection scheme specific to the TEFCS will have to be 
installed in the substation for controlling of the neutral circuit breaker.  This protection 
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schemes, and it will operate much faster than the conventional protection.  Therefore there is 
no need for protection coordination between the TEFCS protection and the conventional 
protection of the MV feeders.   
Due to the unavailability of an appropriately rated single phase circuit breaker a standard 
stock 3-phase pole-mounted auto recloser will fulfil this function.  The recloser circuit breaker 
and control box will be mounted on an existing substation structure between the two NECRs. 
Two of the three recloser main contacts will be used to connect the two NECR neutrals to 
earth. 
The station electrical diagram of the substation, identified for the proposed TEFCS trial site, 
amended to incorporate the neutral circuit breaker (auto-recloser) and its associated 
protection, is depicted in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21:   Station electrical diagram / AC key diagram of the proposed transient earth fault 
clearing scheme trial site substation. 
For drawing clarity purposes only protection for two of the four MV feeders has been 
indicated on the station electrical diagram / AC key diagram of the trial site substation.  
Three of the MV feeders (Farmers 1, 2 & 3) are overhead and one is partly overhead and 
partly cable (Munic Feeder).  The bus section circuit breaker is normally in the closed 
position and is normally only used during maintenance and substation fault situations.  In the 
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Interlinking points between the different MV feeders is not indicated on the diagram (see 
Figure 25).  During commissioning testing of the trial site these interlinking points will be 
utilized to arrange the feeders from one feeder (fault throw feeder), two feeders, three 
feeders, or all four feeders on one busbar (bus section circuit breaker closed). 
One major benefit of the Eskom MV overhead networks, with respect to implementation of 
the trial site, is that they are all fully insulated for phase-to-phase voltage to earth.  This 
implies that all line insulators, surge arresters, all equipment connected to the lines and all 
substation equipment are fully insulated for normal phase-to-phase voltage to earth.  All 3-
wire MV networks utilize NECRs, of which the neutrals are fully insulated for normal phase-
to-neutral voltage. 
All pole-mounted line equipment is supposed to be fitted with gapless metal-oxide surge 
arresters (MOVs) with the following rating:  12 kV maximum continuous overvoltage (MCOV) 
and 10 kA peak value lightning current impulse (In).  It is foreseen that these surge arresters 
will all contribute to quench any prospective overvoltages generated by arcing earth faults. 
Even though the NECR neutrals are fully insulated for normal phase-to- eutral voltage, the 
neutrals will be further protected by equipping them with gapless metal-oxide surge arresters 
(MOVs) with the following rating:  8 kV maximum continuous overvoltage (MCOV) and 10 kA 
peak value lightning current impulse (In).  
As all studied literature indicated that phase-to-earth capacitance (capacitive fault current) is 
the single most important factor limiting the implementation of an unearthed network earthing 
philosophy, it seems fitting to perform calculations to determine the line capacitance and line 
charging currents of the Eskom 3-wire delta configured 11 kV lines to be used for the trial 
site.  The calculation results are deemed important due to the fact that Lehtonen et al, [2001, 
1185] found 9.5 A and the German standard, VDE 0228 (1987) [Hänninen, 2001, 16 and 
Cucic et al, 2008, 82], specify 35 A to be the upper limit of capacitive fault current to still 
allow for reliable self-extinguishing of arcing earth faults. 
Calculation of these phase-to-earth capacitance values and the prospective capacitive 
current magnitudes during earth fault conditions will provide some pre-commissioning 
knowledge about the fault currents to be expected during commissioning of the TEFCS.   
The results of a few calculations are tabulated in Table 4.  These calculations have been 
performed by means of MathCad and one set of calculations for the abovementioned MV 
line is attached in Annex A. 
Table 4 should be read in conjunction with Figure 22 which indicates the capacitive current 
flow during an earth fault. 
As one would expect, it may be seen from Table 4 that there is a linear increase in phase-to-
earth capacitance and in capacitive charging current as the line length is increased.  No 
provision has been made in the calculation for the effect of buildings or trees in close 
proximity to the lines, vegetation such as bushes and vineyards under the lines, variations in 
conductor height above ground level, and the proximity of other power lines.  These factors 
may all have an influence on the phase-to-earth capacitance and may therefore influence 
the capacitive earth fault current magnitude, which may again have an effect on the success 
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Based on the literature study the abovementioned factors seem to be having a minor 
influence on the phase-to-earth capacitance as mention thereof was totally lacking from all 
the studied literature. 
When comparing the calculated capacitive earth fault currents listed in Table 4 with the 
maximum current limits to ensure self-extinguishing of arcing earth faults, as proposed by 
Lehtonen et al [2001, 1185], 9.5 A, and by the German standard, VDE 0228 (1987) 
[Hänninen, 2001, 16 and Cucic et al, 2008, 82], 35 A, it effectively implies that the maximum 
total connected Eskom 11 kV feeder length connected to the same busbar should not 
exceed 39.4 km in the case of Lehtonen and 145.2 km in the case of the German standard.   
This wide variation in allowable maximum capacitive earth fault current will have to be 
verified with the TEFCS trial site, if the network’s capacitive current is large enough, as there 
are obviously environmental factors or line design/construction factors dictating the 
maximum allowable feeder length, which have not been addressed by the studied literature.  
The maximum allowable feeder length to ensure self-extinguishing of arcing earth faults will 
definitely determine the economic viability, or not, of the proposed transient earth fault 
clearing principle. 
As may be seen from Table 4, the phase-to-phase capacitance values are about half the 
size of the phase-to-earth capacitance values, and this fact is also reflected in the total 
capacitive current flowing back to the source in the faulted phase.  This will obviously not 
influence the self-extinguishing ability of arcing earth faults, as this additional capacitive 
current is not passing through the fault point, but may need to be taken into account when 
determining an appropriate protection setting for a feeder when operating as an unearthed 
network.  
The phase-to-phase capacitive current magnitudes are determined by the physical 
conductor spacing and line length.  
Physical selection of the transient earth fault clearing protection scheme trial site was based 
on the following criteria: 
• Stakeholders of this specific Eskom substation and 11kV network are supportive of 
the idea to try a method specifically aimed at earth fault clearing that may be able to 
reduce the number of permanent faults and consequential network outages, in order 
to improve CAIDI and CAIFI performance figures. 
• It is a rural network within reasonable distance from the main Eskom Distribution 
technical centre, thus making it easy to attend to unforeseen problems and enable 
regular site visits during the trial period. 
• The selected network is a good representation of the average Eskom MV network 
and will not receive any special attention before or after installation of the trial site. 
• All pole-mounted line equipment is equipped with gapless metal-oxide surge 
arresters (MOVs) with the following rating:  12 kV maximum continuous overvoltage 
(MCOV) and 10 kA peak value of a lightning current impulse (In).  It is anticipated 
that the surge arresters will effectively clamp all large prospective overvoltage spikes, 
due to arcing earth faults, to an acceptable level during the time that the neutral 
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Table 4:  Capacitance values for a typical Eskom 3-wire delta configured overhead 11kV line with Hare conductor.  The resulting capacitive currents 
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Returning to the 
Source via the 
a-phase  
[A] 
km Cab Cbc Cca Cae Cbe Cce Iae Ibe Ice Iab Ibc Ica Ibe Ice If ICapacitive total  
1 0.0198 0.0191 0.0198 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.077 0.080 0.080 0.068 0.066 0.068 0.139 0.139 0.241 0.359 
10 0.198 0.191 0.198 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.68 0.66 0.68 1.39 1.39 2.41 3.59 
100 1.98 1.91 1.98 3.9 4.0 4.0 7.7 8.0 8.0 6.8 6.6 6.8 13.9 13.9 24.1 35.9 
 
Figure 22:   Overhead line capacitances and capacitive currents flowing during an a-phase earth fault.  Cae is not shown as it is effectively short 
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5.2. Trial Site Preparation 
Briefly the following should be done to prepare the trial site for testing: 
• All stakeholders, including the controllers at the Regional Network Control Centre, will 
be properly briefed about the trial site and its intended operation methodology before 
commissioning and testing of the protection scheme. 
• All relevant official Eskom plant drawings will be updated to reflect the new 
equipment and cabling to be installed at the identified substation as the Regional 
Network Control Centre needs to be aware of all switchable equipment on all 
networks under its control. 
• It needs to be ensured that all modifications are being done in a safe manner and 
that all conform to Eskom’s electrical and safety standards. 
• As indicated in section 5, a standard 3-phase pole-mounted auto recloser will be 
employed as the neutral circuit breaker due to the unavailability of a suitably rated 
single phase circuit breaker.  The neutrals of the two NECRs will be connected to 
earth via two of the three recloser circuit breaker poles.   
• The neutral circuit breaker, a single 3-phase pole-mounted recloser in this case, will 
be indicated on the single line system diagram at the Regional Network Control 
Centre, as if for a permanent installation. 
• Two single phase VTs will be installed to monitor the neutral-to-earth voltage on each 
of the two NECR neutrals. 
• The existing 11 kV 3-phase busbar VT on the bus section, onto which the fault throw 
feeder terminates, will be used by disturbance recorders in the relay room during the 
commissioning tests, as well as for monitoring the TEFCS’s performance for some 
time after putting the trial site into service. 
• Although it is a standard Eskom MV overhead network protection philosophy to have 
surge arresters installed at vulnerable primary plant equipment such as pole-mounted 
distribution transformers, pole-mounted reclosers, pole-mounted sectionalizers, pole-
mounted capacitor banks, and pole-mounted voltage regulators, the actual 
installation thereof needs to be verified and defects corrected if encountered.  This 
exercise is required in order to protect the network against the claimed prospective 
overvoltages as a result of arcing earth faults.  These surge arresters are rated for 12 
kV maximum continuous overvoltage (MCOV).  
• A surge arrester of lower rating than the phase-to-phase voltage rated surge 
arresters will be installed on each of the two NECR neutrals in order to clamp any 
overvoltage spikes to a value close to, but greater than the normal phase-to-neutral 
voltage.  A suitable surge arrester rating for this duty would be a standard Eskom 6.6 
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• Disturbance recorders will be set up to record the following: 
o 11 kV busbar voltage via 3-phase busbar VT on the fault throw feeder’s bus 
section. 
o Fault throw feeder’s 3-phase currents. 
o Neutral voltages of the two NECRs. 
o NECR neutral currents. 
o Status of the neutral circuit breaker’s main contact. 
• Three customer installations have to be identified where quality of supply loggers are 
to be installed for the duration of the fault throws.  
o One close to the fault throw position. 
o The second near the end of the fault throw line. 
o The third one is to be installed at a customer supply point on one of the 
adjacent feeders. 
• The controller of the pole-mounted auto-recloser to be used as neutral circuit breaker 
is able to provide all the required protection/control functionality and no special 
modifications are required. 
• A special input/output electronic module needs to be added to the standard recloser 
in order to obtain external open and close indications to trigger the disturbance 
recorders. 
• A suitable position has to be identified on one of the four available MV feeders at 
which fault throws may be done safely. 
• Barricade netting, fire extinguishers and spades have to be arranged for the selected 
fault throw site on the day of the fault throws. 
• All stakeholders are to be briefed on the operation of the TEFCS and what tests are 
to be conducted during the two commissioning days set aside for this exercise. 
• It is to be arranged that a “local control” be established on the fault throw days in 
order to allow the operator on site to perform switching on the network without first 
reporting to the Regional Control Centre.  This entails that the network be handed out 
to the operator on site.  He then controls all switching operations from the fault throw 
location itself, and once all testing have been finished successfully, and the TEFCS is 
functioning as designed, the network is returned to its normal state, inclusive of the 
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6. Test Protocol 
General 
Before any tests are to be conducted a risk assessment has to be performed and all persons 
present are to be made aware of the identified dangers, and all present are to sign the risk 
assessment as proof that they have been informed of the identified risks.  
The actual trial site network (fault throw network) is exactly the same as that depicted in 
Figure 21.  The 11 kV network is so designed that the feeders may be interlinked by means 
of strategically placed normally open points.  See Figure 25.  This feature is a requirement to 
determine the effect different line lengths (change in phase-to-earth capacitance) may have 
on the ability of an arc to self-extinguish. 
6.1. Tests to be Conducted 
It is envisaged that a number of earth fault throws be conducted on the TEFCS trial site, with 
the aid of the test arrangement shown in Figure 23, in order to verify correct operation during 
transient and bolted earth fault conditions.   
The purpose of the fault throws is primarily to: 
• Measure the capacitive fault current during a bolted earth fault when the neutral 
circuit breaker is open (unearthed network). 
• Established if arcing earth faults do produce the harmful overvoltages as claimed by 
many literature sources. 
• Establish to what extent the network’s surge arresters are able to clamp 
overvoltages, if they are being generated during arcing earth faults. 
• For a given spark gap size, determined up to what capacitive fault current level 
(network size) consistent self-extinguishing of arcing earth faults is still possible for 
the given 11 kV trial site network. 
• Determined the minimum spark gap size that will allow consistent self-extinguishing 
of arcing earth faults for the maximum available 11 kV trial site network size 
(maximum capacitive earth fault current). 
• Prove that the TEFCS can function as an integral part of the 11 kV network 
protection, without negatively interfering with the existing MV feeder or transformer 
protections. 
For the overvoltage tests it is envisaged that a number of arcing earth faults will be initiated 
on the largest network configuration possible in order to obtain the largest possible 
capacitive fault current from the given network, which represents the worst case insofar 
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The tests to determine the maximum capacitive fault current level which still allows reliable 
arc extinction across a given spark gap will have to be conducted with some network 
sections disconnected from the same busbar as to which the “faulted feeder” is connected to 
in order to establish a trend. 
 
Figure 23:   Fault throw arrangement showing fused link, arcing horn and earth spike. 
A specially constructed adjustable arcing horn (Figure 24) will be employed to simulate 
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Figure 24:   Arcing horn for establishing arcing and transient earth faults with. 
In an attempt to obtain the required information as listed above, the following 
six tests will be conducted: 
Test 1:  
Purpose:  To measure the three MV phase voltages to earth on the network under test with 
one phase solidly earthed (arcing horn bypassed), and the neutral circuit breaker 
in the open position (unearthed network).  
Pre-test network state:   The complete network is connected to the same 11 kV busbar, the 
neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and the fault throw link is open.  The 
neutral circuit breaker protection is disabled. 
Step 1:   Deactivate the sensitive earth fault (SEF) protection on all four MV feeder protection 
devices within the substation, and on the recloser upstream (REC2516) of the fault 
throw point. 
Step 2:   Open the neutral circuit breaker. 
Step 3:   Apply a bolted earth fault to one of the overhead feeder conductors at the test 
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Step 4:   With a MV voltmeter manually measure and record the voltages to earth of all three 
phases at the fault point, at a point about half way between the fault throw point and 
the end of the feeder, and at a point close to the end of the overhead feeder.  
Step 5:   Measure and record the capacitive fault current at the fault point. 
Step 6:   Remove the earth fault, by opening the fault throw link. 
Step 7:   Close the neutral circuit breaker. 
Test 2:  
Purpose:   To establish the extent of overvoltages produced by arcing earth faults on an 
unearthed network.   For this sustained arcing will be initiated between the arcing 
horns of the arcing horn test rig indicated in Figure 23. 
Pre-test network state:   The complete network is connected to the same 11 kV busbar, the 
neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and the fault throw link is open.  The 
neutral circuit breaker protection is disabled. 
Step 1:   Deactivate the SEF protection on all four MV feeder protection devices within the 
substation, and on the recloser upstream of the fault throw point. 
Step 2:   Ensure that the whole network is connected to the same 11 kV busbar. 
Step 3:   Adjust the arcing horn’s spark gap to 10 mm  
Step 4:   Bridge the gap with thin (0.2 mm diameter) wire strand.  (The capacitive fault 
current needs to burn off the binding wire.) 
Step 5:   Open the neutral circuit breaker. 
Step 6:   Close the fault throw link to initiate an earth fault via the arcing horn’s spark gap. 
Step 7:   Measure and record the capacitive fault current at the fault point while the arc is 
maintained. 
Step 8:   If the thin wire strand does not burn off, open the fused link, close the neutral circuit 
breaker, substitute the binding wire with a thinner binding wire and repeat from 
Step 5. 
Step 9:   If arcing across the spark gap does not clear within about 15 s open the fused link.   
Step 10:   If the arcing quenched by itself, open the fused link.  
Step 11:   Close the neutral circuit breaker. 
Step 12:   In the case of sustained arcing record the spark gap length and repeat the test 
once more from Step 4 (to establish if the attained overvoltages are of similar 
magnitude for every fault). 
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Step 14:   Close the neutral circuit breaker. 
Step 15:   Decrease the spark gap by 2 mm and repeated the test from Step 4. 
Step 16:   Record the arcing horn gap size which does not allow self-extinguishing of arcing 
earth faults. 
Test 3:  
Purpose:   To established the effect of feeder length (influence of line conductor 
capacitance-to-earth size) on the self-extinction ability of an arc across an air 
gap. 
Pre-test network state:   The complete network is connected to the same 11 kV busbar, the 
neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and the fault throw link is open.  The 
neutral circuit breaker protection is disabled. 
Step 1:   Deactivate the SEF protection on all four MV feeder protection devices within the 
substation, and on the recloser upstream of the fault throw point. 
Step 2:   Link all feeders to the same 11 kV bus section. 
Step 3:   Use the recorded spark gap length at which sustained arcing was established, as 
measured in Step 14 of Test 2. 
Step 4:   Increase the arcing horn’s spark gap by 2 mm from that in Test 2. 
Step 5:   Bridge the gap with thin (0.2 mm diameter) wire strand. 
Step 6:   Open the neutral circuit breaker. 
Step 7:   Close the fault throw link to initiate an earth fault via the arcing horn’s spark gap. 
Step 8:   Measure and record the capacitive fault current at the fault point. 
Step 9:   If arcing across the spark gap does not clear within about 15 s open the fault throw 
link:   
 Close the neutral circuit breaker. 
 Repeat test from Step 4. 
Step 10:   If the fault cleared by itself open the fault throw link. 
Step 11:   Close the neutral circuit breaker. 
Step 12:   Repeat the test a few times from Step 5 in order to establish consistent arc 
clearance. 
Step 13:   Record the smallest arcing horn gap size which does allow repeated self-
extinguishing of arcing earth faults. 
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Step 15:   Move an 11 kV feeder (not the fault throw feeder) to the other 11 kV bus section, 
away from the test feeder’s bus section. 
Step 16:   Open the bus section circuit breaker (Ensure that transformer overloading will not 
be a problem).  
Step 17:   Decrease the arcing horn spark gap by 2 mm and record the gap length. 
Step 18:   Repeat test from Step 5, but where a repeat is required of Step 4, decrease the 
spark gap instead of increasing it as requested, until the fault throw feeder alone is 
on one 11 kV bus section. 
 
Figure 25:   TEFCS trial site substation’s 11 kV station electrical diagram. 
Switching sequence during Test 3, as per Figure 25 (“F” designates a Farmers 
feeder): 
Test 3 a):    CBs closed – F1; F2; F3 ; Munic 1 & 11kV bus section 
  CBs open - None 
Isolators closed – F1 line; F2 line; F3 line; Munic 1 line 
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Test 3 b):   CBs closed – F1; F2; F3 (Fault throw feeder (F1), Munic 1 and F3 on the 
same busbar) 
  CBs open - Munic 1 & 11kV bus section 
Isolators closed – F1 line; F2 line; F3 line, Munic 1 line; F1/Munic 1 
Isolators open -; F2/Munic 1; F2/F3 
 
Test 3 c):    CBs closed – F1; F2; F3 & Munic 1 (Fault throw feeder (F1), and F3 on the 
same busbar) 
  CBs open - 11kV bus section 
Isolators closed – F1 line; F2 line; F3 line; Munic 1 line 
Isolators open - F1/Munic 1; F2/Munic 1; F2/F3 
 
Test 3 d):    CBs closed – F1; F2 & Munic 1 (Fault throw feeder (F1) alone on a busbar) 
  CBs open - 11kV bus section & F3 
Isolators closed – F1 line; F2 line; Munic 1 line; F2/F3 
Isolators open - F1/Munic 1; F2/Munic 1; F3 line 
Test 4:  
Purpose:   To verify correct automatic operation of the TEFCS, due to a tree branch causing 
an arcing earth fault by wiping/sweeping across the gap between a live 
conductor and earth. 
Pre-test network state:   The complete network is connected to the same 11 kV busbar, the 
neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and the fault throw link is open.  The 
neutral circuit breaker protection is enabled. 
Step 1:   Activate all SEF protection that has previously been disabled on the 11 kV network. 
Step 2:   Adjust the arcing horn gap to the largest air gap size used in Test 3 (no bridging 
wire).  
Step 3:   Attach a small green (blue gum/pine) tree branch to the end of an operating stick.  
Step 4:   Close the single phase fault throw link to liven up the one side of the arcing horn.   
Step 5:   Slowly pass the branch over the arcing horn gap, in a direction from the live 
conductor towards the earthed end of the arcing horn in order to simulate a tree 
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Step 6:   Measure and record the fault current at the fault point. 
Step 7:   Observe and record whether the neutral circuit breaker opened.  
Step 8:   As soon as the arc is cleared, due to the neutral circuit breaker opening, remove the 
tree branch.   
Step 9:   Observe that the neutral circuit breaker close again after the 10 s dead time. 
Step 10:   Repeat the test a number of times from Step 4, but wait for the neutral circuit 
breaker reset time of 30 s (the normal protection should operate for a fault within 
this time) to expire before applying the next fault.  Note that from the second fault 
onward a reset time will have to be allowed for as the neutral circuit breaker will 
only perform one ARC operation and then stay closed for this reset time, during 
which the normal protection is supposed to clear a permanent fault. 
Step 11:   Immediately after the neutral circuit breaker has closed, after the last tree branch 
fault was applied, apply a tree branch fault again for about 2 seconds and observe 
(and record) that the neutral circuit breaker does not open.  (It is assumed that the 
fault current will be above the SEF pickup, and by removing the fault after about 2 
seconds, SEF operation and consequential feeder breaker operation will be 
prevented.) 
Test 5:  
Purpose:   To verify correct operation for a transient  earth fault by the TEFCS in co-
operation with the standard 11 kV feeder protection schemes when an arc is 
establishing across the arcing horn air gap by means of a thin wire strand strung 
between the poles of the arcing horn test rig.  
Pre-test network state:   The complete network is connected to the same 11 kV busbar, the 
neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and the fault throw link is open.  The 
neutral circuit breaker protection is enabled.  All 11kV feeder protection is in the 
normal state.  
Step 1:   Activate all SEF protection that has previously been disabled on the 11 kV network. 
Step 2:   Link all feeders to the same 11 kV bus. 
Step 3:   Adjust the arcing horn gap to the size that would allow reliable self-extinguishing of 
an arcing earth fault, as found in Test 3 for the complete network.  
Step 4:   Bridge the gap with a thin (0.2 mm diameter) wire strand. 
Step 5:   Close the fault throw link to initiate an earth fault across the arcing horn. 
Step 6:   The neutral circuit breaker should open immediately and stay open for a 10 s dead 
time. 
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Step 8:   The neutral circuit breaker should close after expiry of the dead time and no further 
action should take place.   
Step 9:   Repeat the test a number of times from Step 4. 
Test 6:  
Purpose:   To verify correct operation of the TEFCS operation in conjunction with the 
standard 11 kV feeder protection schemes when a permanent earth fault is 
applied.  This action should cause the upstream recloser (REC2516), to trip, go 
through its auto-reclose cycle, and lock out.  
Pre-test network state:   The complete network is connected to the same 11 kV busbar, the 
neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and the fault throw link is open.  The 
neutral circuit breaker protection is enabled.  All 11kV feeder protection is in the 
normal state.  
Step 1:    Activate the SEF protection on all the protection devices on the test feeder. 
Step 2:    Ensure that all feeders are linked to the same 11 kV bus. 
Step 3:    Bridge the arcing horn gap with an adequately rated conductor able to handle the 
maximum expected earth fault current.  
Step 4:    Close the fault throw link to initiate a solid earth fault.   
Step 5:    The neutral circuit breaker should open immediately and stay open for the set 10 s 
dead time. 
Step 6:    Measure the capacitive earth fault current at the fault point during the neutral circuit 
breaker’s dead time. 
Step 7:   The neutral circuit br aker should close after expiry of the dead time and a reset 
timer (30 s) should start automatically, effectively disabling the neutral circuit 
breaker protection for 30 s (longer than the longest expected fault clearing 
duration, which should effectively be longer than the sensitive earth fault timer 
setting and the ARC cycle of the feeder breaker protection).   
Step 8:   The recloser upstream from the fault point (REC2516) should detect the earth fault 
current and go through its set auto-reclose cycle and lock out in the open position. 
Step 9:   The neutral circuit breaker protection reset timer should time out after the set 30 s, 
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6.2. Test Instruments Required 
• Three QOS loggers:  Two QOS loggers to log the 400 V supply voltages at two 
customer installations on the faulted feeder (Farmers 1), one about half way between 
the substation and the fault throw point, and one about half way between the fault 
throw position and the end of the feeder.  A third QOS logger will be installed on one 
of the other feeders (Farmers 2) to monitor an additional customer 400 V supply 
point.  The three QOS loggers will be set to continuously monitor the three customer 
supply point voltages for the duration of the commissioning tests. 
• Two disturbance recorders for recording the 11kV busbar voltage, the phase currents 
of the faulted feeder, the two NECR neutral voltages to earth, the NECR neutral 
currents, and the neutral circuit breaker main contact status.  The one recorder is 
essentially a back-up for the first.  Disturbance recorders within the substation is to 
be triggered upon every neutral circuit breaker trip and close operation, on an 11 kV 
busbar overvoltage condition with respect to earth of more than 15% of the nominal 
phase-to-neutral voltage, and on a NECR neutral overvoltage with respect to earth of 
more than 2 % the nominal phase-to-neutral voltage.  The recorder’s sampling rate 
will be set to 2.5 kHz, 500 ms pre-trigger recording duration and total recording 
duration of 2 s. 
• Two medium voltage (40 kV) voltmeter, operating stick mountable, for measuring the 
three phase voltages to earth during a bolted earth fault on the third phase at the fault 
point, at a point half way between the fault throw point and the end of the faulted 
feeder, and at the end of the faulted feeder. 
• A medium voltage (40 kV / 0 to 2000 A rms), ammeter, operating stick mountable, for 
measuring the capacitive earth fault current at the fault throw point during the 
different tests. 
• A specially constructed arcing horn test rig with adjustable spark gap. 
• Tape measure for adjusting the arcing horn’s spark gap length. 
• A cut-out base with solid link for initiating all the test faults. 
• Two way radios for communication between all measurement points. 
• Earth resistance tester for measuring the earth electrode’s resistance to earth at the 
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7. Risks 
A fault throw inherently has an element of risk as a network fault is deliberately initiated, but 
if conducted in a well planned and orderly fashion it could be conducted without any risk to 
personnel, as has been done on previous occasions on the same network.  As far as 
network equipment is concerned there is always a risk that equipment may fail during a fault 
situation, but in this respect a fault throw fault is no different from a “normal” network fault. 
The following risks applicable to the commissioning phase of the trial site, have been 
identified  
• All stakeholders should be well informed of what the tests entail and what the 
responsibility of each person would be. 
• At the fault throw site one person should be in charge of the operation. 
• All personnel on site at the fault throw are to keep well clear of the applied fault and 
surrounding area in order to minimize the risk of step potentials and accidental 
contact with live parts.  The fault throw area will be barricaded to prevent accidental 
entry. 
• If public safety becomes a concern during the fault throw, a person is to be assigned 
the duty to keep them at a safe distance from the fault throw site. 
• Spades should be kept at hand on the fault throw site as fault point arcing may cause 
a veld (bush) fire. 
• An operator should be located at the substation in order to ensure that the neutral 
breaker does not inadvertently lock out in the open position and leave the MV 
network in an unearthed state for an extended period. 
• An operator should be located at the fault throw site in order to close and open the 
single phase fault throw link which will be used to initiate the single phase faults, and 
to ensure that everyone on site adheres to the required HV Regulations.  
• Good communication between all stakeholders is of extreme importance during the 
fault throws as all actions are to be clearly communicated to all involved in order to 
take the correct action when required. 
• Depending on the magnitude of the literature-claimed overvoltages expected to be 
experienced during the fault throws, there may be some flashovers or surge arrester 
failures on the network.  This should be expected as the insulation of some devices 
on the network may have degraded over time and an imminent failure may have 
been due anyway.  Such failed equipment should be replaced, as soon as its failure 
has become known, before continuing with further fault throws.  Some of these 
failures may not result in permanent faults and may therefore not be detected during 
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8. Trial Site Commissioning Test Results 
General 
Two sets of two days, a week apart, were set aside for conducting commissioning tests of 
the TEFCS.  The second set of two days was reserved for backup test day in the event that 
something unforeseen should happen, such as bad weather, or emergency fault repairs, 
preventing the tests from taking place during the first set of two days.  
While conducting the first test (Test 1 of section 6.1) on the very first day of commissioning 
testing, a combined current and voltage transformer (CT/VT metering unit), used at a 1 MVA 
metering point, failed catastrophically due to an internal insulation failure.  From disturbance 
recordings captured during the test it was possible, afterwards, to see the insulation failure 
development over time.  Initially, while the neutral circuit breaker was open, an earth fault 
developed, which then developed into a 3-phase fault upon which the unit failed.  This 
incident happened about a kilometre from the substation during application of the solid earth 
fault on the B-phase of the 11 kV network.  Fault currents recorded by the affected feeder’s 
protection relay were about 5500 A per phase.  Figure 26 depicts the failed CT/VT metering 
unit. 
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Due to this incident testing had to be stopped and all attention was shifted to getting supply 
restored to the affected customers. 
This then lead to testing being postponed to the following week. 
On the first test day the second week, everything went according to plan and it was 
managed to complete all required testing more or less as planned within one day. 
The 11 kV test site has four 11kV feeders (delta configuration as depicted in Figure 27) 
feeding from a single busbar equipped with a bus section circuit breaker.  The bus section 
circuit breaker, together with feeder interlinking points as depicted in Figure 25, allowed for 
different network configurations in order to attempt to simulate different feeder lengths 
connected to the faulted feeder bus section.   
The total combined trial site MV feeder length, including all spurs, is 217 km. 
A small section (4.443km) of the total Eskom trial site network consists of cable instead of 
overhead conductors.  One of the Eskom overhead MV feeders (Munic feeder), however, 
supplies a small town of electricity, and the town obviously has its own underground cable 
reticulation network of a few kilometres. 
Use was made, during the fault throw tests, of a pole-mounted recloser’s earth electrode 
conveniently located at the fault throw site. 
The resistance-to-earth of this earth electrode was measured to be 90 ohm.   
Depicted in Figure 28 is the purposely built arcing horn used to facilitate the fault throws in 
order to verify operation of the TEFCS.  On the right hand side of the arcing horn is the 
conductor leading to the fault throw link connected to the B-phase of the 11 kV line.  On the 
left hand side is the conductor leading to the earth electrode.  The bare earthing conductor 
was elevated from ground level by putting it on insulators in order to prevent veld fires due to 
arcing between the earthing conductor and earth, as was experienced during Test 1 when 
the CT/VT metering unit failed.  Also shown on the left, hanging from the earth conductor, is 
a MV rated ammeter for measuring the earth fault current. 
The fault throw link between the arcing horn and the B-phase of the 11 kV line was manually 
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Figure 27:   The actual fault throw point.  Note the delta configuration line construction and 
the single phase cut-out base mounted on the closest pole, just below the phase conductors. 
A solid link was inserted into the cut-out base for initiating all the fault throws.  The arcing 
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Figure 28:   The actual arcing horn purposely built to facilitate the fault throws in order to 
verify operation of the TEFCS. 
It is important to note the following issues regarding the test phase disturbance recordings 
dated 17 and 24 November 2010: 
• Voltages are displayed as primary values. 
• Currents are displayed as primary values.   
• Unfortunately the neutral CB open and close indications were accidentally not wired 
to disturbance recorder 2 during the commissioning tests, and therefore they are not 
being displayed by recordings from this device.  This omission has been corrected 
subsequent to the commissioning test phase. 
• There is a time lag of between 40 ms and 100 ms from the time that the neutral 
circuit breaker’s main contacts open (or close) until the circuit breaker’s auxiliary 
contacts are actually reflecting the main contact status.  This delay will be noticed on 
all recordings from recorder 1.  This is an inherent non-deterministic delay within the 
recloser as processor power is prioritised and the most important functions are 
serviced first. 
• The main recorder, recorder 1, which recorded all three phase voltages and currents 
of the fault throw feeder, NECR 1 neutral voltage and current, as well as the neutral 
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2010).  Fortunately recorder 2 recorded without a problem and provided some good 
recordings, but due to the limitation of the number of physical analogue inputs the B-
phase voltage and current of the fault throw feeder could not be recorded.  At the 
time of programming recorder 2 it was not known which phase was the actual fault 
throw phase.  This only became known during the first fault throw, unfortunately too 
late for reprogramming of the recorder.  
• All earth faults were applied to the B-phase of the test network by manually closing 
the fault throw link by means of a link stick. 
• Note that the measurements listed on the right hand side of the disturbance 
recordings are those during the fault condition. 
8.1. Test 1 
Network status upon fault application:   All four MV feeders were con ected to the same 
busbar, and the neutral circuit breaker was open. 
Protection status upon fault application:   The neutral circuit breaker protection disabled.  
SEF switched off on all four MV feeders and on the recloser upstream of the fault throw 
point. 
Spark gap:  Was bridged out with a portable earth conductor in order to establish a solid 
earth fault upon closing the fault throw link. 
Actions:  The solid earth fault was sustained for 8 minutes and 20 seconds, after which the 
CT/VT metering unit failed catastrophically, and the feeder circuit breaker tripped.  At this 
point the fault throw link was opened.  The long fault application duration was not intentional, 
but it was due to time delays in getting the voltage measurements executed at the fault throw 
point, a point half way between the fault throw point and the feeder end, and at the end of 
the feeder. 
Measurements:   Figure 29 is relevant. 
The Capacitive earth fault current measured at the fault point was about 16 A. 
The NECR neutral voltage increased from zero to 6.3 kV with respect to earth at the instant 
of fault application. 
The two healthy phase voltages rose from the normal phase-to-neutral voltage of 6.35 kV to 
10.5 kV and 11.8 kV respectively, with respect to earth. 
The faulted phase’s phase-to-earth voltage measured at the substation was 1.35 kV, 0.1 kV 
at the fault throw point and 0.62 kV at the end of the faulted feeder. 
Observations:   This test proved that, when applying a solid single phase earth fault to an 
unearthed network, the two healthy phases rise to about full normal phase-to-phase voltage 
with respect to earth, and that the NECR neutrals will rise to about normal phase-to-earth 
voltage with respect to earth.  The neutral voltage rise will depend on the voltage drop 
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point.  The higher the voltage drop across the earth electrode, the lower the NECR neutral 
voltage rise above earth potential will be.  
 
Figure 29:   With neutral circuit breaker open a solid B-phase earth fault is applied to the B-
phase.  Note drop in B-phase voltage and rise in NECR neutral voltage and R- & W-phase 
voltages.   
8.2. Test 2 
Network status upon fault application:   All four MV feeders were connected to the same 
busbar, and the neutral circuit breaker was open. 
Spark gap:  Was set to 10 mm, 7 mm and 4 mm alternatively, and bridged with a thin wire 
strand on each occasion before closing of the fault throw link. 
Actions:  It was attempted to generate sustained arcing across the spark gaps.  Sustained 
arcing across the spark gap was allowed to carry on for about 25 seconds, after which the 
fault throw link was opened to clear the fault. 
Measurements:  Figure 30, Figure 31 and Figure 32 are relevant. 
The Capacitive earth fault current measured at the fault point during sustained arcing across 
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Note that the NECR 2 neutral current is clipped in the disturbance recordings due to a 
recorder scaling error.  The current of NECR 1 is correct and should be multiplied by 2 to 
obtain the total transformer neutral current. 
The faulted phase-to-earth voltage measured at the fault throw point varied between 1.9 and 
5.4 kV during the sustained arcing. 
Observations:   Due to a misunderstanding between the control officer and me, the first two 
tests (10 mm and 7 mm spark gaps) were conducted with the neutral circuit breaker closed.  
That is why there are neutral currents present in Figure 30 and Figure 31.  The total earth 
fault current was about 88 A during these two tests. 
With 10 mm and 7 mm spark gaps, arcing across the gap was initiated, but arcing was only 
sustained for about 50 ms with the 10 mm spark gap and 210 ms with the 7 mm spark gap.  
With the 4 mm park gap (Figure 32) sustained arcing was established across the spark gap, 
which was cleared by opening of the fault throw link after about 25 s. 
None of the disturbance recordings gathered during this test exhibited any trace of extreme 
overvoltages, except for the expected increase in healthy phase-to-earth voltage to normal 
phase-to-phase voltage and the increase of NECR neutral voltages to normal phase-to-
neutral voltage, during repeated sustained arcing earth faults.   
During the applied earth faults the healthy phase voltages with respect to earth were 
measured to be: 
• 6.8 kV & 6.4 kV during the 10 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker closed) 
• 6.7 kV & 6.4 kV during the 7 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker closed) 
• 10.7 kV & 12.7 kV during the 4 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker open) 
During the applied earth faults the neutral voltage with respect to earth was measured to be: 
• 745 V during the 10 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker closed) 
• 753 V during the 7 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker closed) 
• 7.1 kV during the 4 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker open) 
The highest peak overvoltages recorded on the healthy phases were: 
• 10.5 kV during the 10 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker closed) 
• 10.7 kV during the 7 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker closed) 
• 18.1 kV during the 4 mm spark gap test (neutral circuit breaker open) 
During both the solidly earthed neutral (10 mm and 7 mm spark gaps) and unearthed neutral 
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Figure 30:  With the neutral circuit breaker closed, an arcing earth fault was initiated on the 
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Figure 31:  With the neutral circuit breaker closed, an arcing earth fault was initiated on the 
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Figure 32:   With the neutral circuit breaker open, an arcing earth fault was initiated on the B-
phase, across a 4 mm spark gap, which resulted in sustained arcing across the spark gap.  
Note the rise in NECR neutral and R- & W-phase voltages and the absence of dangerously 
high overvoltages. 
8.3. Test 3 
Network status upon fault application:   The test was started off with all four lines 
connected to the same busbar.  The lines will then be moved over, one-by-one, to a bus 
section separate from that to which the fault throw line is connected.  After removal of each 
line, the test will be repeated.  Both the MV bus section and neutral circuit breakers were 
open. 
Spark gap : Was set to 4 mm, and bridged with a thin wire strand (0.2 mm diameter). 
Actions:  Open the neutral circuit breaker, and then close the fault throw link onto the 
bridged 4 mm spark gap. 
Measurements:  Figure 33 through Figure 36 are relevant. 
The Capacitive earth fault current measured at the fault point during an applied earth fault 
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• All four MV feeders connected to the same busbar was about 18 A (wire strand burnt 
off and sustained arcing took place).   
• Three MV feeders connected to the same busbar was about 15 A (wire strand burnt 
off and sustained arcing took place).   
• Two MV feeders connected to the same busbar was about 5 A (wire strand did not 
burn off and sustained arcing could not be initiated).   
• One MV feeder, the fault throw feeder, connected to the busbar was about 3 A (wire 
strand did not burn off and sustained arcing could not be initiated).   
Observations:    
As an unplanned experiment the fault throw link was closed onto an unbridged 4 mm spark 
gap, which flashed over spontaneously and developed sustained arcing across it.  The spark 
gap was then increased to 5 mm and spontaneous arcing across the spark gap could not be 
established again by closing the fault throw link onto the unbridged spark gap. 
 
Figure 33:   With three of the four feeders connected to the same busbar and the neutral 
circuit breaker open, an arcing earth fault was initiated on the B-phase across a 5 mm spark 
gap.  Self-extinguishing of the arc did not take place and the fault throw link was opened 
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With four or three feeders connected to the same busbar the thin wire strand across the 5 
mm spark gap burnt off upon closing of the fault throw link, and sustained arcing across the 
spark gap had to be cleared by opening of the fault throw link.   
The highest peak overvoltage, with respect to earth, attained during this test was 17.3 kV on 
the W-phase. 
With one or two feeders connected to the same busbar the fault current was too low to burn 
off the thin wire strand and arcing could not be established.  
 
Figure 34:   With two of the four feeders connected to the same busbar and the neutral 
circuit breaker open, an arcing earth fault could not be initiated on the B-phase across a 5 
mm spark gap as the fault current was too low to burn off the thin bridging wire strand.  The 
fault throw link was opened (depicted here) to clear the fault. 
The highest peak overvoltage, with respect to earth, attained during this test was 15.6 kV on 
the W-phase. 
NECR 1’s neutral VT voltage is zero during the applied fault as the bus section circuit 
breaker was open during the fault in order to only have two of the four feeders on one bus 
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Figure 35:   With the fault throw feeder connected to its own busbar and the neutral circuit 
breaker open, an arcing earth fault was spontaneously initiated on the B-phase across an 
unbridged 4 mm spark gap upon closing the fault throw link.  Self-extinguishing of the arc did 
not take place and the fault throw link was opened after about 8 s to clear the fault.   
The highest peak voltage on the two healthy phases, of 17.7 kV, was measured on the W-
phase during the sustained arcing depicted in Figure 35. 
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Figure 36:   With the fault throw feeder connected to its own busbar and the neutral circuit 
breaker open, an arcing earth fault could not be initiated on the B-phase across a 5 mm 
spark gap as the fault current was too low to burn off the thin bridging wire strand.  The fault 
throw link was opened (depicted here) to clear the fault.   
8.4. Test 4 
Network status upon fault application:   The complete network (all four MV feeders) is 
connected to the same 11 kV busbar, the neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and 
the fault throw link is open.  All MV network protection, including the neutral circuit breaker 
protection, is switched on.  Upstream SEF protection is switched off. 
Spark gap : Was set to 5 mm. 
Actions:  Closed the fault throw link onto an unbridged 5 mm spark gap.  Arcing across the 
air gap was initiated by sweeping a small green tree branch across the spark gap to simulate 
a tree branch sweeping across a live conductor/equipment. 
Measurements:  Figure 37 and Figure 38 are relevant. 
Observations:   A green tree branch being swept across the unbridged 5 mm spark gap 
initiated arcing across the air gap.  Arcing was sustained for 4 seconds after tripping of the 
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before the neutral circuit breaker closed again after its 10 s dead time.  A capacitive earth 
fault current of about 17 A was measured during arcing, which is well above the upstream 
SEF pick-up settings.  As is evident from the disturbance recording of Figure 37, some earth 
faults are bound to clear very fast.  This fault self-cleared within 37 ms, even before the 
neutral circuit breaker had a chance to physically open.  The neutral circuit breaker did open 
after the fault self-cleared.  While the neutral circuit breaker was open the tree branch was 
again swiped across the spark gap and arcing was re-established about 63 ms after the fault 
self-cleared.  This time there was no NECR neutral current as the neutral circuit breaker was 
already open. 
 
Figure 37:    With neutral circuit breaker closed arcing was initiated with a green tree branch 
swept across a 5 mm spark gap and removed again quickly after arc initiation during the 
dead time (10 s) of the neutral circuit breaker.  
About 4 s after the initial fault, arcing across the spark gap quenched and the neutral circuit 
breaker closed after expiry of the 10 s dead time. 
It is interesting to note that during the arcing earth fault, while the neutral circuit breaker is 
open, that the R-phase peak voltage to earth (14 kV peak) is about 3 kV lower than that of 
the W-phase (17 kV peak).  Perhaps this has some connection with the physical conductor 
position on the delta line structures.  The W-phase is located at the middle on top of the 
structure.  After the fault cleared in about 4 s the R- and W-phase voltage peaks were 
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The R-phase current on the fault throw feeder stayed constant during and after the fault at 
about 147 A.  The W-phase current changed from about 143 A during the fault, to about 142 




Figure 38:    The arcing earth fault self-extinguished 4 s after initiation by means of a green 
branch tree branch swept across a 5 mm spark gap.   
8.5. Test 5 
Network status upon fault application:   The complete network (all four MV feeders) is 
connected to the same 11 kV busbar, the neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and 
the fault throw link is open.  All MV network protection, including the neutral circuit breaker 
protection, is switched on.   
Spark gap : Was set to 5 mm and bridged with a thin wire strand (0.2 mm diameter). 
Actions:  Closed the fault throw link onto a bridged 5 mm spark gap to establish an arcing 
earth fault across the spark gap. 
Observations:   Upon applying the fault with the neutral circuit breaker closed, the neutral 
circuit breaker opened, but sustained arcing took place even after opening of the neutral 
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throw point tripping on SEF after 6 s.  See Figure 40.  The neutral circuit breaker closed after 
10 s (dead time). 
Next the spark gap was set to 6 mm and the test repeated a few times.  Sometimes arcing 
stopped immediately upon neutral circuit breaker opening, and sometimes arcing was 
sustained for a few seconds, but during testing arcing was not sustained for longer than 6 s.  
All neutral circuit breaker clearing attempts were successful, i.e. cleared within the 10 s dead 
time of the neutral circuit breaker. 
 
Figure 39:   With neutral circuit breaker closed, the fault throw link was closed onto the 5 mm 
spark gap bridged with a thin wire strand.  The wire strand burnt off and sustained arcing 
took place even after the neutral circuit breaker opened.  Note that the disturbance recorder 













  Page 98 
 
Figure 40:   The recloser upstream of the fault throw point tripped on SEF within about 6 s 
after initiation of the arcing earth fault in Figure 39.   
8.6. Test 6 
Network status upon fault application:   The complete network is connected to the same 
11 kV busbar, the neutral circuit breaker is in the closed state and the fault throw link is 
open.  All network protection, including SEF is enabled.  The neutral circuit breaker 
protection is enabled.  
Spark gap : The 6 mm spark gap was bridged with a standard portable earthing cable used 
by an operator for temporarily earthing line conductors, or other electrical apparatus to be 
worked on. 
Actions:  Closed the fault throw onto the solid earth fault. 
Observations:   Upon applying the solid earth fault with the neutral circuit breaker closed, 
the neutral circuit breaker was tripped immediately by its protection.  After the 10 s dead time 
the neutral circuit breaker closed again, and after about 6 s the auto recloser immediately 
upstream of the fault throw point tripped on SEF.  All these protection operations were 
executed as designed, and therefore successful.  Waveforms obtained during this test were 
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9. Discussion of Trial Site Commissioning Test Results 
9.1. Test specific discussions 
Test 1  confirmed that the healthy phase voltages with respect to earth of an unearthed 
network increase to full phase-to-phase voltage, and that the NECR neutral voltage 
increases to about normal phase-to-neutral voltage during an earth fault.  This was as 
expected from the theory of unearthed networks. 
The faulted phase-to-earth voltage measurements at the substation (1.35 kV), fault throw 
point (0.1 kV) and at the end of the feeder (0.62 kV) indicate that the faulted phase voltage 
rises in both directions as one moves further away from the fault point.   
Test 2:  With all four MV feeders connected to the same busbar, sustained arcing across the 
spark gap could not be established with the 10 mm or 7 mm spark gaps.  Sustained arcing 
earth faults were, however, generated across a 4 mm spark gap.   
This test proved without any doubt, that for the given network, no overvoltages of the order 
of 3 to 6 times normal peak phase-to-earth voltage are being generated during arcing earth 
faults, as predicted by a number of sources [ABB, 1994, 94, Evans et al, 1939, 392; Glover, 
1978 or later, D-2; Hänninen, 2001, 13, Uppal, 1984, 911].   
It may be possible to attribute the absence of any damaging overvoltages during the physical 
fault throws to the relatively low capacitive earth fault current of 16 to 18 A, and damping 
within the network that prevent generation of high voltages.  Due to this uncertainty as to the 
lack of overvoltage generation during arcing earth faults, it is recommended that similar fault 
throw tests be performed on larger networks where such transient earth fault clearing 
schemes are to be implemented in order to determine generation of damaging overvoltages, 
or not. 
At this point it should also be mentioned that Allen & Waldorf [1946, 301] commented that 
the voltages produced by arcing across a spark gap during their tests were not nearly as 
high as published theory indicates.   
Allen & Waldorf [1946, 302] stated that the total phase-to-earth capacitance of one phase of 
their test network was about 2.6 µF.  By using equation (3) in section 2.1.2, the total 
capacitive earth fault current for the complete TEFCS test network may be found.   
C = ICapacitive total / (2*√3*π*f* VLL)  [µF] 
ICapacitive total = 2*√3*π*f*VLL* C 
           = 2*√3*π*60 Hz*13 kV*2.6 µF 
           = 22 A 
This value is very close to the 16 A measured during Test 2.  Similarly to the above, the total 
phase-to-earth capacitance for the TEFCS may be calculated as follow: 
C = ICapacitive total / (2*√3*π*f* VLL) 
    = 16 A / (2*√3*π*50 Hz*11 kV) 
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This phase-to-earth capacitance of 2.67 µF calculated from the actual capacitive earth fault 
current measured during the fault throw is much lower than the calculated values depicted in 
Table 4.  From Table 4 the phase-to-earth capacitance of the 217 km test network should 
have been about 8.5 µF.   
This is quite a large discrepancy of about 3 times the actual phase-to-earth capacitance, for 
which there is no definite answer at this stage.  A possible cause for the discrepancy could 
perhaps be due to the influence of trees and buildings close to the lines, as well as vineyards 
and bushes below the lines.  These factors will tend to increase the total phase-to-earth 
capacitance of a line, but the error factor may be too large to be ascribed to these factors 
alone.  A further influencing factor may be transposition of the lines.  Transposition is not 
intentionally performed on the MV networks, but it may happen inadvertently at T-offs from 
the main line, as was the case at a T-off close to the fault throw point.  There may therefore 
be other such unintentional transposition points on the test network, which will all contribute 
to lowering of the overall phase-to-earth capacitance of the total network. 
The fact that neither the Allen & Waldorf, [1946, 304] and the TEFCS exhibited any 
overvoltages higher than normal phase-to-phase voltage between each of the healthy 
phases and earth during arcing earth fault conditions may be ascribed to the similarity of the 
two phase-to-earth capacitance values of the Allen & Waldorf [1946, 302] and that of the 
TEFCS network.  It is possible that the phase-to-earth capacitances of the test networks 
were just too low to generate the overvoltages as claimed by literature. 
Test 3 .  With both four and three lines connected to the same busbar, a 5 mm air gap was 
bridged by sustained arcing upon closing of the fault throw link and burning off of the thin 
bridging wire strand.  Sustained arcing had to be cleared manually by opening of the fault 
throw link.  No overvoltages were recorded during the sustained arcing earth faults. 
With just the fault throw line, or one additional line connected to the same busbar as the fault 
throw line the capacitive currents were too low to burn off the thin wire strand across the 
spark gap to initiate an arcing fault. Fault current with two lines connected was 5.2 A and 
with just the fault throw line the capacitive fault current was 3.3 A. 
Test 3, therefore, was not successful as it could not be established what the effect of line 
length (capacitive current magnitude) is on the self-extinction ability of an earth fault on an 
unearthed network.  The reason for this may be attributed to the low capacitive fault currents 
with one or two lines comprising the fault throw network (3.3 A and 5.2 A respectively), which 
could not burn off the spark gap bridging wire strand (0.2 mm diameter) in order to establish 
arcing, across the air gap.  Unfortunately there were no thinner wire strands available on site 
during the tests. 
It is doubtful, even if a thinner wire strand was available and it did burn off, whether a 
conclusive test result would have been obtained with such a small spark gap (5 mm), and 
the given low capacitive earth fault current range.   
As may be seen from Test 4 below, earth faults initiated across a 6 mm spark gap, with all 
four MV feeders connected to the same busbar, resulted in arcing which cleared by itself 
during the dead time of the neutral circuit breaker.  Test 2 on the other hand established that 
a 4 mm unbridged spark gap flashed over spontaneously upon closing of the fault throw link, 
which is not impacted by the number of MV feeders connected to the same busbar, but 
rather dictated by the voltage level being applied across the air gap.  This then leaves 2 mm 
within which to try and find the effect of different feeder lengths on the self-extinguishing 
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during all the conducted tests it does not seem easily attainable to achieve the desired test 
objective for this given test network. 
A much larger capacitive earth fault current may probably lead to a conclusive test result, as 
logic dictates that the larger the capacitive fault current the larger the spark gap needs to be 
for successful arc quenching, up to some limit of cause. 
If Test 3 is to be repeated in future, the following may be taken into account:  Finer 
adjustment capability of the spark gap will allow much better control over the spark gap 
length.  It may also be easier to perform the test if the range of capacitive earth fault currents 
is much larger (larger network) as any effect a change in network length may have on the 
self-clearing of earth faults for a given spark gap length, will be amplified and should make 
the effects more easily noticeable. 
Test 4  successfully demonstrated that a transient earth fault may be cleared by 
“instantaneously” interrupting the earth fault current by temporarily (10 s) disconnecting the 
NECR neutral from earth, thereby temporarily converting the low resistance earthed network 
into an unearthed network. 
Test 5  successfully demonstrated correct operation of the TEFCS for applied transient  
earth faults, in conjunction with all the normal substation and line protection.  A 6 mm spark 
gap repeatedly ensured successful arc quenching in less than the SEF operating time of 6 s 
of the upstream auto recloser. 
Test 6  successfully demonstrated correct operation of the TEFCS for an applied permanent  
earth fault, in conjunction with all the normal substation and line protection.  The TEFCS 
operated correctly, and the auto recloser upstream of the fault throw point correctly tripped 
on SEF. 
9.2. General observations made during commissioning 
The most significant observation from sustained arcing EF tests is that no potentially harmful 
overvoltages were experienced on the 11 kV network as 17.7 kV was the highest peak 
voltage encountered.  As a comparison it may be noted that an 11k V circuit breaker may be 
pressure tested at 24 kV (33.9 kV peak) for 5 minutes.  
It is claimed that an arcing earth fault on an unearthed network may theoretically result in 
overvoltages of up to 6 times normal phase-to-neutral voltage on the two healthy phases 
[Evans et al, 1939, 392; Glovers 1978 or later, D-2 and Uppal, 1984, 911].  During sustained 
arcing earth fault tests on the fault throw network the highest recorded peak phase-to-earth 
voltage of the two healthy phases was about 17.4 kV peak.  This was measured during 
sustained arcing across a 4 mm spark gap while performing the test when the fault throw 
feeder was connected on its own to a busbar.  See Figure 35. 
This 17.4 kV peak overvoltage is about twice the normal 11 kV peak phase-to-neutral 
voltage.  It may therefore be possible for higher overvoltages to be attained for networks with 
higher network capacitance to earth than the trial site network. 
From the commissioning tests it was found that SEF tripping of feeder CBs and auto-
reclosers upstream of an EF may be a real possibility during sustained arcing EFs while the 
neutral CB open (dead time) as these protections operate on the residual current of the line 
The capacitive fault currents returning to the source through the two healthy phases will 
cause a residual current in all feeders connected to the same busbar.  
During testing there were two incidents where upstream SEF protection operated within the 
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the fault throw feeder and in the other incident the Farmers 2 feeder SEF protection tripped 
the feeder CB.  SEF trip time settings were set at between 5 and 10 s.  After these incidents 
all SEF protection upstream of the fault throw point, including the four feeder CB protections 
in the substation, were switched off in order to resume testing. 
Seeing that it was found possible for feeder protection devices to operate on SEF during 
sustained arcing periods, with the neutral CB open, it may be concluded that there is not 
much sense in setting the neutral CB dead time much longer than the longest SEF operating 
time on the given network.  This may be to the detriment of clearing EFs below SEF pick-up, 
but then again these low current EFs may self extinguish very quickly anyway.  
With a 5 mm spark gap it was possible to initiate sustained arcing EFs by bridging the spark 
gap with a thin wire strand before closing the fault throw link.   
With the neutral circuit breaker open and no earth fault applied to the network, no neutral-to-
earth voltage was measured on the two NECR neutrals.  This indicates that the delta 
configured line construction does not lead to significant zero sequence voltage during normal 
operation.  Inadvertent transposition at T-off points from the backbone feeder may have 
contributed to the absence of zero sequence voltage on the NECR neutrals while the neutral 
circuit breaker is open (unearthed network). 
It was determined that with the neutral circuit breaker closed, that a 4 mm arcing horn air 
gap flashed over spontaneously upon closing the fault throw link to energize the one side of 
the arcing horn, and that consequential arcing does not self-extinguish.   
With a 5 mm arcing horn air gap it was possible to initiate sustained arcing earth faults by 
bridging the arcing horn gap with a thin wire strand and closing the fault throw link.  Closing 
the fault throw link onto the 5 mm spark gap did not result in flashovers of the air gap, but 
arcing, once initiated by bridging the spark gap with a thin wire strand, did not self-extinguish 
in one EF instance and had to be manually cleared by opening of the fault throw link after 
about 38 s.  Other arcing EFs across the 5 mm spark gap were successfully cleared by 
automatic opening of the neutral CB upon fault inception and closing after a 10 s dead time.  
From this then it may be deduced that a 5 mm gap is about the minimum size that might 
allow the TEFCS to clear a transient EF. 
Adjustment of the spark gap to 6 mm allowed arcing to consistently self-extinguish without 
opening of the neutral CB, once initiated by a thin wire strand bridging the spark gap.  During 
Test 2 it was found that sustained arcing was not possible with spark gap sizes of 7 mm and 
10 mm. 
From this then it may be deduced that a 6 mm spark gap is about the minimum size that will 
allow consistent clearing of a transient earth fault by the TEFCS, for the given 11 kV trial site 
network with a maximum capacitive fault current of about 16 A.  Larger networks may 
require a larger minimum spark gap, and higher system voltages will most certainly dictate 
larger minimum spark gaps. 
Transient earth faults downstream of fuses may not be cleared by the TEFCS as fuse 
operation may be too fast for the neutral circuit breaker.  This will, however, depend largely 
upon the fuse rating and on the fault current magnitude.  Earth faults in the SEF range will 
most like be cleared by the TEFCS.  Similarly, for these low current SEF faults the TEFCS 
may succeed in saving fuses from operating due to its quick operation, irrespective of the 
fault current level (153 ms for <10 A and 86 ms for >10 A as determined by the auto-
recloser’s protection and cannot be changed). 
Lethonen et al [2001, 1183] encountered sub-harmonic oscillation of the neutral voltage 
when the flow of earth fault current in an unearthed network was broken, i.e. upon clearing of 
a transient fault, during the time that the two healthy phase voltages return to normal phase-
to-neutral voltage with respect to earth.  This was verified by most of the commissioning test 
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Figure 41:    Disturbance recording indicating sub-harmonic oscillation of the NECR 2 neutral 
voltage when the flow of earth fault current of the unearthed trial site network is interrupted. 
Heine et al [2004, 105] conducted a study on a 20 kV unearthed network and found that if 
arcing in a spark gap was sustained for longer than 10 cycles (200 ms for 50 Hz), the earth 
fault will most likely change to a phase-to-phase-to-earth fault.  During commissioning of the 
TEFCS many arcing earth faults were sustained across a 4 mm spark gap for more than 30 
s before manual opening of the fault throw link, without any one of them developing into a 
phase-to-phase fault.   
For an earth fault to develop into a phase-to-phase fault mainly three factors will play a role 
in determining whether this will take place or not: 
• Conductor spacing:  The site has conductor spacings of 1.15 m in a triangular format 
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• Voltage difference between the phase conductors:  Normally at 11 kV, but voltages 
up to about 20 kV has been measured. 
• Quality of insulation on the network: Most, but not all insulators on the 11 kV trial site 
network are of heavy pollution rating with creepage lengths of 31 mm per kV.  Some 
equipment, such as voltage regulators have 25 mm per kV creepage bushings, and 
other equipments, such as some of the auto-reclosers have 22 kV bushings with 
creepage lengths of 31 mm per kV.  The latter is due to Eskom specifying all new 11 
kV equipment with 22 kV insulation ratings at minimal additional cost, but with an 
immense reduction in stockholding and better equipment performance from an 
insulation point of view. 
It is interesting to note that during all the arcing earth faults, while the neutral circuit breaker 
was open, that the W-phase peak voltage to earth was always higher by about 3 kV than the 
peak R-phase voltage.  Perhaps this has some connection with the physical conductor 
position on the delta line structures, and that the R- and B-phases have been inadvertently 
transposed at least once in the trial site network.  The W-phase is located at the middle on 
top of the structure.   
Application of the pole-mounted auto-recloser as a neutral CB was found to be a very neat, 
effective and easily implementable solution as it is fully self-contained with its integrated 
protection and integrated remote terminal unit (RTU) for SCADA communication.  From a 
cost, commissioning and maintenance point of view it is a much better solution than a 
conventional circuit breaker and its associated protection that needs to be located in a relay 
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10. TEFCS trial site operating history 
After completion of the TEFCS commissioning tests on 24 November 2010, the TEFCS 
officially became part of the protection for the complete 11 kV network it is installed on. 
Since then, up to 16 March 2011, there have been a total of 24 earth faults on the 217 km 11 
kV trial site network.  Table 5 provides a list of all TEFCS operations during this period.  
Three of the 24 faults were permanent faults for which downstream auto-reclosers locked 
out to clear two of the three faults, and the third fault was cleared by a fuse operation, after 
the neutral circuit breaker auto-reclosed.  The remaining 21 EFs were transient in nature.  
Four of these self-cleared after the neutral CB protection issued a trip signal, but before the 
neutral CB could physically open.  Two of these faults re-striked after the neutral CB opened, 
but manage to clear during the 10 s dead time of the neutral CB.  These two EFs are 
therefore also deemed to have been cleared by the TEFCS.  The other two transient EFs 
would not have caused protection operation without the TEFCS either, thus should not be 
counted as part of a TEFCS efficiency calculation. 
This then shows that 19 of the 22 EFs were successfully cleared by the TEFCS during the 
10 s dead time of the neutral circuit breaker, representing a 86% success rate [(22-
3)*100/22]. 
In total then, customers suffered supply interruptions during only 3 of the 22 fault incidents 
as a result of the three permanent faults. 
The disturbance recorders also captured a few events due to the presence of NECR neutral 
currents.  These events did not result in neutral CB operation as the current magnitudes 
were either below the protection pick-up of 4 A (lowest setting available), or did not last long 
enough for the protection to issue a neutral CB trip signal. 
From the onset of the TEFCS idea the intension was to set the EF pick-up very low, say at 
about 1 A primary current, in order to attempt extinguishing faults before they manage to 
escalate into high fault current faults, which are more difficult to clear successfully.  In this 
regard there is a short coming with the TEFCS in that the lowest attainable protection setting 
is 4 A for SEF and 10 for an EF.  Application of the auto-recloser in this particular manner 
amplifies the problem because the EF current will split more or less equally between the two 
NECRs with the effect that th  recloser protection will only start to pick up for a total EF 
current of 8 A (4 A per recloser phase).  If this minimum pick-up setting could be lowered it 
may enable the TEFCS to clear EF even quicker than it does currently. 
Disturbance recordings of the two earth faults, which cleared before the neutral circuit 
breaker’s main contacts physically opened, and did not re-strike again, are presented in 
Figure 42 and Figure 43.   
The highest peak overvoltage recorded by a disturbance recorder within the substation 
during one of the arcing EFs was 20.4 kV peak to earth, or 2.3 times the normal peak phase-
to-neutral voltage.  This is significantly lower than the overvoltages of the order of 3 to 6 
times normal peak phase-to-neutral voltage predicted by others [Allen & Waldorf, 1946, 305; 
Evans et al, 1939, 392; Glover, 1978 or later, D-2, & Uppal, 1984, 911]. 
From the operational disturbance recordings it is not evident that surge arrester conduction 
took place due to overvoltages as no clipping of the voltage waveforms are visible.  It is 
assumed that the surge arresters did conduct, but that the currents were of very low 
magnitudes.  No surge arrester failures on the TEFCS trial site were reported thus far.   
Overheating of the surge arresters is very unlikely as peak overvoltages were mostly of the 
order of 16 kV to 17 kV peak, under which conditions the surge arresters may operate 
indefinitely according to the network’s surge arrester’s data sheet.  Also according to the 
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overvoltage condition may be tolerated for 900 s.  This is an extreme condition and unlikely 
to occur on the TEFCS trial site network, as exposure to the overvoltages will only take place 
during the 10 s dead time of the neutral circuit breaker.  Also, after each neutral circuit 
breaker operation the surge arresters will have 30 s (time for which the neutral circuit 
breaker protection is disabled after each operation) during which to cool down before it will 
be allowed to trip for another EF.  This in itself is unlikely to occur as the normal protection 
would have removed a permanent fault from the network during the 30 s dead time. 
It should be mentioned that the neutral circuit breaker’s auxiliary contact operating time, 
indicated at the bottom of some of the disturbance recordings, is not mechanically linked to 
the main contact operation.  According to the circuit breaker manufacturer, the auxiliary 
contact operating time is in-determined and may vary between 40 ms to 140 ms.  This is due 
to its operation time being dependent on available processor power at any given time, due to 
being assigned a low priority. 
Speed timing tests of the neutral circuit breaker’s main contacts revealed that it operates in 
about 153 ms for an earth fault current below 4 A and in about 86 ms for an earth fault 
current above 10 A.   
 
Figure 42:  A transient earth fault disturbance recording, indicating that the fault cleared 
before the neutral circuit breaker could physically open.  This recording is of a R-phase earth 
fault.  Note that the actual earth fault current is about 214.8 A (2 * 107.4 A) as there are two 
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In order to obtain a much more deterministic auxiliary contact operating time in relation to the 
neutral circuit breaker’s main contact, an auxiliary switch, operated by the mechanical 
open/close status indicator, was designed, fabricated, tested and successfully put into 
service.  Operating time of the auxiliary switch is 169 ms for an earth fault current below 4 A 
and about 100 ms for an earth fault current above 10 A.  The time lag between main contact 
and auxiliary contact operation is consistent at about 16 ms.  This will be used in future to 
determine at what point in a disturbance recording the main circuit breaker contact actually 
opened in cases where earth faults self-clear before the CB’s main contact physically 
manages to open after receiving a protection trip signal.  All recordings in this thesis are from 
the period before implementation of the new auxiliary contact for open/close indications for 
the disturbance recorders. 
The disturbance recording of Figure 42 indicates that the transient earth fault self-cleared in 
about 71 ms.  Without knowing what the fault current magnitude was for a specific fault it is 
not possible to determine at what point on the disturbance recordings of Figure 42 and 
Figure 43 the neutral circuit breaker actually opened as there is no rise in the NECR 1 
voltage trace.  A sudden rise in neutral voltage is a definite indication that the neutral circuit 
breaker opened at that specific point in time, but for this to take place an EF should be 
present.   
 
Figure 43:  A transient earth fault disturbance recording, indicating that the fault cleared 
about 49 ms before the neutral circuit breaker could physically open.  This recording is of a 
W-phase earth fault.  Note that the actual earth fault current is about 110 A (2 * 55 A) as 
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As explained above the neutral circuit breaker’s in-built auxiliary contact operation is only 
indicative of the fact that the neutral circuit breaker did open, but operation time thereof is 
too inconsistent to determine the circuit breaker’s main contact operating time by.  If the 
earth fault current magnitude is sufficiently high and continuous in nature the main contact 
operating times, as verified through testing, and provided above, may be used to determine 
the point of main contact separation. 
The disturbance recording of Figure 43 indicates that the transient earth fault self-cleared in 
about 37 ms, which is about 49 ms before the neutral CBs main contacts opened for the EF 
(assuming an 86 ms total CB operating time for an EF >10 A, as tested). 
 
Figure 44:  Typical earth fault clearing by the TEFCS.  The neutral CB tripped in 98 ms and 
total fault clearing was achieved within 242 ms.  This recording is of a B-phase earth fault.  
Note that the actual earth fault current is about 208.6 A (2 * 104.3 A) as there are two 
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In the case of the EF disturbance recording displayed in Figure 44, for instance, the Farmers 
1 earth fault protection would only have tripped the feeder circuit breaker in 1.5 s, which is 
six times slower than the time taken by the TEFCS to clear the fault.   
Had this EF been due to a human contact incident the chances of survival, may have been 
much better with the TEFCS than with the standard protection on its own as the fault current 
was reduced from 208 A to about 18 A within 98 ms by opening of the neutral CB.  (Where 
18 A is the capacitive EF current as was measured for the trial site network during the 
commissioning tests.)   
Many factors influence the amount of current actually passing through the human/animal 
body during a contact incident making it very difficult, if not impossible, to state that one 
particular method of earth fault clearing is better than another.  Each contact incident will 
have different factors influencing the severity of injuries sustained, but it is felt that if the 
prospective fault current may be reduced to as low a level as possible within as short a time 
as possible, the survival rate of accidental electrical contact victims may be increased 
substantially.  This may be viewed in light of the fact that there are currently, with the existing 
conventional protection, electrical contact incident survivors.  The victims may have suffered 
burns, but they survived. 
In section 4.3 the assumption was made that a lower fault current may enable quicker fault 
clearing.  This assumption has been verified by TEFCS operations, and may be explained as 
follows: 
Of the 21 transient EFs experienced by the TEFCS trial site network thus far only one EF 
took longer than 2 s (but <10 s) to clear, as mentioned earlier in this section.  SEFs 
constituted 9 of the 19 transient EFs cleared by the TEFCS.  All 9 SEF operations would 
have taken at least 5 s to clear with the conventional protection, compared to the TEFCS’s 
average fault clearing time of 499 ms for all 19 transient EFs.  Also about 50% of the 
transient EFs were cleared in less than 200 ms. 
This then is a clear indication that by lowering the earth fault current it is indeed possible to 
dramatically decrease EF clearing times. 
It is very interesting to note that not in all instances did the fault current decrease upon 
opening of the neutral circuit breaker.  During commissioning testing the measured 
capacitive earth fault current for the complete network was about 18 A.  Performance history 
disturbance recordings show that there were four SEF instances with fault currents between 
4 and 6 A before the neutral CB opened.  In these cases the actual fault currents would have 
increased to about 18 A (capacitive) upon opening of the neutral CB, but the faults still 
cleared successfully.  Two of the four faults took between 1 and 2 s to clear and re-striking a 












  Page 110 
 
Figure 45:   This W-phase EF from the TEFCS trial site cleared within 220 ms, and the 
neutral CB opened within 75 ms.  Note that the actual earth fault current is 74.6 A as the 
neutral currents of the two NECRs in the substation needs to be summed to obtain the total 
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Figure 46:   This B-phase EF (unfortunately not displayed in this recording) from the TEFCS 
trial site cleared within 392 ms, and the neutral CB opened within 89 ms.  Note that the 
actual earth fault current is 270.0 A as the neutral currents of the two NECRs in the 
substation needs to be summed to obtain the total earth fault current. 
The disturbance in Figure 46 is the only TEFCS trial site recording exhibiting the strange 
neutral voltage waveform during the last 4 cycles just before the arc extinguished.  No 
explanation can be offered for this strange waveform other than that the fault point arc 
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Disturbance recordings from the TEFCS trial site, listed in Table 5, indicate that: 
• 12 of the 19 EFs cleared by the TEFCS cleared within 400 ms after the neutral CB 
opened. 
• 8 of the 19 EFs cleared by the TEFCS cleared within 200 ms after the neutral CB 
opened. 
• 2 of the 19 EFs cleared by the TEFCS cleared within 50 ms after the neutral CB 
opened. 
• The average trip time of the neutral CB for the 24 faults was 110 ms. 
• The shortest EF clearing time after the neutral CB opened was 40 ms. 
• The longest an EF fault took to clear was >2000 ms, but < 10 000 ms. (The 
disturbance recorder records for 2000 ms after the trigger point, and the neutral CB 
dead time was set to 10 000 ms.) 
• The average total fault duration time for the 19 EFs cleared by the TEFCS, but 
excluding the one fault that cleared between 2000 and 10 000 ms, was 499 ms.  
This is probably much faster in most cases than what the conventional protection will 
manage to clear the same fault.  Compare this to SEF protection which is normally 
set to trip between 4 to 15 s. 
• The longest physically recorded EF clearing time for the 19 EFs successfully cleared 
by the TEFCS was 1984 ms.  Only one of the EFs cleared by the TEFCS took longer 
than this to clear. 
• The maximum EF current recorded during the 24 EFs was 294 A. 
• The TEFCS cleared transient EFs much faster (499 ms on average) than 
conventional SEF or EF protection. 
• High magnitude EFs on average cleared faster than low magnitude EFs after neutral 
circuit breaker operation.  
• There is no need, thus far, to alter MV feeder SEF settings as all transient EFs 
encountered on the TEFCS trial site network cleared before any feeder protection 
operated.  From commissioning test results it was deduced that SEF settings may 
have to be made longer in order to allow more EFs to be cleared successfully.  
Fortunately the performance history suggests otherwise. 
• It should be noted that successful clearance of transient EFs downstream of fuses 
will depend on the fuse size and fault current magnitude.  Fuse saving may take 
place for low magnitude EFs. 
• Five transient EFs took between 1.1 and 2 s to clear successfully.  This finding may 
indicate a wrong assumption by Erroa [2006, 6] whereby he assumed that any earth 
fault lasting longer than 1 s is a permanent fault. 
The disturbance recording of Figure 47 indicates one instance where the EF was cleared 
very quickly.  Depending how one interprets the fault clearing, it may either have cleared 
within 44 ms after the neutral CB opened, or within 130 ms if one assumes that the fault only 
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Figure 47:   This B-phase EF from the TEFCS trial site cleared within 215 ms, and the 
neutral CB opened within 85 ms.  Note that the actual earth fault current is about 62.6 A as 
the neutral currents of the two NECRs in the substation needs to be summed to obtain the 
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Table 5:   Summary of the TEFCS trial site’s fault statistics.  Note that EF clearing times have been taken up to the point where the neutral voltage 
transient died away.  The tabled “Fault clearing time after circuit breaker opened” and “Total fault duration” are therefore very conservative times. 






















1 03/12/2010 02h07:01 88 47 135 125 EF 
2 14/12/2010 11h49:52 87 <5 s ±5s 152 EF:  The fault cleared in just under 5 s within the neutral CB’s dead time of 
10 s, but it seem that the fault re-established during the 30 s protection block 
time of the neutral CB as a downstream auto-recloser tripped and locked 
out.  This EF fault was caused by a jumper that pulled out of a clamp. 
3 22/12/2010 16h47:11 85 130 215 67 EF 
4 01/01/2011 08h27:15 86 (estimated) 0 71 214 EF:  Fault cleared about 10 ms before the neutral CB physically opened and 
did not re-strike, according to the disturbance recording. 
5 01/01/2011 12h58:23 75 145 220 74 EF 
6 02/01/2011 06h09:38 98 144 242 210 EF 
7 04/01/2011 15h29:10 88 173 261 294 EF 
8 05/01/2011 11h36:48 137 1141 1278 4.2 SEF 
9 06/01/2011 15h24:12 158 44 202 60 SEF to EF:  Fault started off as a SEF but escalated to an EF 
10 06/01/2011 17h01:06 124 202 326 52 SEF to EF:  Fault started off as a SEF but developed into an EF, which was 
cleared in 124 ms by the neutral CB.  The fault re-striked a few times and 
died down after 202 ms. 
11 08/01/2011 05h47:39 86 (estimated) 0 55 111 EF:  Fault cleared 49 ms before the neutral CB physically opened and did 
not re-strike, according to the disturbance recording. 
12 12/01/2011 07h49:15 89 303 392 270 EF 
13 18/01/2011 05h31:25 104 2 s < t <10 s >10 s 23 EF:  The fault cleared within the neutral CB’s dead time of 10 s, but it seem 
that the fault re-established during the 30 s protection block time of the 
neutral CB as a downstream auto-recloser tripped and locked out. 
14 19/01/2011 04h39:22 144 1840 1984 4 SEF: Fault re-striked many times before finally clearing. 
15 19/01/2011 04h40:52 153 (estimated) 601 754 7 to 10  SEF to EF:  Fault cleared about 40 ms before the neutral CB physically 
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another 1486 ms, according to the disturbance recording.. 
16 19/01/2011 04h41:37 153 1808 1961 8.4 SEF:  Fault cleared about 43 ms before the neutral CB physically opened, 
but re-striked again after 470 ms, extinguished and re-striked again, and 
extinguished finally after another 398 ms, according to the disturbance 
recording.. 
17 27/01/2011 20h44:42 153 40 193 5.8 SEF 
18 03/02/2011 14h40:21 99 182 281 45.3 EF 
19 03/02/2011 15h00:15 86 307 393 60 EF 
20 19/02/2011 16h08:19 143 235 378 5.4 SEF 
21 05/03/2011 21h49:12 104 1422 1526 23.8 SEF to EF:  Fault started off as a SEF but escalated to an EF 
22 06/03/2011 10h19:22 95 >2000 <10 000 161.3 EF 
23 07/03/2011 12h18:11 113 729 842 12.6 SEF to EF:  Fault started off as a SEF but escalated to an EF 
24 07/03/2011 17h18:29 92 1019 1111 265 EF:  The neutral CB ARCed three times before a downstream fuse operated 
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11. Conclusion 
The thesis proposed a unique transient earth fault clearing system (TEFCS) whereby 
transient earth faults on solid or low resistance earthed MV (or HV) networks may be cleared 
without customer supply interruptions, without compromising public safety and without 
compromising network integrity, if such networks conform, mainly, to the insulation 
requirements of such a TEFCS. 
No prior attempts to selectively clear transient earth faults on MV or HV networks have been 
revealed by the conducted literature study.   
Based on internationally verified MV network fault statistics, as stated in chapter 1, it is 
conservatively estimated that 80 out of every 100 earth faults are transient in nature and 
may therefore most likely be cleared by the TEFCS, without interrupting supply to 
customers.  If such a high transient earth fault clearing success rate is attainable in practice 
it will realize a significant improvement in network performance, quality of supply, customer 
satisfaction and perhaps also a reduction in lost revenue.  Performance of the TEFCS thus 
far attained a 79% success rate for all network earth faults, inclusive of permanent earth 
faults.  
Mainly three earthing methods inherently allow transient earth fault clearing.  These are the 
unearthed (or isolated neutral), high resistance earthed and resonant earthed (Petersen coil) 
methods.  
Capacitive earth fault current magnitude during the neutral circuit breaker’s dead time is 
dependent on the type of line construction (transposed or not), the combined length of lines 
connected to the same busbar, and whether underground cables or capacitor banks are part 
of the network or not.  Through the commissioning tests it was verified that longer lines do 
have higher capacitive fault currents, but it could not be verified that the chance of arcing at 
the fault point is increased with increase in line length, which is suspected what will happen.  
Interruption of capacitive current is more likely to cause arc re-striking due to current 
interruption (at zero crossing) taking place at a voltage maximum.  Arcing earth faults are 
therefore less likely to self-extinguish.  Success of the TEFCS may therefore be heavily 
dependent on the magnitude of the capacitive EF current in a given network, if one assumes 
that the spark gap to earth at the fault point is, and stays, relatively small (say 5 to 10 mm for 
an 11 kV network) for the duration of the earth fault.  
The proposed concept of transient earth fault clearing is based on the premise that during 
the dead time of the neutral CB the cause of the transient earth fault is allowed to drop free 
of the live overhead conductor or equipment, i.e. the fault point spark gap to earth is 
assumed to increase.  It is further assumed that arcing will quench faster due to the lower 
fault current during this period.  
When implementing the TEFCS on a low resistance earthed network, such as the Eskom 
MV distribution network where the earth fault current is limited to a maximum of 360 A per 
NECR, the customers will most likely not be aware of a problem on the network due to the 
low EF current.  This is especially true if the neutral current is interrupted without any 
intentional time delay upon EF detection, say within 120 ms.  Quality of supply loggers 
installed on the TEFCS trial site network during the commissioning tests did not reveal any 
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In a solidly earthed network the earth fault currents will most probably be in the order of 
thousands of ampere, depending mainly on the fault’s distance from the source transformer, 
as opposed to hundreds of ampere in a low resistance earthed network, with the result that 
the customers will most likely notice a dip in voltage with every earth fault, even if the neutral 
current is interrupted within about 120 ms.  This situation may in most cases be more 
acceptable to the customer than a complete loss of supply by auto-reclosing or tripping of a 
feeder circuit breaker or auto-recloser. 
This envisaged improvement in quality of supply and customer satisfaction comes mainly at 
the expense of installing a circuit breaker together with its associated protection in series 
with the substation transformer’s neutral connection to earth.  
The highest peak phase-to-earth overvoltage recorded during the TEFCS commissioning 
tests was 17.7 kV and during subsequent operations of the 11 kV TEFCS trial site a peak 
phase-to-earth overvoltage of 20.4 kV was recorded on the two healthy phases.  This 
translates into an overvoltage of about 2.3 times the normal 11 kV peak phase-to-neutral 
voltage, which confirms some of the claims made by a number of papers obtained during the 
literature study.  Total absence of very high overvoltages in the order of 3 to 6 times normal 
phase-to-neutral, as predicted by a number of literature sources [Allen & Waldorf, 1946, 305; 
Evans et al, 1939, 392; Glover, 1978 or later, D-2, & Uppal, 1984, 911], may possibly be 
attributed to the relatively low capacitive EF current of the trial site network.  It therefore 
seems quite plausible for higher peak overvoltages to manifest itself on networks with higher 
network phase-to-earth capacitance than the trial site network.  Peak phase-to-earth 
overvoltages of the order of 2.3 are not problematic for the trial site network as insulation 
levels of the Eskom distribution networks are sufficient to successfully withstand such 
temporary overvoltages. 
Due to the uncertainty regarding the extent of overvoltages attainable during arcing earth 
faults during the unearthed network period of the TEFCS, it is suggested that fault throw 
tests be conducted on each network before implementation of a TEFCS on said network.  
This should be done until such time as enough experience has been gained regarding the 
implementation of a TEFCS on the Eskom MV distribution networks.  
A TEFCS will improve customer supply quality and reduce customer losses by preventing 
nuisance supply interruptions.  Implementation of a TEFCS may lead to better SAIDI and 
SAIFI figures as some potential EFs may be prevented from escalating from transient to 
permanent EFs by fast operation of the neutral CB.  By the same token the electricity supply 
utility may experience a reduction in lost revenue and less equipment damage by high fault 
currents as a result of fast neutral CB operation.   
The TEFCS may also enhance the safety/survival rate of humans and animals during 
accidental contact incidents through fast reduction of the fault current, and possibly faster 
fault clearance than possible with conventional protection.  Many factors influence the 
amount of current actually passing through the human/animal body during a contact incident 
making it very difficult, if not impossible, to state that one particular method of earth fault 
clearing is better than another.  Each contact incident will have different factors influencing 
the severity of injuries sustained, but it is felt that if the prospective fault current may be 
reduced to as low a level as possible within as short a time as possible, the survival rate of 
accidental electrical contact victims may be increased substantially.  This may be viewed in 
light of the fact that there are currently, with the existing conventional protection (long 
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but they survived the ordeals.  The fact that the TEFCS protection does not have to be 
coordinated with any other protection on the given network presents an immense advantage 
over the conventional protection employed on all the Eskom MV networks.  It may therefore 
be set to operate for very low currents and in very short times as operation thereof does not 
result in any supply interruptions. 
Through studying the TEFCS’s operating history it was established (chapter 10) that by 
substantial lowering of EF currents it is indeed possible to dramatically decrease EF clearing 
times. 
Performance history of the low resistance earthed MV TEFCS trial site network of 217 km 
(including all spurs) over the period 24 November 2010 up to 16 March 2011 is very 
encouraging with a 79% successful earth fault clearance rate of all earth faults (19 out of 
24).  Feedback from the operator responsible for the trial site network is that there has been 
a noticeable reduction in call-outs due to network problems since implementation of the 
TEFCS.   
Successful operating history of the TEFCS should be viewed in contrast to a solid or low 
resistance earthed network without a TEFCS where customer supply would have been 
interrupted for almost 100% of the earth faults that occurred on the TEFCS trial site.  (Almost 
100% as it appears trial site operating history that two earth faults have cleared before the 
neutral circuit breaker physically opened.)   
Based on the commissioning test results and the TEFCS trial site performance history, it 
may be concluded that it is indeed possible to successfully implement the proposed TEFCS 
on (some) solid and low resistance earthed networks.  
The TEFCS trial site performance will be closely monitored over the next year, and if found 
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Annex A 
CAPACITANCE CALCULATIONS FOR A 3-PHASE OVERHEAD DELTA LINE 
CONFIGURATION WITH SYMMETRICAL OR UNSYMMETRICAL SPACING  
 
The following calculations of line capacitance-to-earth and between phases, are based on 
equations from the "Electrical Transmission and Distribution Reference Book", third edition, 




















System voltage: \ lin. lin. 
, 
_ lHO _ OJ v 
System frequency : f:_ lU Hz 
Conductor radiu s: , :_ 0.0011 m IHare co nduclor rad ius = I1mml 
'" _ f 
line length: 
Dw :_ ll1l m Db<: :_ 1.1 '0 m Doo:_ ll1l m 
Height of band c phase. above ground level : h" g :_ 6.S00 m 
Calculation:;: 
Phase_to_Ueutral Voltages: 
\"bn :_ \ lin. lin. ·(--O.l _ --O.SMj) 
{l 
_ _ (ISO) 
_ ""y. (R.(\ en) ,111\(\ cn)\-::-
h n _ 6.i l lxlO' V \-an_""y' _ 0 degree s 
I\"bnl _ ~ . i l l x 10' V \"bn_ony. _ ,'0 degree s 
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Phase_to _Pha.e Voltages: 
\be "" F I\bnl 
hb _ -9.l1~ x 10' _ j.~i X lO' 
\be _ O.201 _ Lli x lO~ 
_ , . , 




(Sc,tr. " " ., _co • • !2.e 18 "j ;" '1 ~om 
V. n . co .. "0 '. ;, oro .. to 0"' to. """' '' 
coo .. . r , l. (_1'~ co,'_) to< V,,) 
(Sc , tr. " " ., ""0 co • • (2. e 18 " j ; • .,.1 ~'''' Vb" 
", ... 'PO" ;, 0<0"' to 0" to. """" p" " 
' POI, ,<OO d"""'1 to< \!he; 
(Sc,tr. " '" 0 ....... ( • . ",,, ,.0 ;, 001 ~'m 
V'" " ...... ",1. '" = .. to 0" ' '" =- '" 
coo," . r , l. «,"" ,,., ' ... 1 ' ''' V'cl 
Determining the different distances between the three line conductor. and their mirror 
images beneath ground level a. indicated in the figure above : 
Heg _ H og 
eo _ l · Hc~. 
He _ hD 
Heg _ 
" 
hD _ 1 ' . ~ 




(T,;, , ",,"," ,<,- ",." ... m , ,,",, 
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::. - l l ,~ m 
h"bc _ EMS m 
Heb _ EMS m 
Hac _ l U ll m 
h"ba _ l U ll m 
Hab _ 11.611 m 
Hea _ IHlI m 
Equivalent distance between the three phase conductors: 
Oj 3, 
D' q" (Dab- Dk Dool D' q _I. UJ m 
.. . ... «.ea ._ . • OC 
Det ermining line capacitance to earth. and between phases. by using equations from 
"Electri cal Transmission and Distr ibution Reference Book ''. third edition, 1944, 
Westinghouse Electric, p509. 
(m') [ (~) ( or" )) ( JHe)) ( ('"0)) ( (&')) ( (HbO))] Dt _ ---;-:6 . " ~  . 2~\ -;;;- . 2 ~\ -;;:- + 2 2 1n D.b - 2 1n Dca ,lin Dbc 
D:_ DI _ D2 0 _ m .517 
M _ ("i'."lH~)}H~)) -H~))'l 
D 
I'F IKm 
KH _ ("i'."lH~)}H~)) -H~))'l 
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u"_ (~IH~)}H~)) -Hii;;))H~))l 
D 
C.b :_ Kab C.b _ 0.019"j p ll<m between" and c phases 
.oc _ (~IH~))H';;')) -H~)}Hii;;))l 
D 
Cb<: :_ Kb< Cb< _ O.OI911 pflkm between b.nd c phases 
Ceo :_ Kca Ceo _ 0.019"j pflkm between" and c phases 
, 
------"1b 
Pha ... _lO_Eanh Capacitances: 
C • • :_ Ka_Kab_Kco Coo _ 0.0)'i p ll< m to earth 
Cb. :_ Kb - Kab - Kbc Cb. _ 0.0.< I'f fkm to earth 
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Pha.e_IO_E~nh Capacitance. of the total line length : 
Conductor" to earth I ou! C •• _ i .Sl' 
Conductor b to earth I ou! Cb. -_ l in. lrn. th ·Cb. I ou! Cb. _ ! .Oi 
Conductor c to earth I ou! Cct _ ~.O' 
Pha.e_IO_Pha.e Capacitances of the total line length : 
Conductor" to b I ou! Cab :_ l in. lm. th ·C.b I ou! Cab _ 1.9Jl - - -
Conductor b to c I ou! Cbe _ l in. lm. th ·Cbo I ou! Cbe _ 1.911 
Conductor c to • I ou! Cea -_ l in. lm. th ·Cca I ou! Cea _ 1.9Jl 
Determining charging currents due to line capacitance to earth, and between phases. 
line Charging Current flowing 10 eanh for the a_. b_ and c_pha.es under normal conditions due to 
line capacitance between each phase and eanh. for the total line length : 
"di"", 
Icharg. _lin._ct._nomtal "" ~I otal_Cb. fl~f1:;] 






















In an Uneanhed Network: Line Charg ing Current fl owi ng to eart h for the b- . nd c -ph. se, wh en th ere is . n 
e.rt h f. ult on th e . -ph. se, due to li ne c.p.c it. nce between th e b- . nd c -ph. ses . nd e.rt h, fo r the tot. lli ne 
lengt h Un der th is co ndition th ere wi ll be lu ll ph. se-to-ph. se "" l .ge bet""en th e b-ph. se . nd e.rt h, . nd th e 
c -ph. se . nd e.rt h 
lch",g.),,,,Jb._"_to_. _ 6.%) - U .G6i 
lch"'g ' _lin. Jet _ "_to _ . _ mgl. :_ mgl.(R<{lch",g . _lin. Jet _ "_to _.) .Jm(lchMg. _lin. Jet _ "_to _ .)) 
For . ve ctor represent ation refer to th e fi gure below (FigJ re 4 of th e th es is ) 
lchatg . lin. Cb. norm.u 
lchatg . _lin. Jb. _ "_to _ • 
. .. . . .. . . ... . y ~ .... .. .... f~ ... .s~. !1. ! ~~ ~ .~~t ~ Tl'!i ........ -;;E-iF-"'-''''-'-'''''' 
Linuo-
• • ~h 
• o~ag" 
..... . t!!~.~~1 ~9· ",crt .... rtf, r, nct 
'. ':2-- ' . '00 
Note, 
It., - ,3" . nd I" - , 3,\ 
\\h~[j Ib . nd ~a[j tho 
normal pha, e~o-e.rth 
capaCItive clIITen!s 



















Une Charging Current, when there is an eanh fault on the a_pha ... , for the b_ and c_pha ... due 
to line capacitance between the a_phase and the b_pha ... , and between the a_pha ... and the 
c_pha ... , for the total line length: 
l eharg . _lin._Cbe _ r I oulJbo lh f l -~::] 
l eharg . _lin. _ Cbe _ mp. "" m.~.(l.(lchMg. _lin. Jbc) ,!m(lcharg. _lin. Jb<:» 
Summary of phase-to-earth and phase-to-phase li ne charging currents for an 






100 000 Ie •• ,. th o ph.",4o -eorth '''P'cOi',", CurTOnt, 
dumg an a-phase ea rtl1 1<OJl1 oed lab ~ \ and lea are 
the pha,e-tai>'1os, capac itive ",,,nt, = ~ . + Ic. 
and Ic• p",,"'."'" = \ ... lao + lea Omont 'oc dooo not 















Total line b-phase to earth capac it anoe 
Total line c -ph. se to e.rth c.pac it anoe 
Total line a- to b-"hase c.pac it ance 
Total line b- to c -"hase c.pac it ance 
Total line c - to . -"hase c.pac it ance 
Total line b-ph.se to e.rth charging current 
due to phase-to-€a rth c.pac it ance _ 
Cb, :_ I ou! Cb. 
C" _ Toto! Cet 
Cb. :_ Tot o! C.b 
Cbc :_ I ou! Cbe 
Coo _ I ou! Coo 
lb. :_ leh",,~. lin, Cb •• to • - - - ---
Total li ne c -phase to earth charging current l et :_ Ichar3' _lin, Jet _ a _ '0_ ' 
due to phase-t o-€arth c.pac itance _ 
Total li ne b- to a-"h.se charging curr, nt 
due to phase-t a-ph. se capac it ance -
Total li ne c - to a-"h.se charging curr, nt 
due to phase-to-ph. se ca"acitance-
Total capacit~'" fau lt curr"nt. If "" To . _ let 
lea :_ leh",,~. lin, Ceo 
If _ =.¢' _ anglt(Rt(lf ) ,1m(1f)) 
Cb, _ I.OJ 
" 
Cet _ ' .Oi " 
Cb. _ L9Jl 
" Cbo _ t.9 tt 
" Cea _ 1.911 
" 
11b.1 - tl .9l5 
Il et l _ t J.9l1 
lib. I - 6.Sl ' 
lie. I - ~ . Sl ' 
Total capacitive current flowing back o the source via the a-phase during an a-phase earth 
fault: 
~ may be see n from the diagram .b""" that Cb<l .nd Cab are effectivel y in para llel during an .-phase-to·earth 
ault. Th e same .ppl ies to Cce and Cca The total li ne charging current during an . -ph os e-to -earth f.ult "; l1 
hwefore b<l the "ectof s um of all four char in current s 
